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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Elections
1. Remedies for Employer Unfair Election Practices: NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson
Co.*
An employer's pre-election unfair labor practices may render a union
representation election invalid and may also prevent the holding of a fair sec-
ond election within a reasonable period of time. When a fair election is pre-
cluded by an employer's actions, union authorization cards obtained without
misrepresentation or coercion may provide a more accurate indication of a
union's majority status than the tainted election. Consequently, where the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (Board) finds that an employer has acted unfairly
during an election period, it may ignore the election results and order bargain-
ing on the basis of authorization cards, provided the Board also finds that the
employer's conduct makes holding a fair second election in the near future im-
possible.' In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.,' the Supreme Court held that it
was for the Board rather than for the courts to determine the effects of unfair
labor practices upon the election process, and that the courts should give the
Board's choice of remedy special respect.'
Nevertheless, during the Survey year, NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., 4 the
Ninth Circuit, while affirming the Board's order to set aside an election
because of the employer's violations of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (Act), 5
 overturned the Board's bargaining order and instead
ordered a new election. 6
 The court took this action because it disagreed with
the Board's conclusion regarding the effect of the violations upon the future
prospects for a fair election.' The case is significant because the court, despite
the holding in Gissel, substituted its own judgment for that of the Board, both in
• By Rachel Kurshan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
	' According to the National Labor Relations Act, 29
	
§,§ 151-169 (1976), upon a
finding of an unfair labor practice, the Board is empowered to "take such affirmative action . . .
as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. 160(c). In NLRB v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969), the Court held that the Board's remedies included the
issuance of a bargaining order.
• 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
• Id. at 612 n.32. The Court stated:
It is for the Board and not the courts, however, to make the determination, based
on its expert estimate as to the effects on the election process of unfair labor prac-
tices of varying intensity. In fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of
5 10(c) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 5 160(c)), the Board draws on a fund of knowledge
and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special
respect by reviewing courts.
Id.
▪ 606 F.2d 266, 102 L.R,R.M. 2576 (9th Cir. 1979).
• Id. at 268, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(1),
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.",
" 606 F.2d at 268-69, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
Id.
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its characterization of the seriousness of the unfair labor practices committed,
and in its conclusion as to the possibility of conducting a fair second election.
In Chatfield-Anderson, the union had petitioned the Board for an election
after the company refused to recognize the union as the employees' bargaining
representative even though the union had obtained authorization cards from a
majority of employees.' During the following month, the company's senior ex-
ecutives and supervisory personnel engaged in a series of practices designed to
inhibit employee support of the union. These practices included interrogating
employees about their union activities and sympathies, threatening plant
closure, imposing strict work rules, and withholding contemplated raises and
bonuses. 9 Additionally, management promised retroactive raises "after the
union was out of the picture,"" threatened to prolong negotiations with the
union, and announced an open door policy to improve communication be-
tween employees and management." The union lost the election and both
sides filed allegations of unfair labor practices with the Board." The Board
decided that the company had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act,' 3 and that the
violations precluded the holding of a fair second election within a reasonable
period of time." Therefore, on the basis of the number of authorization cards
the union had obtained, the Board ordered the company to recognize and
bargain with the union."
The case came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on application of
the Board for enforcement of its orders." The court first concluded that there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's findings of section
8(a)(1) violations." The court went on to find, however, that the circumstances
of the Chatfield-Anderson case did not warrant the Board's imposition of a
bargaining order." In reaching its decision, the court relied upon the Supreme
Court's opinion in Gisse1. 19 The court noted that Gissel had identified three
categories of pre-election wrongful employer conduct: (1) exceptional cases in
which a bargaining order definitely was warranted because of extreme and per-
vasive unfair labor practices; (2) less serious cases in which a bargaining order
still was appropriate because employer practices undermined the union's ma-
jority status and interfered with the conduct of a fair election; (3) minor cases in
which a bargaining order was not warranted because of the minimal effect of
the unfair labor practices." Based on its review of the Board's decision, the
B Id. at 267, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2577.
9 Id.
10 Id.
" Id.
12 Id.
Chatfield-Anderson Co., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 50, 50, 98 L.R.R.M. 1190, 1191
(1978).
' 4 Id. at 51, 98 L.R.R.M.. at 1192.
15 Id.
18 NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., Inc., 606 F.2d at 267, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2577.
17 Id. at 268, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578. The court characterized threats of adverse
economic consequences as "among the clearest forms of unfair labor practices." Id. at 267-68,
102 L.R.R.M. at 2577-78.
18 Id. at 269, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
18 Id. at 268-69, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
2° Id. at 268, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578 (discussing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613-15).
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court concluded that the Board had characterized the Chatfield-Anderson
violations as falling within the second Gissel category. 2 ' The court disagreed
with the Board's characterization, however, and decided that the violations
were outside the scope of both of the Gissel categories in which a bargaining
order was warranted. 22 In the court's opinion, the coercive effects of the
employer's unfair labor practices could be overcome. 23 The court stated that
the effects of the more severe violations, such as, threats of plant closure, were
mitigated by the president's eventual disavowals, and that the other violations
were "almost trivial. >24
The Chatfield-Anderson case shows a continued willingness in the Ninth Cir-
cuit to examine closely Board determinations that bargaining orders are
necessary to remedy pre-election unfair labor practices. 25 After stating that it
would not serve as a "rubber stamp" for Board decisions, the court proceeded
to consider both the seriousness of the pre-election unfair labor practices and
the possibility of remedying the violations. 26 The court's focus upon remedying
unfair labor practices that have tainted an election is consistent with its view
that bargaining resulting from a fair election is more desirable than a bargain-
ing order based upon authorization cards. 27
In keeping with its preference for elections, as opposed to bargaining
orders, as the better method for employees to express their desires, the Ninth
Circuit, even before Chatfield-Anderson, had shown a willingness to look closely
at all of the circumstances surrounding the unfair labor practices at issue. In
NLRB v. Western Drug," for example, the court reversed a Board decision to
issue a bargaining order, 25 and criticized the Board for "mechanically
appl[ying]" the Gissel criteria. 3° In Western Drug, the employer docked wages,
Id. The court criticized the Board's decision for its lack of specificity. Id. The court
noted that the Board characterized Chatfield-Anderson's violations as "pervasive" and "some-
times flagrant," but did not take this as proof that the Board placed the case within the first Gissel
category. Id, Instead, in the court's view, the Board's concern with the union's card majority
status indicated that the Board placed the violations within the second category. Id.
27 Id.
23 Id. at 269, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
" Id. The court agreed with Member Murphy's dissent in the Board decision, 236
N.L.R.B. 50, 52-53, 98 L.R.R.M. 1190, 1192-93 (1978), that the president of the company had
reduced the impact of supervisors' threats of plant closure by expressly disavowing any intent to
close the plant. 606 F.2d at 269, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
25 See, e.g., NLRB v. Western Drug, 600 F.2d 1324, 1327, 101 L.R.R.M. 3023, 3025
(9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Randall I'. Kane, Inc., 581 F.2d 215, 220, 99 L.R.R.M. 3022, 3025
(9th Cir. 1978). Other circuits have similarly shown a willingness to scrutinize closely bargaining
orders. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lloyd Wood Coal Co., Inc., 585 F.2d 752, 757, 100 L.R.R.M. 2028,
2032 (5th Cir. 1978) (employer unfair labor practices not so serious and extensive so as to support
a bargaining order); First Lakewood Associates v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416, 423-24, 99 L.R.R.M.
2192, 2198 (7th Cir. 1978) (Board's conclusion that the employer's serious and pervasive viola-
tions make a fair election unlikely is unsupported by specific findings).
" 606 F.2d at 268, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
27 Id.
" 600 F.2d 1324, 101 L.R.R.M. 3023 (9th Cir. 1979).
24 Id. at 1327, 101 L.R.R.M. at 3025.
'" Id. at 1326, 101 L.R.R.M. at 3024.
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reduced working hours, threatened and interrogated employees, promised
benefits, and solicited grievances in response to union organizing efforts. 3 '
Although the court agreed with the Board that the employer's misconduct was
serious enough to place the violations potentially within the second Gissel
category," the court determined that a second fair election could be held."
Since the employees affected by the unfair labor practices voluntarily had left
their employment for reasons unrelated to the employer's violations, and
because there was no indication that prior violations continued to affect current
employees, the court felt that a bargaining order was not warranted. 34
While Chatfield-Anderson, and its predecessor Western Drug, were both cor-
rect in their view that bargaining resulting from a fair election is preferable to
the use of authorization cards," the Chatfield-Anderson opinion can be criticized
for its substitution of the court's judgment for that of the Board majority. As
justification for its extensive review of this case, the court cited the Board's
failure to state specifically its reasons for concluding that a bargaining order
was necessary." While it is true that the Board did not identify plainly the
Gissel category in which the case fell, the Board did explain why it decided that
some of the violations were serious and could not be remedied by a second elec-
tion. For example, the Board concluded that because the president of the com-
pany previously had made numerous unlawful statements, his assurances that
the plant would not be closed could not erase effectively the earlier threats of
plant closure." Moreover, the Board considered that threats of plant closure,
along with other threats of economic retaliation, such as the withholding of
raises, the cessation of the pension and profit-sharing plans, the prolonging of
negotiations, and the denial of overtime, represented pervasive and flagrant
violations of section 8(a)(1). 38 While these statements of the Board are certainly
conclusory, the Supreme Court has held that it is for the Board to determine
the effects of unfair labor practices. 39
 In light of the broad discretion granted to
the Board, it would have been appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to remand the
case to the Board for substantiation of its conclusions." Instead of remanding
the case, however, the Chatfield-Anderson court merely substituted its own
analysis of the facts for that of the Board, and concluded that the employer's
violations were either minor or remediable through a second election. 4 ' It is dif-
" Id. at 1325, 101 L.R.R.M. at 3024.
32 Id,
" Id. at 1326, 101 L.R.R.M. at 3024.
" Id. at 1326-27, 101 L.R.R.M, at 3024-25.
See, e.g., Gissel, 395 U.S. at 603, wherein the Court stated that authorization cards
were "admittedly inferior to the election process."
39 606 F.2d at 268, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
" 236 N.L.R.B. at 51 n.6, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1192 n.6.
38 Id. at 51, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1192.
39 Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32. See text and note at note 4 supra.
40 See NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442-44 (1965). The Supreme
Court stated that it was appropriate to remand the case to the Board because the Board failed to
articulate reasons for its decision which would enable proper judicial review, M.
" 606 F.2d at 269, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
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ficult to reconcile the court's action with the Supreme Court's statement in
Gissel that deference is to be afforded to Board determinations regarding the ef-
fects of unfair labor practices. 42
As the Chatfield-Anderson case indicates, the labor practitioner should be
aware of the strong preference of the courts for the holding of fair elections in-
stead of relying upon union authorization cards in establishing a bargaining
relationship. This decision points out the extreme importance of articulating as
specifically as possible the reasons that the holding of a fair election would be
impossible following pre-election unfair labor practices. When the Board's
findings consist of merely conclusory statements, there is created a definite ten-
sion between the court's standard of review, which requires that Board findings
be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,'" and the re-
quirement that deference be given to the Board's determination of the effects of
unfair labor practices. In the absence of reasoned decision making by the
Board, the court cannot determine that the Board adequately weighed the ef-
fects of unfair labor practices, so as to meet the substantial evidence standard of
review. Therefore, unless the practitioner prevails upon the Board to explain
why certain unfair labor practices prevent the holding of a fair election, he is
inviting a reviewing court to overturn a bargaining order based upon the deter-
mination that the Board's findings are inadequately supported.
B. Bargaining Unit Determination
1. University Faculty: NLRB v. Yeshiva University*
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) first asserted jurisdiction
over a labor dispute at a university in 1970.' Within a year of that decision, the
Board approved the formation of a bargaining unit composed of university
faculty members. 2 At that time, the Board reasoned that a unit made up of
faculty members was appropriate because professional employees were in-
cluded expressly within the statutory coverage of the National Labor Relations
Act (Act),' and because the policymaking and quasi-supervisory authority
42 395 U.S at 612 n.32.
" 20 U.S.C. 5 160(e) (1976).
• By Rachel Kurshan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1275 (1970).
2 C.W. Post Center of Long Island University, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905, 77 L.R.R.M.
1001, 1003 (1971).
Id. (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 55 151-169 (1976)). Section 2(12)
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 152(12), indicates that an employee is not to be excluded from the Act's
coverage simply because he is a professional. The section provides in part:
The term "professional employee" means — (a) any employee engaged in work
(i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exer-
cise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation
to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a Held of
science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
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exercised by the full-time faculty as a group did not make them supervisors or
managerial employees:* The Board soon developed a three part rationale for
including faculty members within a bargaining unit: (1) faculty authority is ex-
ercised collectively rather than individually; (2) ultimate authority for universi-
ty decision-making rests with the board of trustees rather than with the faculty;
and (3) faculty members advocate their own interests rather than the interests
of management.' During the Survey year, however, in NLRB v. Yeshiva Universi-
ty, 6
 the United States Supreme Court held that the full-time faculty members of
Yeshiva University are managerial employees, and therefore are excluded
from the categories of employees entitled to protection under the Act.' While
the holding of the Court should be limited to the fact situation present at
Yeshiva, the decision can be expected to have a widespread impact upon facul-
ty unionization at many universities.'
Yeshiva was a private university operating eight graduate and five under-
graduate schools.' On October 30, 1974, the union filed a representation peti-
tion with the National Labor Relations Board seeking certification as the
bargaining agent for the full-time faculty members at ten of the thirteen
schools." The university opposed the petition on the ground that its faculty
members were managerial or supervisory personnel, and thus were not covered
employees under the Act." Hearings before a Boarcl-appointed.hearing officer
revealed that a central administrative hierarchy served all of the schools, with
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospi-
tal, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship
or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical proc-
esses . .
Id.
189 N.L.R.B. at 905, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1003. The Act provides that an employer need
not deem a supervisor as an employee. 29
	 $ 164(a). The term supervisor is defined in 29
U.S.C.	 152(11) to mean:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effec-
tively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing, the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.
5
 See, e.g., Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 250, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862, 1867
(1975); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 631, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634, 1637 (1974); Tusculum
College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 29-30, 81 L.R.R.M. 1345, 1347 (1972).
6 444 U.S. 672 (1980). The Supreme Court ruled that managers were not covered under
the Act in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974).
444 U.S. at 679.
8 See id. at 690 n.31. In justifying its determination of an appropriate bargaining unit,
the Board stated that the role and authority of Yeshiva's faculty in relation to hiring, promotion,
salary increases, granting of tenure and other areas of governance was not significantly different
from that of other university faculties in which the Board had certified a representative union.
Yeshiva University, 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1018 (1975). While the
Board may refine its analysis in future decisions according to the factors stressed by the Court, it
also can be expected that universities will emphasize the similarities between their institutions
and Yeshiva.
9 444 U.S. at 674.
lo Id.
" Id. at 675.
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ultimate authority vested in the board of trustees.' 2 The central administration
formulated university-wide policies, including general guidelines as to teaching
loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and fringe benefits.' 3 The
budget for each school was drafted by its dean or director, subject to approval
by the president.' 4 The individual schools within the university were headed by
a clean or director, and, beyond the limitations described above, their opera-
tions were substantially autonomous.' 5
The hearing officer also found that faculty members at each school formal-
ly and informally met to determine matters of institutional and professional
concern.' 6 Most of the schools had faculty committees concerned with various
areas of educational policy." These committees effectively determined each
school's curriculum, grading system, admission and matriculation standards,
academic calendar, and course schedule. 18 Faculty welfare committees
negotiated with administrators regarding salary and conditions of employ-
ment.' 9 Faculty members also made recommendations to the dean or director
concerning faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination, and promotion. 2°
Although the central administration made the final decisions on these issues
based upon the advice of the dean or director, most faculty recommendations
were followed. 21
In light of these facts, the Board, in December, 1975, granted the union's
representation petition and directed an election in a bargaining unit consisting
of full-time faculty members." The Board rejected the university's contention
that the faculty members were managerial and supervisory personnel and con-
cluded instead that they were professional employees covered under the Act."
In rejecting the university's position that faculty members should be excluded
under the Act, the Board reasoned, as it had in the past, that faculty decisions
were made on a collective ratherthan an individual basis, that faculty members
acted in their own interest rather than in the interest of the employer, and that
final decision-making authority rested with the board of trustees rather than
' 2 Id. Members of the board of trustees, with the exception of the president, did not hold
administrative positions at the university. Id. Four vice presidents oversaw medical affairs and
science, student affairs, business affairs, and academic affairs. Id. An executive council of deans
and administrators made wide-ranging recommendations to the president. Id,
13 Id.
" Id. Senior professors or department chairmen in some of the schools prepared budget
requests which were almost always approved by the school's dean or director. Id. These pro-
fessors were included within the bargaining unit. Id. at n.3.
Id, at 676.
' 6 Id. The only university-wide faculty body was the faculty review committee composed
of elected representatives who adjusted grievances through informal negotiations and who made
formal advisory recommendations to the president or the dean of the affected school. Id.
17 Id.
Id,
19 Id
20 Id. at 677.
2 ' Id.
22 Yeshiva University, 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1057, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1021 (1975)
(direction of election omitted). The unit included assistant deans, senior professors, department
chairmen, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors. Id., 91 L.R.R.M. at 1021.
" Id. at 1054, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1018.
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with the faculty. 24 The Board found no significant difference between faculty
roles at Yeshiva and at other universities where the Board previously had con-
cluded that faculty members were covered under the Act."
The union won the ensuing election and was certified by the Board. 26 The
university again asserted that the faculty members were managerial employees
and refused to bargain. 27 In an unfair labor practice proceeding brought by the
union, the Board ordered the university to bargain with the union." When the
university again refused to negotiate with the union, the Board sought enforce-
ment in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 29 The Second Circuit,
however, refused to enforce the Board's order, concluding that the faculty,
though professional employees under section 2(12) of the Act, nevertheless en-
joyed managerial status, and thus were excluded from coverage. 3 ° The Board
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court affirmed the
decision of the Second Circuit. 3 '
Before the Court, the Board argued as part of its rationale for the inclusion
of university faculty under the Act that the straightforward test of managerial
authority normally used by the Court could not he applied because professional
employees often appeared to be acting on behalf of management when they
were in fact performing routine job duties. 32 Therefore, the Board contended
that it was necessary to apply an "alignment with management" test," which
looked to whether a group of professional employees exercised its decision-
making authority in its own interest or on behalf of the employer. Using this
test, the Board asserted that it was reasonable for it to conclude that the
Yeshiva faculty was not aligned with management because the faculty exer-
cised independent judgment rather than conforming to management policies
and because its members were not evaluated according to their ability to effec-
tuate management positions." In its argument before the Court, the Board
stressed that one of the policy reasons behind excluding supervisory and
managerial employees from the Act's coverage was the danger that these per-
sonnel would assert union interests rather than representing management con-
cerns." In the Board's view however, faculty unionization at Yeshiva would
24 Id.
25 Id. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. Decisions that the university sought to
distinguish were: Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975);
University of Miami, 213 N,L.R.B. 634, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974); Adelphi University, 195
N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972); Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78
L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971); C.W. Post Center of Long Island University, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77
L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
" 444 U.S. at 679.
27 Id.
28 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (1977). The Board granted a motion for summary judgment,
holding that all of the issues raised by the university were or could have been litigated in the prior
representation proceeding. Id. at 598, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1602.
" NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1978).
30 Id. at 697-98, 703.
3 ' Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. at 691.
32 Id. at 683-84,
" Id. at 684.
34 Id.
" Id.
50	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:40
present no danger of divided loyalty between the union and the administration
because the faculty was expected to pursue independent professional values
rather than to advocate university interests. 36
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, rejected the Board's con-
tentions. 37
 Instead it centered on whether the faculty members at Yeshiva were
"managerial employees." 38
 The Court defined managerial employees as those
who "formulated and effectuated management policies by expressing and
making operative the decisions of their employer. "39
 As a result of this defini-
tion, the Court rejected the Board's argument that the status of professional
employees should be determined according to the "alignment with manage-
ment" test." The Court was critical of the "alignment with management" ra-
tionale because the Court did not consider the interests of the faculty and ad-
ministration to be separable." According to the Court, both groups pursued
common goals of academic excellence and institutional distinction. 42
 The
Court also disputed the Board's assertion that the divided loyalty of the faculty
between the union and the administration was not a problem. 43
 The Court
stated that the faculty's professional expertise was necessary in order to formu-
late and implement academic policy." The Court reasoned that the Yeshiva
faculty members were managerial employees because they exercised authority
that would be considered managerial in any other context. 45
 The Court
analogized the situation at Yeshiva to an industrial model, stating that the
faculty determined within each school "the product to be produced, the terms
upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served. "46
Four Justices joined in a dissenting opinion that supported the Board's
method of analysis and its conclusions.'" Justice Brennan, in writing the dis-
sent, agreed with the Board that the appropriate inquiry in determining
36 Id. The same rationales underlie the exclusion of managerial employees from
coverage under the Act as supervisors. Id. at 694-95 (Brennan, J,, dissenting opinion). If super-
visors represented the rank and file, they might become accountable to the workers, interfering
with their ability to advance management interests. Id. at 695.
" Id. at 691.
38 Id. at 686. Because the Court concluded that faculty members were managerial and
thus excluded from the Act's coverage, it did not discuss their supervisory status. Id. at 682.
38 Id. at 682 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974)).
40 See id. at 686-87.
41
 Id. at 688.
42 Id.
4 ' Id. at 689.
" Id. While the Court acknowledges that there was some tension between the Act's in-
clusion of professional employees and its exclusion of managerial personnel, id. at 686, the Court
noted that the Board had not inquired previously as to whether employees' decisions were based
on independent professional judgment or upon management policy when determining their
managerial status. Id. at 687. The Court cautioned that the managerial exclusion could not be
used to remove all professionals from the Act's coverage. Id. at 690. Instead, the duties of a pro-
fessional would align him with management only if his activities fell outside of the scope of the
duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals. Id.
" Id. at 686.
" Id. The Court acknowledged that a professor performing governance functions may
be held less accountable for departures from institutional policy than a middle-level industrial
manager, but the Court found this distinction to be immaterial. Id. at 689.
" Id. at 692, 694.
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managerial status was whether an employee in performing his duties acted
primarily upon his own behalf or in the interest of his employer." If an
employee was not expected to conform with management policies and was not
judged by his effectiveness in carrying out these policies, then it was unlikely
that unionization would lead to divided loyalty, which the Act's managerial ex-
clusion was designed to avoid." The dissent pointed out that university pro-
fessors were not expected to represent management interests, since they were
judged by the quality of their teaching and scholarship, rather than by their im-
plementation of administrative policy. Therefore, unionization created no con-
flict of interest." The dissent also rejected the majority's contention that the in-
terests of the faculty and the administration were indivisible." In the dissent's
view, the fact that the faculty and administration shared interests did not mean
that their concerns were identical, as evidenced by the faculty's desire for
unionization," The dissent noted that the university administration operated
under economic and fiduciary constraints, while the primary concerns of facul-
ty members were academic and related to their own professional reputations."
Having concluded that the Board analyzed the faculty role at Yeshiva in light
of the purposes of the Act's exclusion of supervisory and managerial
employees, the dissent stated that the Court should have upheld the Board's
decision. 54
The Yeshiva decision can be expected to have a significant impact upon
Board characterizations of university faculty members as non-managerial
employees. The Court's reasoning marks the demise of the Board's traditional
three-part rationale, 55 which frequently led the Board to conclude that full-time
faculty members were not managerial employees." The Court's comparison of
the responsibilities of faculty members with the job duties of employees in in-
dustrial settings makes it likely that fewer faculty members will be included in
bargaining units certified by the Board."
" Id. at 695-96.
49 See id. at 696.
5° Id. at 699-700.
51 Id. at 700-01.
52 Id. at 701-02.
" Id. at 701. The dissent pointed out that the interests of employees and employers
never totally diverged, since both sought to maintain a viable operation and to produce a quality
product. Id. The dissent stated that university decision-making today hardly resembled the ma-
jority's idealized notion of collegial decision-making that was a vestige of medieval universities.
Id. at 702. The Court noted that the trend towards administrative decisions based upon financial
concerns increasingly has eroded the faculty's role in the university decision-making process. Id.
at 703.
" Id. at 705-06.
" See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
56 See, e.g., Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975);
University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974); Adelphi University, 195
N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972).
" See Trustees of Boston University v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301, 98 L.R.R.M. 2070 (1st
Cir. 1978), vacated, 445 U.S. 912 (1980). The First Circuit applied a test that was nearly identical
to the Board's assessment in Yeshiva in order to determine whether department chairpersons
were supervisory or managerial employees. The court examined the relative amount of interest
of chairpersons in furthering the policy of the administration as opposed to the interests of
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The dissenting opinion in Yeshiva represents a different approach toward
judicial review of Board decisions than that undertaken by the majority. The
dissent took the position that judicial authority was restricted to the review of
Board decisions for their rationality and for their consistency with the Act. 58 In
the dissent's view, the Board had considered the nature of governance at
Yeshiva in light of the purposes underlying the Act's exclusion of supervisory
and managerial personnel, so that the Board's determination that a faculty unit
was appropriate should have been upheld by the Court. 59 The dissent noted
that it agreed with the Board's conclusions based upon the facts of this case. 6°
The dissent stated, however, that even if it had made a different determination,
it would have upheld the Board's decision because the Board used an appropri-
ate method of analysis and reached a rational result. 6 ' The majority, like the
dissent, asserted that it reviewed the Board's decision for its rationality in
evaluating the articulated facts and for its consistency with the Act. 62 The ma-
jority stated, however, that it found neither criterion satisfied. 63
While the Board's decision may be criticized, it is incorrect to conclude, as
did the majority, that it was irrational. The majority correctly asserted that the
interests of the Yeshiva faculty and management were not as separable as the
Board represented." The majority, however, completely ignored the difference
between the faculty's and management's primary concerns. The Court's label-
ing of the Board's opinion as irrational merely enabled the majority to
substitute its own judgment as to the proper method of analysis of the faculty's
managerial status. The approach of the dissent is more consistent with the
Court's statement in an earlier case that it was up to the Board, rather than the
judiciary, to adjust national labor policy to the changing patterns of industrial
life." There are no clearcut boundaries between professional employees, who
expressly were included within the Act, 66 and managerial employees, who have
been excluded from coverage. 67 The structure of labor-management relations
is not readily transferable from an industrial to a university setting. The dissent
correctly reviewed the Board's decision and determined that the Board proper-
ly both had examined the purposes behind the Act's supervisory and manageri-
al exclusion and had considered these reasons when it concluded that the Act
covered faculty members. The majority, on the other hand, claimed to be using
members of the bargaining unit. 575 F.2d at 305, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2073. The First Circuit
agreed with the Board that chairpersons were aligned with faculty members rather than with the
adtninistration because department chairpersons consulted with the faculty before making
recommendations, and because final decisions were made by the president of the university and
the hoard of trustees rather than by chairpersons. Id. at 305-06, 98 L.R,R.M at 2073-74. The
Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit's opinion presumably for the reasons articulated in
Yeshiva.
50 444 U.S. at 693-94.
59 It at 705-06.
60 Id. at 706.
61
62 It at 691.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 688.
65 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1974).
66 See 444 U.S. at 705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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the same standard of review, while it substituted instead its own judgment as to
the relationship of the Act to an industrial setting.
The Yeshiva decision can be expected to make it much more difficult for
faculty members to achieve protected status under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. Because the Supreme Court in effect ignored the differences between
authority structures in the typical industrial and academic settings, the tradi-
tional professional duties of faculty members will often be classified as
managerial. Rather than making a broad determination of the faculty's align-
ment with management as opposed to representation of its own professional in-
terests, the Court has mandated a factually based assessment of the control and
authority actually asserted by faculty members. Only if the desires of the facul-
ty and administration are antagonistic will faculty members be classified as
nonmanagerial employees. The attorney representing the faculty union
therefore, should attempt to demonstrate that the administration frequently
overrules faculty decision-making, and that there are significant areas of
university governance in which the faculty exercises no authority. Conversely,
the labor lawyer representing the university should therefore seek to show
similarities between the faculty's active participation in governance at Yeshiva
and at the institution which he represents.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. Representation at Investigatory Hearings: Baton Rouge Water Works Co. *
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court held
that an employee has a statutory right to union representation at an investiga-
tory interview with his employer if the employee requests representation and
reasonably believes that the interview may result in disciplinary action being
taken against him. 2 An employer who requires an employee to attend such an
interview without union representation, the Court held, violates section 8(a)(I)
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 3 by interfering with the individu-
al right of the employee, protected by section 7 of the NLRA, 4 to engage in
. .. concerted activities for . .. mutual aid or protection . . . The Court in
Weingarten noted that the National Labor Relations Board (Board) had drawn a
* By Adelbert L. Spitzer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
Id. at 268.
Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
title.''' 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(1) (1976).
• Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 252.
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distinction between "investigatory" and "disciplinary" interviews. 6 At an in-
vestigatory interview the employer is trying to investigate and determine the
facts of a situation, while at a disciplinary interview the employer is already
aware of the facts to his satisfaction and seeks to obtain an admission of the em-
ployee's wrongdoing.' Although Weingarten recognized the right to union repre-
sentation at either an investigatory or a disciplinary interview, the decision did
not indicate whether a similar right to representation exists if an employer
seeks to meet with an employee, not to obtain information or an admission, but
simply for the purpose of announcing a predetermined disciplinary decision.
During the Survey year, the Board confronted this issue in Baton Rouge
Water Works Co.,' and resolved a conflict, which had developed subsequent to
Weingarten, between two Board decisions — Certified Grocers of California, Ltd. 9
and Amoco Oil Co. 10 A divided Board in Baton Rouge held that an employee has
no section 7 right to union representation at a meeting held solely to inform
him of a previously made disciplinary decision." The Board noted, however,
that at any interview, whether deemed "investigatory" or "disciplinary,"
where the employer seeks to do more than simply announce his disciplinary
decision, the employee has a section 7 right to representation."
The question of whether Weingarten applied to meetings held solely to an-
nounce a predetermined disciplinary decision was First confronted by the Board
in Certified Grocers. This case involved a plant manager who was dissatisfied
with an employee's low productivity and, after an initial warning, called the
employee into his office to impose a two week disciplinary layoff." When the
employee came to the manager's office he requested to have his union repre-
sentative present and to see his production records." Both requests were
denied.' 5 The manager stated that the company had reviewed the employee's
work, that it was still not satisfactory, and that he was, therefore, issuing
another warning and a two week layoff." The meeting then terminated. In
response to the union's petition on behalf of the employee, the Board held that
the manager had violated the employee's section 7 rights by continuing the
meeting without allowing the employee's union representative to be present."
The Board emphasized that the role of the union representative was both to as-
6 Id. at 259-60.
This distinction was first expressed in Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 362, 66
L.R.R.M. 1296, 1297 (1967), enf'l denied, 408 F.2d 142, 170 L.R.R.M. 3045 (5th Cir. 1969).
103 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1979).
9 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 94 L.R.R.M 1279 (1977), eel denied, 587 F.2d 449, 100
L.R.R.M. 3029 (9th Cir. 1978).
'° 99 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1978).
" 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
" Id.
Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1211-12, 94 L.R.R.M. at
1280.
" Id.
15 Id
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1212, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1283. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to enforce the decision of the NLRB. NLRB v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 587
F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1978). The court emphasized that the employee did not have the right to
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sist the employee and to see what bearing the meeting might have on other em-
ployees in the unit.'Thus, under the holding in Certified Grocers, an employee
had the right to union representation at any meeting, whether or not an "inter-
view" in the traditional sense of the word, where the employee reasonably
believed that discipline might be imposed.
Almost two years later, the Board in Amoco Oil Co." substantially reduced
the scope of the Certified Grocers holding. In Amoco an employee had been called
into his superintendent's office for the purpose of being given an indefinite sus-
pension notice. 20 When the employee insisted upon union representation, the
superintendent responded by announcing the disciplinary decision and termi-
nating the meeting. 21 The Board held that the superintendent had not violated
the employee's section 7 rights because he promptly terminated the meeting
after the employee had requested union representation. 22 There was no men-
tion in the decision of the need to have a union representative present to
evaluate the effects of the discipline on the other employees. The Board distin-
guished Certified Grocers by stating that the employer there had continued the
planned interview and had commented negatively on the employee's .work
after the request for representation had been made." Although this distinction
is plausible, both situations were in fact quite similar in that both primarily in-
volved announcing a predetermined disciplinary decision. Thus, in spite of the
holding in Amoco that an employer could announce a disciplinary decision at a
meeting without allowing union representation, it was not clear at what point
union representation had to be granted.
The Board in Baton Rouge cleared up the uncertainty that existed in the
wake of Certified Grocers and Amoco by expressly overruling Certified Grocers and
holding that an employee does not have a right to union representation at a
disciplinary announcement and that a discussion instigated by the employee
does not transform a disciplinary announcement into an interview where the
Weingarten rights apply. 24 The complaining employee in Baton Rouge worked in
the general office department of the respondent company, where she was classi-
fied as a "probationary employee," as were all of the respondent's new em-
ployees for the first 120 days of employment." Near the end of the employee's
probationary period, her supervisor reported to the manager of the general of-
fice department that the employee was not performing her duties in a satisfac-
tory manner. 26 After consultation with an assistant vice-president and addi-
tional observation of the employee, the decision was made to discharge her and
union representation because no "discussion or consultation" occurred or was even con-
templated. Id. at 451. Rather, the meeting was held solely "to deliver the warning notice." Id.
The court cited Mt. Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977), and NLRB v,
Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976).
la Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1213, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1282.
' 9 99 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1978).
20 Id. at 1251.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
2* Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
" Id. at 1056.
25
 Id.
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a discharge form was filled out. 27 Three days later, the employee was called in-
to her supervisor's office and told that because "things were not working out,"
she was being discharged. 28 The employee responded by arguing that the
discharge was unfair and requested the presence of her union representative. 29
The superintendent in turn told the employee that she was not entitled to union
representation because of her probationary status." During this discussion the
assistant personnel manager walked into the office and the employee asked him
whether she was entitled to union representation. 3 ' He confirmed the
superintendent's ruling that she had no right to union representation." Then,
in response to the employee's demand to know why she was being fired, the
personnel manager answered that it was a departmental decision and that the
company could not use her services. 33 The manager of the general office
department then entered the office and discussed with the employee the latter's
work performance, offering several specific examples of poor performance in
the past. 34 Soon after this discussion the meeting ended.
Upon learning of this meeting; the union petitioned the Board, claiming
that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by refusing the em-
ployee's request for union representation and then . continuing the meeting
without a representative present. 35 In a plurality opinion, Members Jenkins
and Truesdale for the Board concluded that there had been no violation of sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and held that "under the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten,
an employee has no right to the presence of his union representative at a
meeting with his employer held solely for the purpose of informing the em-
ployee of, and acting upon, a previously made disciplinary decision. "36 They
found that despite the discussion that ensued after the discharge announcement
was made, the meeting was not one where the Weingarten rights applied. 37
Members Jenkins and Truesdale stressed, however, that they were not holding
that there is no right to union representation at any disciplinary interview."
'They noted that if an employer were to inform an employee of a disciplinary
action, and then seek facts to support the action, attempt to have the employee
acknowledge his wrongdoing, or urge the employee to sign a statement, the
right to union representation would attach. 39 If, however, the employee begins
a discussion of the reasons for the disciplinary measures, this fact alone will not
convert the meeting into one where the Weingarten rights apply."
The Board commented that although Certified Grocers had been decided in-
" Id. at 1057.
26 Id,
" Id.
la Id.
21 Id.
" Id.
"
34 Id
35 Id.
36
	at 1058.
37 Id.
38 Id.
"
'° Id.
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correctly, the decision properly had abandoned the distinction between investi-
gatory and disciplinary interviews.' Henceforth, the right to representation
would exist at either type of interview, except for "those conducted for the ex-
clusive purpose of notifying an employee of a previously determined discipli-
nary action. " 42 The Board stated that if it were to apply Weingarten to meetings
held only for the purpose of announcing disciplinary actions, employers would
simply forego such meetings and return to using the " 'pink slip,' a result
which . . . would serve neither the interest of the employee nor any objective of
enlightened labor relations policy.""
In a concurring opinion seeking to clarify the Board's position, Member
Murphy drew a distinction between "interviews" held to secure information
from the employee, where the Weingarten rights apply, and disciplinary "ac-
tions," where they do not." In applying this distinction to Baton Rouge, she
concluded that the meeting at issue was only a disciplinary action because the
discussion that developed was caused by the employee's protestations and
management's inability to end the confrontation gracefully." The employer
was not seeking information or an admission from the employee. 46
Chairman Fanning, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with the other
members that if an employer simply makes a discharge announcement, no
right to union representation arises." He argued, however, that if an employer
proceeds to discuss an employee's work record, the employee then has the right
to union representation because the disciplinary action has been transformed
into a disciplinary interview." Chairman Fanning objected that the majority
interpreted Weingarten too narrowly and ignored the earlier case law that estab-
lished the right to union representation at disciplinary interviews." What
began as a discharge announcement to the Baton Rouge employee became a
discussion of the employee's work record; at that point, Chairman Fanning
concluded, the Weingarten right to union representation properly could have
been invoked."
Member Penello also dissented, and although his position was essentially the
same as that of Chairman Fanning, he stressed that the right violated by Baton
Rouge Water Works was fully established prior to Weingarten. 5 ' In offering a
detailed history of pre-Weingarten case law, Member Penello stated that the
Board's initial position was that there is a right to union representation at
disciplinary, but not at investigatory interviews." The Board then expanded the
4I Id.
42 Id.
" Id. at 1059.
Id.
" Id. at 1060.
46 id.
47 Id.
" Id.
49
 Id, , n.13.
50 Id.
5 ' Id. at 1061.
32 Member Penello cited, inter alia, as examples of the earlier position, Texaco Inc., Pro-
ducing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967), elf t denied, 408 F.2d 142, 70
L.R.R.M. 3045 (5th Cir. 1969); Dayton Typographical Services, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 357, 72
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right to union representation, stated Member Penello, to investigatory inter-
views where the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would
result from the investigation." He noted that this expansion was approved by
the Supreme Court in Weingarten." Member Penello stressed that because
Weingarten was based upon the previously established section 7 right to union
representation at any disciplinary interview, the majority's holding was a
"legal impossibility" that undercut the very foundation of Weingarten."
The Baton Rouge decision is significant because it formally abandoned the
distinction between disciplinary and investigatory interviews and because it
clearly defined when the section 7 right to union representation does and does
not exist. Although an employee has the right to union representation at "in-
terviews" with his employer, he does not have such a right if the employer
simply announces a disciplinary action. An employee's protestations or request
for information will not suffice to transform a disciplinary action into an inter-
view, even if some discussion of the employee's work ensues. This holding thus
clears up the uncertainty that existed after the Certified Grocers and Amoco deci-
sions as to when the right to union representation exists.
Several factors favor the Baton Rouge decision. Despite Member Penello's
dissatisfaction with the changing course of the Board's decisions in regard to
the right to union representation at employer-employee meetings, the develop-
ment of the law in this area exemplifies what the Supreme Court referred to in
Weingarten as the "evolutional approach," which it concluded is particularly
fitting for administrative agencies. 56 As the Court noted in Weingarten, it is
essential that the Board be able to change its position in response to
developments in industrial life and unfolding variant situations." The Board
responded in Baton Rouge to what it saw as the unsatisfactory distinction be-
tween investigatory and disciplinary interviews and to its impression that an
employee does not have a substantial need for union representation at meetings
held simply to announce a disciplinary action, where the employer does not
seek information or an admission from the employee."
Contrary to the assertion of Chairman Fanning that the majority inter-
preted Weingarten so narrowly as "virtually to destroy the concept from which it
sprang," 5 " the protection afforded an employee by Weingarten was not seriously
L.R.R.M,, 1073 (1969); and Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 78
L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971).
" Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1063. Member Penello found this
expansion in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), enf't denied, 481
F.2d 1018, 83 L.R.R.M. 2817 (4th Cir, 1973), reu'd sub nom. International Ladies Garment
Workers Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 416 U.S. 968, 88 L.R.R.M. 2698 (1975); Mobil Oil
Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972), enf't denied, 482 F.2d 842, 83 L.R.R.M.
2823 (7th Cir. 1973); andj. Weingarten, Inc,, 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 82 L.R.R.M. 1559 (1973),
enf't denied, 485 F.2d 1135, 84 L.R.R.M. 2823 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 251, 88
L.R.R.M. 2689 (1975).
" Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1064.
" Id. at 1065.
" NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 265.
57 Id.
58 Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058-59.
" Id. at 1060 n.3.
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diminished by Baton Rouge. An employer who wishes to interview an employee,
in the sense that he wishes to obtain some information or an admission from the
employee, must still abide by Weingarten. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated in Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB," "it is the presence of an in-
vestigatory element which gives rise to the right [to union representation]." 6 ' If
an employer does seek information or an admission of any kind from the em-
ployee, the employee can demand union representation, and the employer
must either terminate the interview or allow the representative to be present. 62
An employee cannot be punished for insisting upon this right." Baton Rouge
simply holds that when an employer seeks only to make a disciplinary an-
nouncement, an event that hardly can be described as an interview, the em-
ployee has no right to representation." The employee's recourse at this point,
if he feels the discipline imposed is unjust, is the grievance procedure."
What has been taken away from employees and their unions by the Baton
Rouge decision is the right to have the union observe disciplinary meetings that
might have an effect on the other employees in the unit in addition to the
employee being disciplined. A union representative would be of little use if no
more occurred at a meeting than an announcement, but when an evaluation of
the employee's work occurs at a meeting, as it did in Baton Rouge, these matters
are of great importance to the union and to the individual workers in the unit.
The Board in Baton Rouge, however, concluded that formal grievance pro-
cedures can protect workers' interests, for it stated:
Contrary to the contention of the majority in Certified Grocers, such
a conversation or discussion [of the employee's work] between the
employer and the employee does not require the presence of the
union representative to inform the employee of his rights and the sup-
port the employee might expect from the union, or to elicit informa-
tion necessary for the protection of the interests of the other
employees in the unit. Once a disciplinary decision has been made by
the employer, the proper forum for the discussion and evaluation of
that disciplinary action shifts to the grievance procedure."
The formal grievance procedure, however, would not be as capable of reveal-
ing the stated and unstated expectations of the employer as would union repre-
sentation at disciplinary meetings where the representative could observe the
informal exchange between the employer and employee. Furthermore, an em-
ployee who is being disciplined might not understand fully the evaluation of his
work that takes place at the disciplinary meeting. When he resumes work he
might be subjected to additional discipline simply because he has not under-
stood completely the employer's evaluation. The presence of a union represen-
tative at a disciplinary meeting where the employee's work is discussed could
help all the employees better understand why the discipline is being imposed.
60 587 F.2d 403, 99 L.R.R.M. 2841 (9th Cir. 1978).
61 Id. at 411-12, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2846.
62 Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
63 See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223, 94 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1977).
64 Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 103 L.R.R.M, at 1058.
" Id., n.3.
66 Id.
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The Baton Rouge decision clarified an area of the law that had been left
unclear by the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten. By dropping the dis-
tinction between disciplinary and investigatory interviews, a distinction that
had never been well defined, the Board simplified matters considerably. The
distinction that now must be made in each case is between interviews, where the
employer actively seeks information-or an admission from the employee, and
disciplinary announcements. Although the protection offered an employee by
Weingarten is not limited dramatically by Baton Rouge, the bargaining unit as a
whole has lost an important right to have a representative present when an
employee initiates a discussion and evaluation of his work at a disciplinary an-
nouncement.
2. Discharge of Supervisors for Union Activism: DRW Corp.*
The National Labor Relations Act (Act or NLRA) denies supervisors pro-
tection from discharge or discipline for engaging in union or other concerted
employee activities.' During the Survey year, however, the NLRB, in DRW
Corp., 2 held that the firing of a supervisor for engaging in union activities is an
unfair labor practice and constitutes a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Acts
when the firing is part of a pattern of conduct by the employer intended to in-
hibit employee exercise of their section 7 4 rights.' When an employer creates an
atmosphere of coercion in which it is impossible for the employees to determine
whether the employer is legitimately exercising power to prohibit union activity
among supervisors or whether the employer is improperly interfering with the
employees' right to engage freely in union activity, the Board ruled that restor-
ation of the status quo ante is required to dissipate fully the coercive effect. 6 Such
a restoration requires reinstatement of all individuals affected, including super-
visors.'
For policy reasons the NLRA specifically excludes supervisors from its
protection. The congressional purpose in creating this exclusion was twofold:
to ensure that rank-and-file employees can unionize and select their leaders
without undue influence from supervisors in the union, and, to ensure that
• By Eric Wilson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
See Gorman, LABOR LAW 33-37 (1976).
7 DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 103 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1980).
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1976).
• Section 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C.	 157 (1976).
• DR W, 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 4, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
• Id., slip op. at 5, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
Id. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
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supervisors remain loyal to their employer and do not fall into league with, or
become accountable to, the employees that they are charged to supervise.' This
policy is effectuated by sections 2(3) and 14(a) of the Act. Section 2(3) expressly
excludes supervisors from the definition of employee under the Act. 9 Section
14(a) provides that no employer covered by the NLRA shall be forced, for the
purpose of collective bargaining, to treat as an employee any individual defined
by the Act as a supervisor.'° Thus, although it allows supervisors to become
union members," the Act does not provide supervisors the same right to organ-
ize that it grants to other employees.
The Board implemented this congressional policy in decisions that recog-
nized an employer's prerogative to discharge supervisors for union activism in
order to assure their loyalty to management. As long as the action reasonably
was adapted to this end, the Board allowed such employer actions: 2 Despite
the Act's clear policy of permitting supervisor dismissals for union activity,
however, the Board, even before DR W, had held that in certain limited cir-
cumstances the discharge of a supervisor may violate section 13(a)(1) of the Act.
For example, the Board found such a violation when a supervisor was fired for
giving testimony adverse to the employer's interest either at NLRB pro-
ceedings," or at a hearing of an employee's grievance under a collective bar-
gaining agreement: 4 Additionally, the Board made similar rulings in cases
where supervisors were discharged for reasons, such as, not informing the com-
pany about union activity among rank-and-file employees," not complying
fully with the employer's instructions to keep the union out of the plant," not
cooperating with a company plan to classify supervisors as operators for the
purpose of the eligibility list to be used in an NLRB election," or not partici-
pating in the discriminatory discharge of an employee." Supervisors were af-
B Gorman, supra note 1, at 34.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
'° 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). The section also states: "Inlothing herein shall prohibit
any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor
organization . . . ." Id.
" See note 10 supra.
12 See, e.g., Stop and Go Foods, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 103 L.R.R.M, 1046
(1974); L & S Enterprises, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (1979). The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the Act permits "employers to discharge supervisors without violating the Act's re-
straints against discharges on account of union membership." Beasley v. Food Fair of North
Carolina, 416 U.S. 653, 654-55 (1974).
13 Better Monkey Grip Company, 115 N.L.R.B. 1974, 38 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1956),
enf'd, 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957); Modern Linen and Laundry Ser-
vice, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1974, 39 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1956); Oal-Tex Optical Company, Inc., 131
N.L.R.B. 715, 48 L.R.R.M. 1143 (1961), enf'd, 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962); Oil City Brass
Works, 147 N.L.R.B. 627, 56 L.R.R.M. 1262, enf'd, 357 F.2d 466, 61 L.R.R.M. 2318 (5th
Cir. 1966).
Ebasco Services, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 768, 73 L.R.R.M. 1518 (1970); Rohr In-
dustries, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1029, 90 L.R.R.M. 1541 (1975).
12 Inter-City Advertising Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1103, 26 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1950).
16 NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, 213 F.2d 209, 34 L.R.R.M. 2196 (5th Cir.
1954).
" NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 664, 19 L.R.R.M. 2177 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 332
U.S. 826, 20 L.R.R.M. 2185 (1947).
EB General Engineering, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648, 48 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1961).
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forded protection under the Act in these cases in order to protect employees'
section 7 19
 rights. The Board, under the above circumstances, concluded that
the firing of supervisors interferes with the employees' exercise of their section
7 rights, and that reinstatement is required in order to protect those rights.
The DR W case dealt with the reconciliation of the conflict between an
employer's right to dismiss a supervisor for union activism or other concerted
activity, and the prohibition against supervisor dismissals that violate em-
ployees' section 7 rights. DRW involved a supervisor, Oatman, and an em-
ployee, Houk, who were active in a union organizing campaign. Oatman, with
Houk's assistance, had questioned employees about their interest in the union,
had arranged for a meeting with union officials at his house, and had passed
out union cards and literature. 20 Shortly thereafter, the employer, DRW
Corp., laid off Oatman and Houk, and informed its other employees (1) that
Oatman and Houk had been fired because they were union instigators, (2) that
the other employees would be discharged if they supported the union, and (3)
that the plant would be closed if the employees chose the union to represent
them. 2 ' The employees were also interrogated about their union activities and
given the impression that their union activities were under surveillance."
Following the firings of Houk and Oatman, the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America filed a complaint on their behalf with the
NLRB, and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)."
The Alj concluded that DRW Corp. violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the
discharge of supervisor Oatman, and that section 8(a)(3) was violated by the
discriminatory discharge of employee Houk. 24 The Board affirmed the rulings,
findings and conclusions of law of the ALJ and adopted his recommended
order, and it also issued a separate opinion that explained more fully the
grounds for the reinstatement of Oatman."
In its supplementary opinion, the Board acknowledged that the Act does
not prevent employers from discharging or disciplining supervisors for engag-
ing in antagonistic union activity. 26 The Board went on to state, however, that
when an employer engages in a widespread pattern of misconduct against both
employees and supervisors, that conduct, taken as a whole, may be sufficient
evidence to find that the employer was motivated by a desire to discourage
union activities among its employees in general." Such employer conduct, ac-
cording to the Board, is a violation of section 8(a)(1). 28 The Board noted that in
past cases such a situation has been characterized as a pattern of conduct aimed
at coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 29 According to
' 9 See note 4 supra.
2° DR W, 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 2, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
7 ' Id., slip op. at 2-3, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
" Id., slip op. at 3, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
" Id. at ALJ's opinion p. 2.
" Id., slip op. at 2, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1507.
25 Id., slip op. at 1, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1507.
26 Id., slip op. at 3, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
" Id., slip op. at 4, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
28 Id.
29 Id. See Fresno Townhouse, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 103 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1979);
Downslope Industries, Inc. and Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 103
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the Board, in such an intentionally created atmosphere of coercion, an em-
ployer oversteps the bounds of his right to prohibit union activity among super-
visors and treads on the employees' right to engage freely in union activity
themselves." This atmosphere of coercion, the Board reasoned, makes it diffi-
cult for employees to determine when the employer is exercising his legitimate
right to prohibit participation by supervisors in union activities and when the
employer is interfering with the employees' right to engage in union activities. 31
When these circumstances were found to exist in past cases, the opinion noted
that the Board found that restoration of the status quo ante was required to fully
remedy the coercive effect of the employer's actions and that this restoration
must encompass reinstatement of all individuals affected, including super-
visors. 32
After expounding upon these general principles, the Board applied them
to the facts of DRW. It found that Oatman's discharge was part of a pattern of
conduct aimed at coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights
and, therefore, the firing was held to be a violation of section (8)(a)(1) of the
Act. 33 In reaching this conclusion, the Board noted that the employer had
threatened and interrogated its employees, and had engaged in other unlawful
conduct against them, including the discharge of employee Houk. 34 The Board
also pointed to the use of the two firings by DRW as an example to other em-
ployees of what would happen to them if they supported the union. 35 These
facts, according to the Board, constituted an atmosphere of coercion which re-
quired the restoration of the status quo ante.
In a dissenting opinion, Member Truesdale stated that he did not believe
the discharge of Oatman constituted a section 8(a)(1) violation." Truesdale
argued that two lines of cases exist that hold that the firing of a supervisor is a
section 8(a)(1) violation. He identified the first line of cases as those holding
that a violation occurred when a supervisor's discharge clearly and directly in-
terfered with employees' section 7 rights. He stated that he approved of these
decisions." Truesdale disapproved, however, of the second line of cases, which
L.R.R.M. 1041 (1979); Fairview Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. 318, 82 L.R.R.M. 1566
(1973).
30 DRW, 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 4-5, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508. The Board
acknowledged that the mere fact that a supervisor's firing may cause employees to fear that they
will incur the same fate if they engage in similar union activities is not sufficient to transform a
supervisor dismissal into a section 8(a)(1) violation. Id., slip op. at 3-4, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
According to the Board's analysis, the section 8(a)(1) violation occurs when an employer actively
attempts to inhibit employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights in conjunction with the
dismissal of a supervisor for union involvement. At that point the employer has combined a
lawful act with an unlawful act and the Board has felt that when the two acts coincide employees
cannot distinguish the lawful act from the unlawful act.
" Id. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
33
 Id., slip op. at 5, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
" Id., slip op. at 5-6, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508. See notes 3-4 supra.
34 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 5, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
" Id., slip op. at 5-6, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1508.
" Id., slip op. at 9, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1509 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting).
37 Id., slip op. at 12, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1510 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting). An ex-
ample of this line of cases is Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836, 40 L.R.R.M. 2027 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957), in which the Board held that the discharge of a supervisor
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he identified as the "integral part" or "conduit" cases. These cases ruled that
the discharge of a supervisor was a section 8(a)(I) violation when it was "an in-
tegral part of a pattern of conduct aimed at penalizing employees for their
union activities. "38
Truesdale pointed to two factors that distinguished the two classes of
cases. First, he stated that the former class of cases involved supervisors who
only were involved tangentially in union activity, while the supervisors in the
latter category actively had sought to organize the rank-and-file employees for
the union." Second, Truesdale pointed out that the principles that governed
the first class of cases had been applied uniformly by the Board, but that the
second category of cases seemed to lack any controlling principles. Many cases
containing similar factual settings, he noted, have resulted in decisions that are
difficult to reconcile. 4° Thus, Truesdale concluded that "the 'integral part' or
`conduit' line of cases has produced decisions that are confusing and inconsis-
tent, with no clear guidelines articulated regarding when supervisory participa-
tion in union or concerted activity is protected. " 91
Having concluded that the "conduit" line of cases does not properly deal
with supervisory discharges, Truesdale set out what he believed to be the ap-
propriate test for reviewing supervisor discharges. This test would require the
reinstatement of a supervisor whenever he has been discharged for acting to
protect employees' section 7 rights 42 or, for refusing to perform an act that
would infringe employees' section 7 rights. 43
 If a supervisor was discharged,
either alone or along with rank-and-file employees, because of his participation
in union or concerted activity, however, Truesdale's test would uphold the
supervisor's discharge because supervisors are excluded from protection under
the Act. 44 Applying this test in DRW, Truesdale concluded that Oatman's
discharge had not interfered with the rights of employees to exercise their sec-
tion 7 rights, and that his reinstatement was not necessary to convey to
employees the extent to which the Act protects these rights. 45
for testifying adversely to the employer's interests in a NLRB proceeding violated the Act
because the discharge intimidated non-supervisory employees in the exercise of their statutory
rights. Id. at 837, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2027.
"" 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 12-13, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1510 (Truesdale,
Member, dissenting). See, e.g., Krebs and King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 462, 463 n.4, 80
L.R.R.M. 157{), 1571 n.4 (1972).
39 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 13, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1510 (Truesdale, Member,
dissenting).
" Id. 103 L.R.R.M, at 1510. Compare Pioneer Drilling Co., Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 918, 64
L.R.R.M. 1126 (1967), enf'd in material part, 391 F.2d 961, 67 L.R.R.M. 2956 (10th Cir. 1968)
and Krebs and King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 462, 80 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1972) with Karl Krist-
offerson, 184 N.L.R.B. 159, 74 L.R.R.M. 1645 (1970), enf'd sub nom. Johnson v. NLRB, 441
F.2d 266, 76 L.R.R.M. 3056 (4th Cir. 1971) and Sibilio's Golden Grill, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B.
1688, 94 L. R.R.M. 1439 (1977).
41 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 17-18, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1512 (Truesdale,
Member, dissenting).
" An example would be the dismissal of a supervisor for giving testimony adverse to his
employer's interests at a grievance hearing.
" 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 22, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1513 (Truesdale, Member,
dissenting).
" Id., slip op. at 22-23, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1513 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting).
" Id., slip op. at 23, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1513 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting). In sup-
port of this conclusion, Truesdale pointed out that the threat made by the employer concerning
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 65
The majority in DRW would require the reinstatement of a discharged
supervisor whenever the supervisor's firing has been part of a pattern of con-
duct by the employer intended to inhibit employees' exercise of their section 7
rights. Reinstatement should be required in this situation, according to the
Board, because without it employees will not be able to make the distinction
between the employer's lack of power to interfere with their right to organize
and participate in union activities and the employer's right to prevent such ac-
tivity among supervisors." Thus, before a supervisor is reinstated, the Board
must make a subtle differentiation between those firings of union activist super-
visors that merely cause employees to fear that the same fate may befall them if
they engage in union activity, and those firings that actually create an atmos-
phere in which employees cannot distinguish their own right to organize front
their employer's right to prohibit supervisor union activity.'"
It is unlikely that the subtle distinction between a supervisor discharge
that makes employees fear for their jobs and one that actually makes them in-
capable of identifying their own rights to unionize can be made consistently
and accurately. Because of the difficulty in making this determination accu-
rately, the Board in applying this test will probably conclude that an atmos-
phere of coercion has been created whenever a supervisor's discharge for union
activity coincides with an attempt by the employer to dissuade employees from
choosing a union to represent them." The effect of this rule will be to inhibit
employers in the exercise of their right to discharge a supervisor for union ac-
tivities at precisely the time the right is most valuable to the employer — during
an organizing campaign. It is during such a campaign that an employer will be
most interested in preventing supervisor participation in union activities so
that supervisors will not influence employees in their union representation
decision.
Admittedly, employers should not be encouraged to accompany super-
visor discharges with efforts to prevent employees from exercising their section
7 rights, but employee organizing activities by an employer should not take
away an employer's right to discharge supervisors for union activism. If the
employer's efforts to prevent employees from exercising their section 7 rights
become so extreme as to amount to a section 8(a)(1) violation, employees may
be made aware of their rights by Board ordered corrective action short of rein-
statement of supervisors." Full restoration of the status quo ante, except for the
union support by employees could have been cured by the posting of an appropriate notice by the
Board. Truesdale also stated that the reinstatement with hack pay of unlawfully discharged
employees was all that was needed to make other employees aware of the protection accorded by
the Act to organize and bargain collectively. Id., slip op. at 22, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1513 (Trues-
dale, Member, dissenting).
46 See text at note 29 supra.
" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has described this distinction as a hilse issue in
viewing supervisor discharges. See Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466, 470 (5th Cir.
1966).
48 This was the fact situation in DRW. Supervisor Oatman and employee Houk were
discharged simultaneously for engaging in union activity and the firings coincided with other em-
ployer actions which were aimed at discouraging the selection of a union as a bargaining repre-
sentative by employees. Sec text at notes 20-22 supra.
" Member Truesdale noted in his dissent that reinstatement of the employees and the
posting of appropriate notices by the Board were adequate to make employees aware of the extent
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rehiring of supervisors, and the posting of notices at the workplace should be
sufficient to inform employees of the scope of their section 7 rights.
The test for reviewing supervisor discharges that was set out by Member
Truesdale is faithful to the congressional intent of permitting the discharge of
union activist supervisors while still prohibiting discharges that are intended to
interfere with employee exercise of section 7 rights. His approach should be
adopted by the Board. Truesdale properly pointed out that the Act protects
employees, not supervisors. 5 ° Therefore, he would hold that any discharge of a
supervisor for participation in union activity is lawful." Only if a supervisor
had not engaged in union activity, but instead had been discharged for giving
testimony adverse to his employer's interests, or for refusing to commit unfair
labor practices, would he be reinstated under Truesdale's test." The super-
visor would be reinstated because his discharge interfered with employee exer-
cise of section 7 rights, and not because of any protection accorded supervisors
by the Act.
Truesdale's test could be accurately and consistently applied, and it would
give full effect to Congress' decision to permit employers to prevent supervisor
union activism. The threshold inquiry would be whether the supervisor had
participated actively in union activities. If he has, then he may be discharged
lawfully and his discharge would be upheld. If he has not participated in union
activities, the Board then would determine whether the supervisor was dis-
charged for refusing to cooperate with the employer's attempts to interfere with
employees' section 7 rights. If the Board found that this was the basis for the
discharge, the supervisor would be reinstated. Reinstatement of employees and
the posting of notices by the Board could be used if it becomes necessary to edu-
cate employees as to the extent of their rights under the Act.
The Truesdale test would clarify and protect the rights and powers
granted employees, employers and supervisors under the Act because it can be
easily understood and consistently applied. It also implements properly the
congressional intent expressed in the Act. These qualities make the test an ef-
fective one for prospectively informing all parties of what their rights and
powers are under the Act. For these reasons it should be adopted in future
cases.
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1. Hot Cargo Agreements in the Construction Industry: Pacific Northwest Chapter of
the Associated Builders and Contractors v. NLRB*
Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act)' prohibits labor-
management agreements in which an employer contracts with a union not to
of their section 7 rights. DRW, 248 N.L.R.B. No. 95, slip op. at 22, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1513
(Truesdale, Member, dissenting).
" Id., slip op. at 22-23, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1509 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting).
" Id. 103 L.R.R.M. at 1509 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting).
" Id., slip op. at 22, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1509 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting).
• By Jeffery L. Keffer, Staff Member, BosioN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Section 8(e) provides in pertinent part:
it shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
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do business with specified persons — so-called hot cargo agreements. 2 This
prohibition has been construed to extend only to agreements embodying sec-
ondary, not primary, union objectives. 3 Primary union objectives involve pro-
tecting the work opportunities of bargaining unit employees, while secondary
objectives encompass general union objectives such as organizing the
employees of neutral employers. 4 Thus, union signatory clauses which require
that a general contractor only subcontract with firms that are parties to a
specific union contract, are unlawful under section 8(e) because they are
directed toward the secondary union purpose of organizing the employees of a
subcontracting firm. 5 A proviso in section 8(e), however, exempts secondary
agreements from the general prohibition against hot-cargo clauses provided the
agreements pertain to subcontracted work that is to be done at a construction
site. Since the enactment of section 8(e) in 1959, the National Labor Relations
Board (Board or NLRB) consistently has held that union signatory clauses in
construction industry agreements arc within the scope of this proviso, and
hence not prohibited by the Act. 6
During the Survey year, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors v. NLRB'
(Associated Builders) took a more limited view of the section 8(e) proviso. Relying
on its perception of congressional intention and the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 8 the Ninth Circuit held that
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, where by such em-
ployer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or
to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement
entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void. Provided, that nothing in this subsection shall ap-
ply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the con-
struction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to he done
at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, struc-
ture or other work.
29 U.S.C.	 158(6) (1976).
The name, hot cargo, evolved because of the prevalence of these agreements at one
time in Teamster Union contracts.
See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass' n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 637-38 (1967).
4 Id. An agreement with a primary union objective is addressed to the labor relations of
the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees. Thus, collective bargaining agreements
designed to preserve work for bargaining unit employees and to assure that negotiated standards
are not undermined are primary in nature. Where, however, the object is not to preserve or pro-
tect the working standards of employees in a unit, but to control the employment practices of
firms which seek to do business with the employer and to assist union members generally, such
object is secondary and unlawful. See Heavy, Highway, Building & Constr. Teamsters Comm. of
N. Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 269, 272, 94 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1214 (1976).
Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 239 N.L.R.B. 253, 99 L.R.R.M. 1610
(1978).
6 The Board originally held that although union signatory clauses were permitted under
the construction industry proviso, picketing to obtain such clatiscs violated section 8(6)(4)(A).
Subsequently, when these holdings were denied enforcement in several courts of appeal, Orange
Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the Board ac-
quiesced and permitted such picketing. See Northeastern Ind. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
148 N.L.R.B. 854, 57 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1964).
7 609 F.2d 1341, 103 L.R.R.M. 2144 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No.
78-3469 (9th Cir. 'Aug. 19, 1980).
421 U.S. 616 (1974).
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the construction industry proviso does not exempt all union signatory clauses
from unfair labor practices charges. 9
 The court instead held that the proviso
only shields signatory clauses that stem from a collective bargaining relation-
ship and that pertain to a construction site where signatory union members
may work alongside non-union workers.L°
Two decisions of the National Labor Relations Board were before the
Ninth Circuit in Associated Builders. The first case" involved a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the International Union of Operating Engineers
(Engineers) and the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General
Contractors of America (ACC)." The agreement contained a provision
precluding AGC members from assigning jobsite work to any subcontractor
that did not have a current labor agreement with the signatory union, the
Engineers. 13
 Another provision required that violations of the agreement be
subject to grievance and arbitration procedures as well as such other actions
that the parties might find necessary.I 4
 An association of contractors that was
not a party to this agreement filed charges with the NLRB, and the Board's
General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the subcontracting clause
violated section 8(e). In the second case, 15
 negotiations between the Woelke
and Romero Framing Co. (Woelke) and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and joiners of America (Carpenters) terminated when Woelke, a general con-
tractor, refused to accept a proposal that would prevent it from subcontracting
jobsite work to anyone other than employers that were parties to the current
Carpenters agreement.' 6
 When Woelke was picketed, it filed charges with the
General Counsel, who issued a complaint against the Carpenters union.
Upon review, the Board found that although the subcontracting clauses in
each case were secondary in effect, they were nevertheless authorized by the
construction industry proviso of section 8(e)." The Board observed that these
provisions were not primary in nature because they were not directed to labor
° 609 F.2(1 at 1347, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2147.
'" Id. at 1347-48, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2147-48.
Operating Engineers Local 701, 239 N.L.R.B. 274, 99 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978).
12 The Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors is an associa-
tion of two hundred contractors in the Pacific Northwest.
The collective bargaining agreement between Engineers and AGC contained this pro-
vision:
Article VIII: Subcontractors and Other Employers — Employers shall not con-
tract any work covered by this Agreement to be done at the site of construction,
alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work to any person,
firm or company who does not have an existing labor agreement with the Union
covering such work.
Id. at 275, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1590.
'I Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1590.
IS Carpenters Local 944 and 235, 239 N.L.R.B. 241, 99 L,R.R•.M, 1580 (1978).
'" The agreement rejected by Woelke included this provision, in relevant part: "The
Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on the jobsite will subcontract any
work except to a person, firm or corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agree-
ment with the appropriate Union, or subordinate party signatory to this Agreement." Id. at 243,
99 L.R.R.M. at 1582.
" Operating Engineers Local 701, 239 N.L,R.B. 274, 277, 99 L.R.R.M. 1589, 1591
(1978); Carpenters Local 944 and 235, 239 N.L.R.B. 241, 250, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580, 1588
(1978).
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relations between the contracting employer and its employees. Instead, the
Board found that these clauses were designed to achieve the secondary purpose
of organizing non-union subcontracting firms, and were, therefore, within the
general prohibition of section 8(0.' 8 The Board noted, however, that it con-
sistently had construed the construction industry proviso literally, thereby pro-
tecting "any agreement" that limits subcontracting work at a construction job-
site to firms that are signatories of a specific union agreement.' 9
Having concluded the clauses were legal under its interpretation of the
law, the Board next considered whether its construction of section 8(e) was con-
trary to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the proviso in Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers Local 100. 20 In Connell a union had picketed a general contractor,
and forced the contractor to sign a subcontractor agreement even though the
union did not represent, and did not seek to represent, the contractor's em-
ployees." The contractor challenged the agreement under the Sherman Act,
but the union claimed that the agreement was authorized by the construction
industry proviso of section 8(e). 22 In holding that this agreement could be the
basis for an anti-trust action, the Supreme Court ruled that the proviso only
permits construction industry subcontracting agreements that result from col-
lective bargaining relationships between unions and general contractors and
that it perhaps might only pertain to common situs relationships on particular
jobsites." The NLRB noted that Connell primarily was concerned with situa-
tions where there were no collective bargaining relationships between the
union and the general contractor. The Board reasoned, therefore, that the
Supreme Court had limited the scope of the proviso only to the extent of requir-
ing that a valid collective bargaining relationship exist between signatories to a
subcontracting agreement." Since in both cases before it the subcontracting
clauses concerned jobsite work and arose out of collective bargaining relation-
ships between unions and general contractors, the Board found that the clauses
were protected by the proviso and dismissed the complaints."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Board. While it
agreed with the NLRB's conclusion that these subcontractor clauses were in-
valid under the general prohibition of section 8(e), 26 the court differed with the
Board regarding the impact of Connell on the scope of the construction industry
proviso. The Ninth Circuit observed that Connell had emphasized that one
18 Operating Engineers Local 701, 239 N.L.R.B. at 277, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1591;
Carpenters Local 944, 239 N.L.R.B. at 246, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1585.
19 Operating Engineers Local 701, 239 N.L.R.B. at 277, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1591;
Carpenters Local 944, 239 N.L.R.B. at 246, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1585.
25 421 U.S. 616 (1974).
21 421 U.S. at 623.
22 id.
23 Id. at 633.
" Operating Engineers Local 701, 239 N.L.R.B. at 277, 99 L.R.R.M, at 1591;
Carpenters Local 944, 239 N.L.R.B. at 250, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1588.
" In Operating Engineers Local 701, 239 N.L.R.B. 274, 99 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978),
the Board found that the grievance and arbitration procedures included in the agreement sanc-
tioned economic action to insure compliance with the subcontractor clause. Since the Board in-
terpreted the proviso to section 8(e) as only enforceable through judicial action, the self help
measures were found unlawful. Id.
26 609 F.2d at 1346, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2147.
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significant objective of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) of
1959, of which section 8(e) was a part, was to limit top down organizing cam-
paigns by unions. 27 Top down organizing occurs when a union forces an em-
ployer to recognize the union as its employees' representative without permit-
ting the employees a choice as to their representative. The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the subcontracting clause in question permitted precisely this kind
of organizing by the unions." Therefore the court of appeals held that the
union signatory clauses then before it, although the result of collective bargain-
ing, should not be shielded by the proviso. 29
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the unions' contention that
the construction industry proviso was enacted at a time when union signatory
clauses were accepted as lawful, and that the proviso merely served to preserve
the status quo in the construction industry. 30 The court declared that the per-
missible limits of subcontractor agreements had not been determined conclu-
sively prior to the enactment of section 8(e). 31 The leading Supreme Court case
at the time of the proviso's enactment, .United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB
(Sand Door), 32 the court observed, did not consider the lawfulness of signatory
clauses relating to subcontracting but dealt only with supply contracts. 33 Fur-
thermore, the court found that it was not clear that the proviso was supposed to
preserve the then existing law. 34 Looking at the legislative history, the court ad-
mitted that some statements in the conference report suggested that the proviso
did not alter the prevailing law, but the court also observed that other state-
ments in the report suggested that the proviso was intended to outlaw the kind
of agreements that the Supreme Court had found lawful in Sand Door. Because
of this conflicting record, the court reasoned that although Congress may have
intended to preserve existing law by enacting the proviso, that intention was
too uncertain to be relied on in determining the proper scope of the proviso."
To determine the intended scope of the proviso the Ninth . Circuit instead
looked to the general purpose of the proviso in the context of its statutory set-
ting. Citing its own decision in ACCO Construction Equipment, Inc. v. NLRB, the
court reiterated that the primary purpose of the proviso was to minimize the
tension that is likely to occur when union members work alongside non-union
workers at a construction site. 36 Thus, the court reasoned that union signatory
clauses that govern work at all jobsites are unnecessarily broad because if the
contractor does not assign any union workers to a particular jobsite no tension
should occur." The court also observed that union signatory clauses have a
" 609 F.2d at 1350, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2150.
" Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 2150.
" Id. at 1347, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2147.
3° Id. at 1348, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148.
31
 Id. at 1349, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148.
32 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (the issue in Sand Door was whether union picketing in support of a
hot cargo agreement, which forbade the use of non-union materials, was unlawful under section
8(b)(4)).
" Id. at 1349-50, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148-49.
" Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148.
" Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149.
" 511 F.2d 848, 851, 88 L.R.R.M. 2536, 2538 (9th Cir. 1975).
" 609 F.2d at 1350, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149.
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potentially coercive effect on employees' section 7 38 right to bargain through
representatives of their own choosing. 39 Union signatory clauses undermine
this right by forcing non-union firms and employees to accept the signatory
union's representation in order to obtain subcontracted work from general con-
tractors who sign such agreements." Thus, such clauses increase the potential
for top down organizing, which is precisely what the Act of 1959 sought to pre-
vent. The court concluded that because the effects of the union signatory
clauses in question extended beyond the purpose of the proviso and had such a
coercive effect on non-union workers, such clauses should not be deemed law-
ful :41
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Associated Builders, although consistent with
its prior interpretation of the construction industry proviso in ACCO Construc-
tion, is not necessarily required by Connell. Moreover, it does not articulate a
practical solution to the unique problems of the construction industry. The
court conceded that "the teaching of Connell ... is not unambiguous." 42 In
Connell the Supreme Court found that the union was interested solely in using
economic pressure to force as many subcontractors as possible to recognize it as
the representative of their employees. 43 The union did not represent, nor seek
to represent the general contractor's employees. Thus, the subcontracting pro-
vision clearly was designed to organize subcontractors. The unions' objectives
were in no way related to the policies the Supreme Court suggested were
behind the enactment of the proviso." These policies included: (1) permitting
some secondary activities at construction sites because of the close community
of interests there, and (2) avoiding jobsite tensions. 45 In the two disputes before
the Ninth Circuit in Associated Builders, the union signatory clauses seem entire-
ly consistent with these policies. Additionally, the clauses only covered work at
construction sites, and thus were designed so that union employees would not
have to work with non-union workers. The unions were, therefore, not dealing
with just "any employer" as in Connell, and they were not seeking simply to ex-
pand union membership. The unions sought these agreements in part for the
purpose of protecting employees of the existing bargaining unit. Thus, the
presence of a collective bargaining relationship between the union and general
contractors, which was a significant concern of the Supreme Court in Connell,
suggests that the subcontractor clauses in Associated Builders were within the pro-
viso.
Furthermore, the purpose that the Ninth Circuit found to be served by the
proviso, minimizing jobsite tensions, may be too narrow because it addresses
only some of the problems unique to the construction industry. As the Supreme
38 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
39 609 F.2d at 1350, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149.
" The court noted that section 8(f) permits "prehire" labor agreements in the con-
struction industry, but asserted that section 8(f) does not override the workers' rights of self-
determination. Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149-50 (citing Connell, 42! U.S. at 632).
" 609 F.2d at 1350, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149.
42 Id. at 1348, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148.
" 421 U.S. 616, 631 (1974).
" Id. at 630.
" Id.
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Court observed in Connell, because of the close community of interests at con-
struction sites, the proviso may be directed toward achieving other policy goals.
For example, craft unionists traditionally have refused to work alongside non-
union men at the same construction project." Such refusals are not generally
the product of jobsite tension, but are the result of union organizing policy. As
a result of such policies, the construction industry has been particularly vulner-
able to sporadic work stoppages.'" Congress, in enacting the proviso, was prob-
ably concerned about the detrimental effects of such stoppages — decreased
productivity in the construction industry and continual labor-management
strife. To combat this problem, the proviso was designed to exempt subcon-
tractor clauses pertaining to construction sites from the general section 8(e) ban
on agreements with secondary purposes." Thus, Congress, in enacting the
proviso, apparently was willing to permit greater secondary activity at con-
struction sites in return for some stability in the industry.
It is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Associated Builders will
promote this policy of stability within the construction industry. The only form
of subcontractor provision left open by the court of appeals is impractical, and
may result in further instability in the construction industry. Associated Builders
only permits collectively bargained subcontractor clauses that preclude signa-
tory union members from working alongside non-union workers." Such agree-
ments would give general contractors complete control over assigning jobsite
work to union or non-union subcontractors. In order to employ non-union sub-
contractors at a construction project, a general contractor could simply not
assign union workers to that site. Under such an arrangement unions run the
risk of actually losing work to non-union labor. Therefore, unions would not
agree to such a provision. Without subcontractor agreements governing con-
tracts between union and non-union workers at construction sites, intermittent
work stoppages and labor-management strife in the construction industry will
certainly increase.
Additionally, the test devised by the Ninth Circuit for measuring the legal-
ity of signatory clauses will be difficult to apply. The court suggested that the
test be construed so that once a union member is present at a jobsite all rele-
vant work, work of a specific craft, must be done by union subcontractors. 5 ° It
is conceivable, however, that employers might conform to this test in ways that
will meet the limited purpose of minimizing non-union jobsite contracts but
will heighten overall tension in the construction industry. For instance, a
general contractor could assign union subcontractors to perform certain tasks
either at the beginning or end of a project, and use non-union workers the rest
of the time. In addition, if a jobsite is not defined clearly because it extends
over a large geographic area, a general contractor could assign union workers
46
 Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters & Millwrights v. NLRB, 332
F.2d 636, 640, 56 L.R.R.M. 2091, 2094 (3d Cir. 1964).
47 Id.
" See, e.g., Orange Belt Dist. Council v. Maloney, 98 L.R.R.M. 3193, 3191 (D.C. Cal.
1978) (signatory contractor cannot nullify the proviso simply by not assigning its union
employees to a jobsite at which non-union subcontractors are employed).
49 609 F.2d at 1347, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2147.
an Id at 1348, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148.
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to sections of the jobsite where they will have no contact with non-union
workers. 51 Since union workers would not be working "alongside" non-union
workers in these two examples technically there would not be a problem with
jobsite tensions as defined in Associated Builders. Thus, a general contractor
could claim that it was acting in a manner consistent with the purpose of the
proviso. This kind of manipulation of workers, however, only could lead to
greater union dissatisfaction and heightened tensions in the construction in-
dustry.
Union signatory clauses have been enforced since the enactment of section
8(e) and the accompanying construction industry proviso in 1959, 52 and the use
of such clauses undoubtedly has had a coercive effect on non-union subcontrac-
tors in the construction industry. Nevertheless, this is not a compelling reason
to restrict the coverage of the construction industry proviso. Some secondary
activity in the construction industry, if confined to work done at Construction
sites, should be permitted in return for industry stability. Until Congress deter-
mines that this policy ought to be changed, it should not be tampered with by
the courts.
2. Secondary Boycotts: Pet, Incorporated*
Unfair labor practices, as defined in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), include union activity designed to force other persons "to cease do-
ing business with any other person. . . ." 1 Such activity, a type of secondary
" See, e.g., Bullard Contracting Corp. v. Local 91, 100 L.R.R.M. 2959, 2963
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (where jobsite may be spread over a considerable geographic area it does not
matter that no union employees are found at the jobsite; the subcontracting clause still is covered
by the proviso).
" Construction Prod. & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422, 54
L.R.R.M. 2246 (9th Cir. 1963); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534,
55 L.R.R.M. 2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 56 L.R.R.M. 2091 (3d Cir. 1964).
• By Gregory Golazeski, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' The Act provides, in part:
8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . .
(4) . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce, where . . . an object thereof is .
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, . . .
Provided further, that for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing con-
tained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers
and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by
an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are dis-
tributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of
inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer
in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer en-
gaged in such distribution; ... .
29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1976).
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boycott, is prohibited in order to protect secondary parties who are not in-
volved in the dispute between the union and the primary employer. 2 The pro-
hibition, however, contains an exception that allows the union to make the
general public aware of its dispute with the primary employer, and toward this
end, the union may identify by truthful publicity products distributed by a sec-
ondary employer that are in fact produced by the primary employer. 3 The only
statutory restrictions on the publicity are that the unions may not engage in
picketing, 4 and that the publicity cannot have the effect of inducing other per-
sons to withhold their services as employees to secondary employers. 5 Permissi-
ble results of union publicity, therefore, have been a boycott of the primary
employer's goods sold by a secondary employer& and a consumer boycott of the
secondary employer's business.' The unfair labor practices prohibitions other-
wise would forbid such economic pressure on the primary employer. Because
the publicity provision protects the union's activity only if the "product or
products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a
primary dispute,"" controversy has settled upon the meaning of the word
"produced."
Decisions by courts and the National Labor Relations Board (Board) have
construed liberally the term produced. For example, in Lohman Sales Co., 9 a
local chapter of the Teamsters Union went on strike against Lohman, a whole-
sale distributor of tobacco products. As an outgrowth of the strike, the union
approached drugstore owners who retailed the cigarettes and other items dis-
tributed by Lohman to induce the owners to stop purchasing those items." In
addition, the union circulated handbills to consumers to encourage them not to
buy items distributed by Lohman." The Board held that the publicity proviso
protected the union's activity. 12 It ruled that the wholesale distributor was a
producer of the items it distributed." The Board noted that production is not
only manufacturing, but includes any application of labor and capital to the
Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile Layers Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C.
Cir, 1972).
3 29 U.S.C. $ 158(6)(4) (1976), reprinted in part at note 1 supra.
+ Id., cf. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (peaceful
picketing limited to reaching only potential consumers of primary employer's goods rather than
secondary employer's entire business); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372
(1980) (union's picketing may not ruin the secondary employer).
29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(4) (1976), reprinted in part at note 1 supra.
fi See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
Local 662, Radio & Television Engineers (Middle South Broadcasting Co.), 133
N.L.R.B. 1698, 1705, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042, 1046 (1961). q NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1001,
100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980) (if picketing is involved, picketing may not ruin the secondary employer);
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (if picketing is involved,
union's boycott of secondary employer is restricted).
a 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (b)(4) (1976), reprinted in part at note 1 supra.
Teamsters Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429
(1961).
i n Id, at 902, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1430.
" Id.
12 Id. at 906, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1432.
" Id. at 907, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1432.
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 75
product.' 4 The labor provided by Lohman in distributing the cigarettes and
other sundries made it a producer of those items.
The Supreme Court expressly approved the Board's Lohman decision
when it decided NLRB v. Servette, Inc. 15 In Servette, the Court resolved a conflict
between the Board and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals over the scope of
the definition of producer. 16 The Court favored the Board's broader interpreta-
tion." In Servette, the union was conducting a strike against a wholesale distrib-
utor of food products. The union wanted supermarket chainstore managers not
to sell goods supplied by Servette, the primary employer.' 8 The Court ruled
that .the publicity provision applied to the situation, and, therefore, the union
activity was protected.' 9 In construing the labor statute, the Court noted that
the term "producer" must be given a broad definition, or it becomes mere
surplusage. 2° After reviewing statements made by Senators while the publicity
provision legislation was in Congress, the Court described the publicity proviso
as the legislature's mechanism for safeguarding a union's freedom to appeal to
the public for support. 2 ' Limiting the proviso to manufacturers or processors,
the Court concluded, would defeat the purpose of Congress in enacting the
legislation. 22
Following the Servette decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
further expanded the definition of producer. In Great Western Broadcasting Corp.
v. NLRB," the union had engaged in a strike against the Great Western Broad-
casting Corporation, owner of television station KXTV. To increase the
pressure on Great Western, the union attempted to force neutral companies to
cease advertising on KXTV by subjecting these companies to a secondary boy-
cott. 24 The court ruled that KXTV is a producer of the products it advertises. 25
Therefore, the publicity provision protected the union when it sponsored a
boycott of those products. 26
During the Survey year, the NLRB again expanded the concept of produc-
tion. In Pet, Incorporated" the Board held that a subsidiary that is the target of a
14 Id. at 906-07, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1432.
" 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964).
16 The conflicting definitions were found in Lohman Sales Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 48
L.R.R.M. 1429 (1961), discussed in text at notes 9-14 supra and Great Western Broadcasting
Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962), discussed in note 26 infra.
377 U.S. at 55.
Id, at 47.
' 9 Id. at 54-57.
20 Id. at 56.
21 Id. at 55.
22 Id. at 55, 57.
23 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966).
24 310 F.2d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1962) (earlier decision in same case).
" 356 F.2d at 436.
26 Id. This decision reversed an earlier decision in the same case. Prior to the Servette
decision, the court of appeals had held that an advertiser is not a producer of the products it
advertises and that, for purposes of the publicity proviso, television advertising is not a product.
310 F.2d at 595, 598.
27 United Steelworkers of America (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 102 L.R.R.M.
1046 (1979).
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strike is a producer of all the products of the parent corporation and the
parent's other subsidiaries." Therefore, the publicity proviso is broad enough
to cover a union prompted consumer boycott of any item produced by the
parent or its subsidiaries under the broad Servette definition. Although the
parent and the co-subsidiaries are not the primary employer, their products
arc, by the Board's reasoning, also products of the primary employer and
susceptible to union pressure.
The Pet, Incorporated case involved a strike by the Steelworkers Union
against the Bridgeton, Missouri plant of Hussmann, Inc., a subsidiary of Pet,
Incorporated. 29 Five months into the strike, Hussmann permanently replaced
the strikers with other employees." In response, 3 ' the union announced on
television a nation-wide consumer boycott of all Pet products and retail
stores. 32
 Although the boycott was labelled "nation-wide" by the union, it was
centered around St. Louis, the site of Pet's corporate headquarters. 33
 The
union purchased advertising space in local newspapers and passed out hand-
bills in the St. Louis area. 34
 The advertisements and handbills named specific
Pet stores and producfs. 35
 The union was careful to comply with the strictures
of the NLRA; there was neither picketing nor interference with any secondary
employer-employee relationships. 36
 Nevertheless, Pet promptly filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board. 37
 Pet contended that the publicity proviso
was inapplicable because the union's publicity was not truthful to the extent
that it implied that Hussmann was a producer of the goods of Pet and the other
subsidiaries."
The Board held that the boycott was protected by the publicity provision.
The Board recognized that underlying Pet's contention of untruthfulness was a
more fundamental question — whether Hussmann was a producer of the goods
and services of its parent and co-subsidiaries. 39
In answering that basic question, the Board detailed the intricate working
relationship bewtecn Pet and its subsidiaries. Pet, Incorporated is highly diver-
sified, and has twenty-seven operating divisions. Most of these divisions are
allocated among four "Groups," the principal subdivisions of Pet, Incor-
porated. Hussmann, for example, a manufacturer of commercial refrigeration
" 102 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
sq Id. at 1048.
" Solien v. United Steelworkers of America, 593 F.2d 82, 83 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 54 (1979) (connected case arising from same strike).
11 Id.
12 Id.
" Id. at 85.
3 ' 102 L.R.R.M. at 1048.
35 Id.
36 Id.
" 593 F.2d at 85. In addition, the Board's regional director sought an injunction against
the union for the period during which the Board was considering the charge. Solien v. United
Steelworkers of America, 449 F. Supp. 580 (F.D. Mo. 1978) (connected case arising from same
strike). Although the district court held for the union and denied the injunction request, 449 F.
Supp. at 583, it was reversed on appeal. 593 F.2d 82, 87-88 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 54 (1979). Six months later, the Board reached its decision.
" 102 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
39 Id.
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and related equipment, is a part of the Commercial Division of the Hussmann
Group. 4° The corporate structure of Pet is such that the president of a division
such as Hussmann answers to a senior executive officer within the Pct chain,
rather than to a board of directors. Control over day-to-day operations, in-
cluding labor relations, rests with the division president. Pet's headquarters
determines long-range planning and sets general policies that guide division
operations. In addition, Pet provides centralized purchasing so that the divi-
sions can take advantage of volume discounts. Pet also provides some legal
services to the divisions.'"
In addition to reviewing the general services listed above, the Board ex-
amined Hussmann's specific ties with Pet. Pet had provided Hussmann with
funding for capital improvements and operating expenses. This "loan" was
unsecured, carried no interest, lacked a repayment schedule, and was not
evidenced by a note. 42
 The ongoing receipts and disbursements of Hussmann,
and the other divisions, were credited first to its own accounts and then to a Pet
general bank account. From the inception of the general bank account until the
strike, Hussmann's disbursements had exceeded its receipts by a significant
amount, resulting in a negative cash flow." Pet charged no interest on the out-
standing deficit." The Board also cited Pet's own reports and brochures, both
of which highlighted Hussmann's contribution to Pet. The Board described
Hussmann as "clearly a major part" of Pet:45
Following this review of the relationship between Pet and Hussmann, the
Board undertook to determine whether the companies' ties made Hussmann
the producer of all Pet products within the meaning of the publicity proviso.
Turning to the liberal definitions of producer in past decisions, the Board
found Hussmann to be within the Supreme Court's interpretation in Servette. 46
The Board also cited Lohman Sales Co. and Great Western Broadcasting Corp., and
relied on its definition in the latter case, that a producer is one who "enhances
the economic value of the product ultimately sold . "47 Since Hussmann
supplied its labor, in the form of "capital, enterprise, or service" to Pet and its
subsidiaries, the Board concluded that Hussmann was a producer of Pet's
products." The union boycott of the primary employer's products, therefore,
was properly aimed also at all the products of the Pet conglomerate."
The significance of Pet, Incorporated lies in the foothold that it gives unions
to apply pressure on management through other members of the corporate
family. The case broadens the scope of permissible boycotts in that the connec-
4° Id. at 1046-47, 1050.
+' Id. at 1047.
" Id.
" Id. at 1047-48 & n.13.
4' Id. at 1048.
" Id. at 1050.
" Id.
47
 Id. at 1049-50.
4" Id. at 1050.
4" Id. at 1051, Having determined that the publicity proviso was applicable, the Board
did not decide whether the union activity fell within the scope of the activities prohibited by the
Act, id. at 1049 n.23, nor did it reach the first amendment aspects of abridging a union's free
speech. Id. at 1051 n.33.
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tion between the primary employer and the boycotted products, supposedly
produced by the primary employer, is tenuous. In prior decisions, the primary
employer had directly affected the boycotted products by distributing or adver-
tising them. On that basis, the courts or the Board found the primary employer
to be a producer of the boycotted merchandise. The holding in Pet, Incorporated
departs from the earlier decisions because it makes the employer a producer of
the goods even though it does not directly handle or market them.
Nevertheless, on both substantive and policy grounds, the Board's deci-
sion in Pet, Incorporated seems to be a reasonable extension of prior law. If an
advertiser can be a producer of another employer's goods, then it follows that a
subsidiary, whose goodwill enhances the entire corporate family, is a producer
of that family's goods. Even though a subsidiary does not directly handle or
market the goods of co-subsidiaries, its successful operation as a going concern
supplies capital to the corporate family for direct or indirect use in furthering
the family's other enterprises. 50 Of course, the argument for extending the
scope of permissible boycotts to co-subsidiaries is weakened when the sub-
sidiary, such as Hussmann, does more taking than giving. Even in such a case,
however, the production concept is still viable because the ultimate goal of the
parent's cash advances to the subsidiary is to make the subsidiary a contribut-
ing family member.
The Pet, Incorporated holding furthers the legislative policy underlying the
publicity provision. The publicity proviso enables a union to take its case to the
public. 5 ' When the primary employer's business is intangible or otherwise not
easily susceptible to a boycott, the proviso creates the only opportunity for an
appeal to the public. The advertising and distribution cases, discussed above,
demonstrate that the courts recognize a congressional intent to create such an
opportunity. Had the Board reached a contrary decision in Pet, Incorporated, the
union, and others similarly situated, would have been denied completely the
opportunity to appeal to the public because Hussmann manufactured commer-
cial shelving and refrigeration equipment," items the general public rarely
purchases. On the other hand, the items made by Pet are familiar to consumers
and found in many households. 53 These products, therefore, are readily subject
to a consumer boycott.
In addition to furthering the policy at the base of the publicity provisions,
the extension of the scope of a secondary boycott in Pet, Incorporated also pro-
motes the national policy of encouraging the peaceful resolution of labor
disputes. 54 As noted above, subsidiaries contribute capital to the corporate
family. In highly diversified conglomerates these contributions create a reser-
voir upon which the primary employer can draw for support in withstanding
the effect of potentially harmful events, such as downturns in the economy, de-
mands by unions, and, if necessary, work stoppages, whether strikes or lock-
5° See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 185 NA—R.13. 303, 304,
75 L.R.R.M. 1014, 1016 (1970), enf'd, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971) (subsidiaries retain "a
comfortable cash balance" as "operating profits" and remit the surplus to the parent).
" Sec text at note 21 supra.
" 102 L.R.R.M. at 1046.
" For example, Pet, Inc. manufactures a line of dairy products and Whitman's Choco-
lates; the boycott literature listed seventeen brand-name food products. Id. at 1048.
" See 29 U.S.C.	 141(b) & 151 (1976) (declarations of policy).
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 79
outs. The extension in Pet, Incorporated restores the balance between the parties
by allowing the union to compensate for a conglomerate employer's advantage
by boycotting the merchandise of co-subsidiaries, thereby, reducing the
cushioning effect the unfettered operation of the co-subsidiaries would have.
Since both parties are now on notice regarding their equalized positions, they
have an incentive to resolve their disputes peacefully and not to engage in
wasteful work stoppages to test the staying power of their adversary.
Although the Pet, Incorporated decision is sound on policy and substantive
legal grounds, the Board's in-depth review of the relationship between Huss-
mann and Pet is an indication that the holding might be limited to similar fact
situations in the future. The Board found a relationship of close interdepend-
ence between Pet and Hussmann. In a somewhat different context, however,
the Board, in Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 55 reviewed the
intra-corporate workings of Hearst and found that the subsidiaries had auton-
omy in finances, day-to-day operations, and purchasing and editorial poli-
cies. 56
 The Board there held that separate corporate subsidiaries can be persons
distinct from the parent and co-subsidiaries and that in fact the Los Angeles
and San Francisco Divisions of the Hearst Corporation were separate per-
sons." The Hearst Corp. decision indicates that, had the facts of Pet, Incorporated
been different, the Board might have found that Hussmann was not a producer
of Pet's products and services because close interdependence was lacking. In
the future the outcome before the Board may depend on how persuasively
counsel for each side can marshall facts depicting the particular parent-subsid-
iary or subsidiary-subsidiary relationship as either autonomous or interde-
pendent.
It remains to be seen whether the broad holding in Pet, Incorporated will be
limited to similar fact patterns. Future cases may be decided on an ad hoc basis
with the decision hinging on the nature of the intra-corporate relationship. For
the time being, though, a union seems to be able to reach all the products of a
diversified organization. The increased leverage available to unions as a result
of Pet, Incorporated may become a significant bargaining factor. This increased
leverage is consistent with the policy underlying the publicity proviso and
enables unions to counter the reservoir of resources available to the managers
of diversified corporate conglomerates. In the long run the decision should en-
courage peaceful resolutions of labor disputes.
55 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 75 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1970), enf'd, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971).
56 Id. at 304, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
" Id. at 304, 75 L.R.R . M. at 1015-16. The Hearst Corp. decision dealt with the defini-
tion of "person" in section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(4)(B), is reprinted in part at
note 1 supra. The secondary boycott problem arises only if there is another person involved in the
union-primary employer dispute. If the Board determines that "neither the subsidiaries nor the
parent exercises actual or active, as opposed to merely potential, control over the day-to-day
operations or labor relations of the other," then the co-subsidiaries are separate persons, each
entitled to . protection ... from the labor disputes of the other." 185 N.L.R.B. at 304, 75
L.R.R.M. at 1015.
In Pet, Inc. the Board declined invitations from both parties to base its holding on a
restructuring of the definition of "person." 102 L.R.R. M. at 1048-49. Applying the test quoted
above, though, it probably would have held that Hussmann and Pet were the same person. In
such an event, the outcome would have been the same because there would have been no second-
ary boycott in the first place.
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3. Access to Union Bulletin Boards: Teamsters Local 515*
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' ensures the right
of employees to participate in union activity and the corresponding right to re-
frain from such activity.' These rights are protected by section 8, which
specifies those actions that constitute unfair labor practices by employers and
unions. 3 Among other things, section 8(a) 4
 has been construed as prohibiting
employers from restricting employee access to employer-owned bulletin boards
that previously had been open to unrestricted employee use. 5 Since the word-
ing of section 8(a), which applies to employers, differs slightly, however, from
that of section 8(b), 6 which applies to unions, it was unclear whether the same
standard applied to union restrictions on the use of union bulletin boards.
During the Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board for the first
time addressed the issue of access to union bulletin boards in Teamsters Local
515. 7 It held that, in certain circumstances, a union may lawfully remove dissi-
dent members' materials from a union-controlled bulletin board. 8 In Teamsters
Local 515, the complainant, an employee of Roadway Express, belonged to
both the union and a dissident faction, the Professional Drivers Council
(PROD). PROD had published a newsletter that was highly critical of the
union." The employee posted the newsletter on a union bulletin board located
in the employees' breakroom even though the employer-union collective bar-
gaining agreement stipulated that the board, although owned by the employer,
was to be used only for "official union business."'° Despite the contract stipu-
lation, the union, for at least ten years, had permitted workers to put all types
of notices on the bulletin board." When the PROD newsletter was posted,
however, the union's job steward removed it on orders from . the union's busi-
ness agent.' 2
 When questioned by the dissident member, the business agent
• By . John 0. Chang, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
' Id. § 157 (1976). Section 7 provides, in part: "Employees all have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . , and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . ." Id.
' Id. § 158.
• Id. 4158(a). Section 8(a) provides, in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 of the NLRA] . . ."
See NLRB v. Challenge-Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 374 F.2d 147, 152-53, 64
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2483-84 (6th Cir. 1967); Container Corp. of America, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 53
(Aug. 17, 1979), 102 L.R.R.M. 1162; Green Giant Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 377, 379, 91 L.R.R.M.
1468, 1471 (1976).
• 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (1976). Section 8(b) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be an un-
fair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7 of the NLRA] . . ." Id. Sec note 4 supra.
7 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Mar. 3, 1980), 103 L.R.R.M. 1318 (2-1 decision).
" 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1318.
" Id.
1 " Id. There were two other employer-owned bulletin boards in the breakroom: one for
use by the employer, and one "all-purpose" board for use by anyone. Id.
" Id.
2 Id.
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replied that, as a union official, " 'he had the legal right to add and delete from
that board, whenever he saw fit.' X 1 '
Subsequently, a similar incident occurred and, as a result, the employee
filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union under section 8(b)(1)(A).
Initially, the employee received a favorable ruling from an NLRB administra-
tive law judge (ALJ)." The ALJ viewed the union's use of the "official . busi-
ness only" 'rule as analogous to situations where employers selectively applied
an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule for the purpose of restricting union
solicitations only.I 5 Such action by employers had been held to be in violation
of the NLRA.' 6 Applying the reasoning of the no-solicitation cases to the im-
mediate facts, the ALJ concluded that, because the union had allowed em-
ployees to place all kinds of notices on the union bulletin board, it could not
now limit that usage by prohibiting the posting of materials critical of the
union."
• The NLRB, however, rejected the reasoning of the administrative law
judge and dismissed the complaint. The Board noted that the case was brought
under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA and that the wording of that section dif-
fered from the wording of section 8(a)(1), the statutory basis for the cases relied
on by the ALI" Both provisions describe unfair labor practices, but section
8(a)(1) is directed at employers who "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" em-
ployees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Section 8(b)(1)(A), on the other
hand, is directed at labor organizations that "restrain or coerce" employees in
the exercise of those same rights. Thus, the NLRA prohibits only restraint or
coercion — but not interference — by a union. Focusing on this statutory
distinction, the Board found that the union's actions were "completely devoid
of any implications of retribution," and that, therefore, the union had neither
restrained nor coerced, even if it had interfered with, the dissident member in
the exercise of his section 7 rights.' 9
In dismissing the complaint, the Board found it significant that the union
did not discipline the employee, or even threaten to do so, for posting the news-
letter. 2° The Board also found merit in the union's argument that the dissident
group's literature was distributed freely in the breakroom, 2 ' and that the
employee was free to post the PROD material on the all-purpose bulletin board
which was located in the same area as the union bulletin board. 22 Thus, the ac-
tion of the union did not seriously impair the employee's section 7 rights.
Unconvinced by the distinction the Board majority drew between com-
plaints brought under section 8(b)(1)(A) and those brought under section
' 2
 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id,
16 See, e.g., Lance, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (Apr. 2, 1979), 100 L.R.R.M. 1560,
1561.
" 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 103 L,R.R,M. at 1318.
la Id.
19 Id.
2° Id.
21 Id,
22 Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1318 n.3.
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8(a)(1), Member Jenkins dissented." He viewed the case as involving the same
underlying concept that was addressed by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Magnavox 0. 24
 That concept, he noted, requires that there be "even-
handed dissemination of employee views concerning unions, whether for or
against . . . "25 Magnavox involved a collective bargaining agreement under
which the employer issued a rule prohibiting employees from distributing liter-
ature on the employer's property." The Supreme Court held that employees'
section 7 rights cannot be waived by the union, and that availability of bulletin
boards for posting of union notices was not a fair substitute for the employees'
right to distribute literature pursuant to their section 7 rights. 27 Although
Magnavox was decided under section 8(a)(1), the dissent argued that it never-
theless should be controlling. In applying Magnavox to a union, Member
Jenkins concluded that a union can neither waive nor preclude the right of an
employee, under section 7, to disseminate materials that support or criticize the
union."
The dissenting opinion also disagreed with the majority's view that section
7 rights must be balanced against the union's asserted right to remove unfavor-
able material from its bulletin board. 29 Member Jenkins stated that the union's
action suppressed the employee's freedom of expression regarding matters pro-
tected by section 7 and, therefore, constituted a restraint on, or coercion of, the
employee's rights." The absence of any threat of reprisal did not lessen the
violation of section 8(b)( 1)(A), the dissent added, but the presence of such a
threat would constitute an additional violation of the NLRA. 3 '
Because the Board's decision in Teamsters Local 515 ultimately turns on the
distinction between section 8(a)(1) and section 8(b)(1)(A), an analysis of that
distinction is warranted. Section 8(a)(1) clearly lists employer interference with
employee rights as an unfair labor practice. 32 Section 8(b)(1)(A), however,
does not similarly prohibit union interference with employee rights. Instead it
limits its prohibition to union restraint or coercion. 33 The removal of dissident
materials from a previously unrestricted bulletin board certainly constitutes an
23 Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 13E9 (Jenkins, M., dissenting).
24 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
27 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1319 (Jenkins, M., dissenting).
415 U.S. at 323.
27 Id. at 325-26.
72 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1319 (Jenkins, M., dissenting).
Id.
30 Id,
31 Id. In upholding the union's action, the majority of the Board disagreed with the
dissenting member's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322
(1974). 248 N.L.R .13. No. 20, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1318 n.2. The majority distinguished Magnauox,
noting that it dealt with the employer restrictions of section 8(b)(1)(A). It further noted that the
issue before the Supreme Court in Magnavox was whether a union could waive certain section 7
rights of its members by agreeing to an employer rule which prohibited employees from
distributing literature on the employer's property. That issue, the Board asserted, was absent
from the instant case, in which the union contracted the right to use a bulletin board on the
employer's premises for official union purposes and did not attempt to waive any employee rights
in the process. 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1318 n.2.
32 See the text of § 8(a)(1) at note 4 supra.
" See the text of § 8(b)(1)(A) at note 6 supra.
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interference with an employee's section 7 rights. The framework of section 8,
however, dictates that interference with section 7 rights constitutes an unfair
labor practice only when it is committed by an employer." A union apparently
is free to interfere with its members in the exercise of their section 7 rights, so
long as it does not restrain or coerce them. Thus, the language difference be-
tween section 8(a)(1) and section 8(b)(1)(A) is crucial to the Board's holding.
The distinction between mere interference and outright restraint or coer-
cion, however, may be difficult to define. The majority in Teamsters Local 515
implicitly acknowledged that, if the respondent had been an employer, rather
than a union, the Board would have upheld the employee's unfair labor prac-
tice charge under section 8(a)(1). Indeed, on various occasions the Board has
found section 8(a)(1) violations where the employer changed its bulletin board
policy before, during, or after a union organization campaign or representation
election." In Liberty Nursing Homes, Inc., 36 for example, the employer changed
its bulletin board policy five weeks before a representation election, to prohibit
"unauthorized notices. "37 In Vincent's Steak House, Inc.," the employer imple-
mented a rule which prohibited the posting of union-related material during
the course of concerted activities." In Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc, , 4 ° following a union
organizational campaign, the employer issued an employee manual which in-
cluded rules restricting employee use of bulletin boards. 4 ' These cases are
distinguishable from Teamsters Local 515, however, because the latter case did
not involve an organizational or representation election.
The Board also ruled against employers who remove pro-union material
and threatened to discipline those employees who posted such material. 42 In
Container Corp. of America," the employer removed union newsletters from
bulletin boards and threatened an employee with disciplinary action for any re-
posting of newsletters. 44 In Green Giant Co., 45 the employer removed pro-union
literature from a bulletin board, reprimanded the employee who had posted it,
and admonished him not to post anything without prior permission. 46 Both
cases are distinguishable from Teamsters Local 515 because the union in
Teamsters did not threaten or discipline the dissident member.
Although the above cases are each distinguishable from Teamsters Local
515, the Board was faced with a case parallel to the instant one in Challenge Cook
" Compare S 8(a)(1) with 5 8(b)(1)(A). See notes 4 & 6 supra.
35 See Liberty Nursing Homes, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 456, 99 L.R.R.M. 1435 (1978);
Vincent's Steak House, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 647, 89 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1975); Beyerl Chevrolet,
Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 120, 82 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1972).
36 236 N.L.R.B. 456, 99 L.R.R.M. 1435 (1978).
37
 Id. at 461.
38 216 N.L.R.B, 647, 89 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1975).
39 Id. at 647, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
40 199 N.L.R.B. 120, 82 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1972).
4 ' Id. at 127.
4 See Container Corp. of America, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (Aug. 17, 1979), 102
L.R.R.M. 1162; Green Giant Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 377, 91 L.R.R.M. 1468 (1976).
13 244 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (Aug. 17, 1979), 102 L.R.R.M. 1162:
44 Id,, 102 L.R,R.M. at 1162.
" 223 N.L.R.B. 377, 91 L.R.R.M. 1468 (1976).
45 Id. at 379, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
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Brothers of Ohio, Inc.'" There the employer had permitted employees to post
notices of all kinds on the company bulletin board, except that, on four
separate occasions, it removed notices of union meetings, claiming no one had
sought or received permission to post such notices. Although the employer
made no threats against the employees or the union, the Board adopted the
trial examiner's finding — based on an argument by the General Counsel —
that " the ... act of singling out the union notices for removal' constitutes in-
terference with the employees' organizational rights in violation of Section
8(a)(1)."" The Board's order was enforced by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that there was substantial evidence "to
support a finding that the removal of the signs was motivated by hostility
toward union activity rather than failure to get permission."" Although the
Sixth Circuit decision lends support to the complainant in Teamsters Local 515,
its precedential value is blunted in that it involved section 8(a)(1) rather than
section 8(b)( 1 )(A).
The section 8(a)(1) cases discussed above are consistent with the statutory
directive that any interference, restraint, or coercion by an employer con-
stitutes a violation of the NLRA. They also are instructive, however, in deter-
mining the dividing line between lawful interference and unlawful restraint or
coercion by a union. A disparately-applied bulletin board policy apparently is
viewed by the Board as mere interference. Interference does not become
restraint or coercion until there is either discipline or the threat of discipline.
The Board noted in Teamsters that it "[did] not agree that the [union's] actions
.. , completely devoid of any implications of retribution, restrained or co-
erced [the employee] in the exercise of his Section 7 rights. " 56 It further noted
that the union "did not discipline or threaten [the employee] because of his ac-
tions.' ' 51
 Thus, the use or threat of discipline seems to be the dividing line be-
tween permissible and impermiSsible union activity.
In interpreting section 8 of the NLRA, the Board was probably correct in
distinguishing section 8(a) from section 8(b). Faced with discrete examples of
union disciplinary activity, however, it will likely be difficult to draw that
distinction rationally.
III. INTERNATIONAL UNION'S DUTY TO END WILDCAT STRIKES:
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers*
Provisions within collective-bargaining agreements requiring the arbitra-
tion of grievances have been held to create an implied contract not to strike.'
Strikes in violation of this implied duty make the local unions liable in damages
" 153 N.L.R.B. 92, 59 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1965), enf 'd, 374 F.2d 147, 64 L.R.R.M. 2481
(6th Cir. 1967).
" 153 N.L.R.B. at 99.
374 F.2d at 153, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2484.
248 N.L.R.B. No, 20, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1318.
Id.
• By Bill R. Fenstemaker, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1972).
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to the employer.' In recent years, a dispute has developed over the imposition
of liability on international unions for such strikes.' Specifically, the dispute
concerns whether an international union is liable for damages to an employer
for failure to use all reasonable means to prevent and end unauthorized strikes
that violate collective-bargaining agreements. 4
 In responding to this question,
a conflict has developed among the various courts of appeals. The Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has imposed a duty upon the international union to use
its best efforts to end unauthorized strikes. 5 In contrast, the Fourth, 6 Sixth,'
and Seventh8 Circuits have rejected such an implied duty.
During the Survey year the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in Carbon
Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers.' In Carbon Fuel, the Court held that there is no
obligation on an international union, "which agreed to arbitrate grievances, to
use reasonable means to try to control the locals' actions in contravention of
that agreement."'° The Court also held that in light of the bargaining history
of the Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement ("agreement"), the "integrity
clause"" in the agreement was not meant to impose on the.Union an obligation
to get unauthorized strikers back to work."
The holdings of the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel are significant for
several reasons. First, the Court resolved the conflict between the circuits con-
cerning an international union's implied-in-law obligation to use all reasonable
means to prevent or end a wildcat strike. This holding has ramifications far
beyond the mining industry and will be reflected in future contract provisions
which attempt to assign this duty to the international unions. Carbon Fuel is also
significant in the coal mining industry for its elimination of one possible inter-
pretation of the integrity clause in the United Mine Worker's (UMWA) Bitu-
minous Coal Wage Agreement." Finally, Carbon Fuel is important because it
emphasizes the necessity of examining the specific terms and bargaining
Id. Injunctive relief has also been allowed when a duty not to strike, whether express or
implied from a mandatory arbitration clause, has been violated. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA,
414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
See text and notes at notes 6-9 infra.
4 Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 213 (1979).
Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 89 L.R.R.M. 3177 (3d Cir. 1975).
Accord, Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. UMWA, 585 F.2d 586, 99 L.R.R.M. 2612 (3d
Cir. 1978); Republic Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d 467, 97 L.R.R.M. 2836 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States Steel v. UMWA, 534 F.2d 1063, 91 L.R.R.M. 3031, rehearing denied en banc, 534
F.2d 1084, 92 L.R.R.M. 2575 (3d Cir, 1976).
6 Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 99 L.R.R.M. 2520 (4th Cir. 1978);
United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 36 L.R.R.M. 2315 (4th Cir,
1955).
Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMWA, 551 F.2d 695, 94 L.R.R.M. 2609 (6th Cir.
1977).
Old Ben Coal Corp. v, UMWA, 457 F.2d 162, 79 L.R.R.M. 2845 (7th Cir. 1972).
9 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
'° Id. at 218.
" The integrity clause, discussed in detail in the text at notes 47-56 infra, provides that
the United Mine Workers will maintain the integrity of the agreement which calls for the
peaceful settlement of all disputes and claims. Id. at 220-21.
12 Id. at 221.
1 ' Id. The significance is lessened, however, because the Court expressly refrained from
deciding what that clause does mean. Id. at n.9.
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history of each contract in order to ascertain the parent union's responsibility
for violations of the collective-bargaining contract by union locals.
An understanding of the significance of Carbon Fuel requires a review of the
facts of that case. During the period between 1969 and 1973, three mine
worker's union locals engaged in forty-eight wildcat strikes in the Carbon Fuel
Company's mines in West Virginia.' 4
 Carbon Fuel Co. alleged that these
strikes were in violation of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements of
1968 and 1971 to which both Carbon Fuel Co. and the UMWA were parties."
During the period of the Agreement, District 17, a regional subdivision of
UMWA, unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the miners not to strike and to
return to work. 16 Seeking injunctive relief" and damages from the strikes, Car-
bon Fuel Co. brought a suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia. ' 8
 The claim was based on secton 310 of the Taft-Hartley Act,' 9
and named as defendants the UMWA, District 17, and the three local
unions." The trial judge held that the strikes violated the agreements as a mat-
ter of law. 2 ' The judge then instructed the jury that the UMWA and District 17
might be liable if it could be proved that they had not used "all of the reason-
able means available to them" to prevent or stop the strikes in violation of the
contracts." The jury returned verdicts aggregating $206,547.80 against the in-
ternational union, $242,130.80 against District 17, and $722,347.43 against
the three local unions."
On appea1, 24 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated in part
and affirmed in part the judgment against the three local unions, and vacated
the judgments against the international union and District 17. 25 With respect
to the local unions, the court of appeals found that seventeen of the forty-eight
strikes were sympathy strikes and therefore, in the absence of a no-strike
clause, were not actionable. 26 The Court found that the other thirty-one strikes
were properly characterized as wildcat strikes and the locals were liable on the
14 Id at 213.
" Id. at 214.
16 Id. at 213-14.
"7 Id. at 214. The contract had expired so that the injunctive relief request was moot by
the time the controversy reached the Supreme Court. Id. at n.2.
is Id
19 29 U.S.C. 5 185 (1976). Section 301 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
making collective-bargaining agreements judicially enforceable as contracts in the federal district
courts. See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v, Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
" Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 214.
21 Id.
72 Id.
" Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1348, 99 L.R.R.M. 2520, 2520 (4th
Cir. 1978),
74 Id.
" Id. at 1351, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2523.
26 Id. at 1348, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2521. Carbon Fuel came to trial before the Supreme Court
decided Buffalo Forge v. Steel Workers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). The Court in Buffalo Forge held that
in the absence of an express no-strike clause, a sympathy strike is not actionable. In light of this
development, Carbon Fuel Co. conceded that the seventeen sympathy strikes should not have
been submitted to the jury. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1348, 99 L.R.R.M.
2520, 2521 (4th Cir. 1978).
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basis of the "mass action" theory of responsibility." The UMWA and District
17 were not found liable under the mass action theory because ordinarily its ap-
plication is limited to the local union unless some complicity is shown on the
part of the larger union entity. 28
 In this regard, the court found that there was
no evidence that the UMWA or District 17 instigated, supported, or ratified
the strike. 29
In vacating the judgments against the UMWA and District 17, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit felt compelled to follow its decision in United
Construction Workers u. Haislip Baking Co." The court in Haislip had held that an
international union has no responsibility for a strike which it neither sanctioned
nor authorized. 31 According to the Haislip court, the correct standard for deter-
mining liability is not whether the non-local union did everything it could to
end the strike but whether it adopted, encouraged, or prolonged the continu-
ance of the strike." Applying this standard, the court of appeals in Carbon Fuel
held that because there was no evidence that the international union and Dis-
trict 17 adopted, encouraged, or prolonged the strike, and because nothing in
the contract imposes liability for wildcat strikes, the judgments against them
should be vacated."
A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals. 34
 To Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, the question was
[W]hether an international union, which neither instigates, supports,
ratifies, or encourages "wildcat" strikes engaged in by local unions
in violation of a collective-bargaining agreement, may be held liable
in damages to an affected employer if the union did not use all rea-
sonable means available to it to prevent the strikes or bring about
their termination. 35
In holding that neither the UMWA nor District 17 was liable in damages
under the circumstances of this case, the Court rejected the employer's conten-
tions that liability could be implied in law because (1) the agreement contains
an arbitration provision for settling disputes, or (2) the agreement contains a
provision that the parties agree to maintain the integrity of the contract. 36
The Court examined in great detail each of the employee's contentions.
First the Court examined Carbon Fuel Co.'s argument that the obligations not
to strike, implied in the agreement to resolve all disputes by arbitration, implies
27 Id. at 1349, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2521. The "mass action" theory confers liability based
on the premise that "large groups of men do not act collectively without leadership and that a
functioning union must be held responsible for the mass action of its members." Id., 99
L.R.R.M. at 2521-22.
28 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 2522.
29
	at 1351, 99 L.R.R.M, at 2523.
223 F.2d 872, 36 L.R.R.M. 2315 (4th Cir. 1955).
3 ' Id. at 877, 36 L.R.R.M. at 2318.
" Id. at 877-78, 36 L.R.R.M. at 2318.
" Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F,2d 1346, 1351, 99 L.R.R.M. 2520, 2523 (4th
Cir. 1978).
" Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 215 {1979).
" Id. at 213.
36 Id. at 216.
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an additional obligation on the international union and District 17 to use all
reasonable means to control the local's actions in derogation of that agree-
ment," In rejecting this theory, the Court reasoned that while section 301" of
the Act makes collective-bargaining agreements judicially enforceable, the
legislative history of the Act shows that Congress "stopped short of imposing
liability upon a union for strikes not authorized, participated in, .or ratified by
it." 39 Instead, Congress provided in section 301(e)" that unions would be
governed by the common law agency test:" The Court determined that Car-
bon Fuel Co. failed to prove that an agency relationship existed between the in-
ternational or district union and the strikers." In support of this determina-
tion, the Court stated that the record did not indicate that these unions in-
stigated or supported the strikes." Moreover, the Court observed that there
was evidence that the UMWA repeatedly expressed its opposition to the
wildcat strikes." Based on these findings, and the clear congressional state-
ment expressed in section 301, the Court concluded that an agreement to ar-
bitrate grievances does not impose upon the international union an obligation
to use reasonable means to control the actions of a local union which violates
the agreement."
After ruling on the effect of the arbitration agreement, the Court focused
on the employer's second argument that if the obligation to use all reasonable
means to end an unauthorized strike cannot he implied from the promise to ar-
bitrate disputes, the obligation should be implied from the international
union's promise to "maintain the integrity" of the contract.'" The employer
contended that this promise, intended to resolve disputes by arbitration, has no
meaning if the UMWA and District 17 are not obligated to exercise their best
efforts to force the miners to live up to the contracts.'" The Court rejected this
argument:" Stating that one of Congress' most important policies in the Taft-
Hartley Act was to promote free collective-bargaining, the Court maintained
that if the parties' agreement specifically resolves a particular issue, the Court
will not substitute a different resolution." From this perspective, the Court
looked at the bargaining history of the "integrity clause" and found that it did
not permit acceptance of the employer's argument." The bargaining history,
which includes a specific deletion of an employer's obligation to end disputes,
shows that whatever the clause may mean, "the parties purposely decided not
Id. at 216-18.
" 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
3`' Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 216.
40 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1976).
4 ' Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 216-17. Agency is by definition a consensual relationship.
" Id. at 218.
/1 Id
"
45 Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 218.
47 Id. at 219.
48 Id. at 218-22.
Id. at 219.
5`' Id. at 219-21.
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to impose on the union an obligation to take disciplinary or other actions to get
unauthorized strikers back to work." 5 '
In addition, the Court observed that since the insertion of the disputed in-
tegrity clause, but before 1968 or 1971 when the arguments at issue were
reached, two courts of appeals had interpreted the provision in a manner which
did not impose liability on the Union for wildcat strikes and did not require the
UMWA to take any action with regard to such strikes. 52 The Court stated that
if the parties did not agree with this interpretation they had "ample opportuni-
ty to make their own understanding explicit." 53
 According to the Court, failure
to do so indicated that they had incorporated the courts' interpretation. 54 Thus
the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court,of appeals."
The Supreme Court's holding in Carbon Fuel was based on the clear ex-
pression of congressional intent in section 301, which limited the union's
responsibility to situations where a common law agency relationship could be
shown. 56 Absent proof of agency, any duty on the part of the union to use all
reasonable means to end a wildcat strike would have to originate in the parties'
agreement. The record at bar clearly showed lack of' an agency relationship or
contractual obligation and therefore necessitated that the Court refuse to im-
pose a duty upon the union. 57 Consequently, the Court's decision, based on
both statutory interpretation and factual analysis, was correct.
The practical results of Carbon Fuel exist at two levels. At the single-
industry level, the Court's rejection of one possible interpretation of the "in-
tegrity clause" in the Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement affects only the min-
ing industry. This holding, however, also has ramifications on the multi-
industry level. Carbon Fuel can be read as requiring employers and international
unions in all industries to include provisions in their collective-bargaining
agreements if they intend the international union to assume liability for wildcat
strikes.
In reaching its holding, the Carbon Fuel Court dealt only with the issues
" Id. at 221. Reviewing the bargaining history of the agreement, the Court noted that
when the parties first contracted, in 1941, the agreement contained an explicit no-strike clause.
The Court observed that this provision was deleted in 1947 because of the UMWA's desire to
avoid liability for contractual breaches under 301. Instead, the liability was limited to em-
ployees "able and willing to work" and the parties agreed that all disputes would be settled
through arbitration or collective-bargaining. In 1950 the contract was again rewritten and the
"able and willing" provision was replaced by a promise to "maintain the integrity" of the con-
tract and "to exercise their best efforts through auailable disciplinary measures to prevent stoppages of work
by strike or lockout." Id. at 219-21 (emphasis in original). In 1952 the union negotiated the
removal of the "best efforts through available disciplinary measures" clause. The provisions of
the 1952 contract, dealing with this issue, were carried forward unchanged to the 1968 and 1971
contracts. Id.
" Id. at 222. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 43 L.R.R.M. 2237 (6th
Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 459 (1960); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d
872, 36 L.R.R.M. 2315 (4th Cir. 1955).
" Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 222.
" Id.
55 Id.
" Id. at 216-18.
$7 Id. at 218-21.
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before it and properly refrained from commenting upon the appropriateness of
imposing a duty upon the international union to use reasonable means to end
or prevent unauthorized strikes. Under the current law such a duty does not
exist. The concept, however, is worthy of legislative attention. While this
chapter favors a legislative enactment of a reasonable means duty, arguments
both for and against its imposition will be discussed. 58
Two criticisms of the "all reasonable means" duty are that it deprives the
international union of flexibility and that the "reasonable means" actually
available to the union are limited. The imposition of an all reasonable
means" duty would lessen flexibility by forcing the international unions to take
sanctions against the wildcat strikers when non-involvement might be more
conducive to a quick settlement. This is especially true when the wildcat strike
is a result of the workers' frustration with or lack of confidence in the interna-
tional union." A second criticism is that a statutory obligation to use all rea-
sonable means to end wildcat strikes would be limited by the notice and hear-
ing requirements of the Landrum-Griffin Act." This act requires that before
being disciplined a member must receive written charges, be given a reason-
able time to prepare his defense, and be afforded a full and fair hearing."
Similar disciplinary restrictions are often found in union constitutions and by-
laws. 62
 Thus, it is argued that a reasonable means obligation to end wildcat
strikes would be neither justifiable nor effective.
The arguments against this view and in favor of adopting a reasonable
means obligation are more concerned with ending wildcat strikes than with
participating in strict statutory interpretation. The mining industry illustrates
the crippling effect that wildcat strikes can have." When the whole nation is
potentially affected by a wildcat strike in the coal mining industry, contractual
provisions between the parties and damage remedies may not prove a satisfac-
tory safeguard. Often one wildcat strike may cause many sympathy strikes."
In light of our current shortage of energy resources our nation can ill afford a
coal industry plagued with shut downs. The fact that these strikes affect the
whole nation and not just the contracting parties makes damages'an insignifi-
cant deterrent. The imposition on the international unions of a duty to use all
reasonable means to end wildcat strikes does not appear to be too heavy a
burden in relation to what is at stake. Such a duty would further our national
labor policy of eliminating obstructions to the free flow of commerce by en-
" For a discussion of the arguments against imposition of the duty, see generally Note,
Unions Have Duty to Use All Reasonable Means to End Unauthorized Strikes, 89 HARV. L. REV. 601,
607.08 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
" Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 52 CORNELL. L.Q. 672, 702 (1967).
" 29 L.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976).
6j Id.
62 Harvard Note, supra note 58, at 609.
63
 The extent of these strikes is shown by the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association's
allegation that in the first half of 1975, wildcat strikes in their mines resulted in a loss of 1,368,000
men-days and of 116,500,000 tons of coal. Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. UMWA, 585
F.2d 586, 590, 99 L.R.R.M. 2612, 2615 (3d Cir. 1978).
64 See Republic Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d 467, 97 L.R.R.M. 2836 (3d Cir.
1978).
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couraging friendly adjustment of industrial disputes through collective
bargaining. 65
Accepting that it was the intent of Congress in enacting the National
Labor Relations Act 66 to encourage collective bargaining as a means of settling
labor disputes," it appears that the international unions are in the best position
to effectuate this intent with respect to wildcat strikes. The international unions
are the connecting factors and perhaps the only organizations capable of pre-
venting an industry-wide shut down. 6a They communicate with both em-
ployers and employees69 and they have the ability to discipline their members.
While Carbon Fuel correctly expressed existing law, it may be time for the Con-
gress to impose upon international unions the responsibility to police their own
locals and prevent their willful repudiation of contractual obligations, their de-
fiance of internal union law, and their disregard of our nation's labor policy. 70
IV. OSHA — EMPLOYEES' RIGHT NOT TO PERFORM DANGEROUS TASKS:
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall*
Section 11(c)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970' (Act)
prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee
because of the employee's exercise of any right afforded by the Act.' In 1973
the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) promulgated a regulation that provides that
one of the rights protected by the Act is the right of an employee to refuse to
perform an assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of death or
serious injury. 3 Under the regulation, the employee must have no reasonable
65 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). This section provides in relevant part: "It is declared to be
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
Mg. . ." Id.
" 29 U.S.C. $§ 141-188 (1976).
" Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68 Republic Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d 467, 479, 97 L. R.R.M. 2836, 2844 (3d
Cir. 1978).
69 Id. at 478, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2844. The court in Republic Steel especially noted the Inter-
national Union's ability to communicate with all locals in the event of sympathy strikes. Id.
70 See Republic Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d 467, 480, 97 L.R.R.M. 2836, 2845
(3d Cir. 1978).
By Adelbert L. Spitzer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976), provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be insti-
tuted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on
behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
The regulation, 29 C.F.R. S 1977.12, as amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 4577 (1973), pro-
vides in part:
(b)(1) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative
history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act
which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe con-
ditions at the workplace. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act
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alternative available for his protection, short of refusing to perform the as-
signed task and must act in good faith. 4
 Although the Act outlines a detailed
procedure for reporting dangerous conditions, nowhere does it expressly pro-
vide that an employee has the right to refuse to perform an assigned job
because of his perception of danger. Two circuit courts of appeals have re-
viewed the legislative history of the Act and held that the regulation is invalid
because the Secretary exceeded his authority granted by the Ac.t. 5
During the Survey year a unanimous United States Supreme Court held in
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall 6
 that in light of the Act's language, structure, and
legislative history, the regulation is a valid exercise of the Secretary's authority,
and constitutes a permissible gloss on the Act.' The decision reflects the
Court's belief that it would be "anomalous" to interpret the Act in a manner
that would force a worker to choose between his job and a perceived risk of
serious injury or death. 8
 The holding in Whirlpool, permitting employee "self-
help" in certain circumstances, is of great importance to advocates of safety in
the workplace. It remains to be seen, however, whether the lower federal courts
will interpret the Act and regulation in a manner that will truly protect workers
faced with highly dangerous job assignments.
will ordinarily be corrected by the employer, once brought to his attention. If cor-
rections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a
hazard, the employe will normally have opportunity to request inspection of the
workplace pursuant to section 8(f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other
public agencies which have responsibility in the field of safety and health. Under
such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be in violation of
section 11(c) by taking action to discipline an employee for refusing to perform
normal job activities because of alleged safety or health hazards.
(b)(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a
choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious in-
jury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the
employee, with no reasonable alternative, refused in good faith to expose himself
to the dangerous condition, he would be protected against subsequent discrimina-
tion. The condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury must
be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then con-
fronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or
serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situa-
tion, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement chan-
nels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also
have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of
dangerous condition.
'
Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
880 (1978); Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., No. 77-2084 (10th Cir., Dec. 28, 1978). In
Daniel Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit concluded from the legislative history of the Act that
workers were given the right under the Act to request inspection of the employer's business
premises in lieu of the right to leave the premises with pay. 563 F.2d at 713. Furthermore, because
Congress expressly denied the Occupational Safety and Health Administration the right to issue
a stop work order, the court found the Secretary's granting of the equivalent right to a worker to
be in excess of the Secretary's authority under the Act. Id. at 715. The court expressed concern
that an employee's abuse of the regulation could "cripple" his employer's business and stated
that the legislative history of the Act was "manifest" that Congress desired to avoid such a result.
Id.
445 U.S. 1 (1980).
Id. at 11, 22.
8
 Id. at 12.
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Whirlpool Corporation operates a manufacturing plant in Marion, Ohio
for the production of household appliances. 9 Overhead conveyor belts trans-
port component parts throughout the plant and a wire guard screen is sus-
pended below the belt, approximately twenty feet above the plant floor, to
catch parts that fall from the belt." It is the duty of the maintenance crew to re-
move these parts from the screen, a task which originally required that the
worker occasionally step onto the screen." In 1973 the unsafe nature of the
screen was called to the company's attention and it began replacing the older
screen with new, heavier mesh screen." On June 28, 1974 an employee fell
through a part of the guard screen that had not yet been replaced and was
killed." Following this incident the company issued an order forbidding main-
tenance employees from stepping on the screen or the angle irons which sup-
ported it." Nevertheless, on July 7, 1974 two employees were directed to per-
form their regular maintenance duties on a section of the old screen." These
employers earlier that day had expressed their concern about the safety of the
screen to the plant maintenance superintendent, and also had notified the
regional Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) office about
the guard screen.' 6 Both employees refused to perform the assignment, claim-
ing that the screen was unsafe." They were ordered to punch out without
working or being paid for the six hours remaining of their shift, and a written
reprimand was placed on their employment files."
A month later the Secretary filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio alleging that Whirlpool had violated section 11(c)
(1) of the Act by discriminating against the employees for their reasonable refusal
to walk on the guard screen." The district court held that although the em-
ployees' refusal to work was caused by a reasonable fear of death or serious bod-
ily harm, and therefore was justified by the Secretary's regulation, relief must be
denied because the regulation was inconsistent with the Act and consequently
was invalid. 20 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded
the case for further proceedings, holding that the regulation was valid. 21 The
Id. at 5.
" Id.
" Id.
12 Id.
" Id. at 5-6.
' 4 Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
16 Id. at 6.
17 Id. at 7.
18 Id.
Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 32-33 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
20 Id. at 33. The district court found that the legislative history of the Act demonstrated
that the regulation was "clearly inconsistent" with the Act. The court considered two aspects of
the legislative history, the rejection of a "strike with pay" provision and the rejection of a provi-
sion entitling an OSHA inspector to shut down a plant. Id. at 33-34. See text at notes 26-36 infra.
2 ' Marshall v..Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 716 (6th Cir. 1979). The Sixth Circuit
made a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Act, concluding that the regulation is a
valid exercise of the Secretary's authority and that it is continent with the Act and with congres-
sional intent. Id. at 736. The court stressed that the two provisions of the Act rejected by Con-
gress, the strike with pay provision and the provision entitling an OSHA inspector to shut down a
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Supreme Court granted Whirlpool's petition for certiorari. 22
Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court," found that "Whe regu-
lation clearly conforms to the fundamental objective of the Act — to prevent
occupational deaths and serious injuries." 24 The regulation also assists the
Act's "general duty" clause, the Court observed, which provides that "[e]ach
employer . . . shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.' " 25 Finally, the
Court stated that because safety legislation is to be construed liberally the regu-
lation would be upheld unless the legislative history of the Act revealed that the
regulation did not further the Act's overriding purpose."
Whirlpool presented two contentions in arguing that the legislative history
of the Act revealed the invalidity of the Secretary's regulation." Whirlpool's
first contention was that Congress specifically had rejected an earlier draft of
the Act that would have permitted employees, under certain circumstances, to
refuse to perform a hazardous task without suffering a loss of compensation. 28
The Court, however, found Congress' rejection of this so-called "strike with
pay" provision to be unpersuasive evidence of the regulation's invalidity for
two reasons. First, the rejected provision applied to a different situation than
that faced by the Whirlpool employees because it "did not concern itself at all
with conditions posing real and immediate threats of death or severe injury.'" 29
Second, the provision's unpopularity apparently was due largely to the em-
ployee's continued right to receive conpensation." The Court noted that the
Secretary's regulation, to the contrary, did not require employers to pay em-
ployees who refused hazardous assignments."' The employer was simply not
permitted, under section 1 1(c)(1) of the Act, to "discriminate" against the
employee. Although the Court found that placing reprimands in the em-
ployees' files constituted such discrimination, the Court expressly noted that it
was not deciding whether the employees' loss of six hours pay was discrimina-
tion under the Act."
The Court likewise was unimpressed with Whirlpool's second contention
that Congress had rejected a proposed provision in the Act that would have
plant, were completely distinct from the rights created by the Secretary's regulation. Id. at
726-36.
22
 44 U.S. 823 (1979).
23 Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 2 (1980).
24
 Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. at 12-13, quoting 29 U.S.C. 5 654(a)(1) (1976),
26 445 U.S. 13, quoting United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969); Lilly
v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943).
27
 445 U.S. at 13.
28 Id. at 14-15. See Section 19(a)(5) of H.R. 16785, H.R. REP. NO. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
OF 1970, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 969-70 (June 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
29
 445 U.S. at 17.
39 Id.
3 ' Id. at 19.
32 Id. at 19 n.31.
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permitted Labor Department officials to temporarily shut down all or part of
the employer's plant in imminent danger situations." Whirlpool contended
that it would be contrary to congressional intent to allow employees the power
to shut down an employer's plant when this same power was denied the De-
partment of Labor." The Court observed, however, that an employee only has
the right to avoid highly hazardous situations, and does not have the authority
to shut down a plant or to order the employer to correct the hazardous situa-
tion." Thus, the regulation does not, the Court concluded, even remotely
resemble the provision that Congress rejected. 36 Because the regulation was in
accord with the purpose of the Act, and because the legislative history of the
Act did not reveal a contrary congressional intent, the Court upheld the validi-
ty of the regulation and affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 37
The Whirlpool decision reveals a willingness on the part of the Supreme
Court to allow the Secretary of Labor to go beyond the formal protections of
the Act so that a worker is not faced with a potentially tragic choice between his
safety and his livelihood. There are, however, limits to the protection provided
by the regulation and the Court's decision. The regulation does not apply to
those situations where an assigned task is hazardous, but does not present a
real danger of death or serious injury." It applies only to the relatively unusual
situation where the other protections guaranteed by the Act either have failed.
or have been delayed, and the employee is faced with an immediate and grave
danger. 39
 For example, after an employee has called the regional OSHA office
and reported an imminently dangerous situation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
657(0, the regulation insures that the employee cannot be required to perform
the dangerous task while waiting for the inspector to arrive. The regulation
does not insure, however, that an employee will be able to assert his rights
without having to face a substantial risk.
The Supreme Court indicated, although it did not decide, that the failure
to pay an employee who refused to perform a life-threatening task does not
necessarily constitute discrimination under the Act. 4° Should the lower courts,
following this Supreme Court dictum, decide that the refusal to pay does not
constitute discrimination under the terms of the Act, an employer conceivably
could refuse to assign the employee to an alternate task. Thus, until the OSHA
inspector was able to inspect the hazardous condition, the worker would return
home safe at the end of the day, but penniless.
Furthermore, an employee who refused to perform a life-threatening as-
signment must gamble everything on the hope that OSHA or a judge will find
his refusal to have been reasonable. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its
Whirlpool decision, described the prospects of an employee who has been fired
33 Id at 19-21. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 263-64, 855, 1193.
34
 445 U.S. at 20.
" Id. at 21.
" Id.
37 Id. at 22.
" See section (b)(I) of the regulation, supra note 3.
39 445 U.S. at 10-11.
4° Id. at 19 n.31.
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for refusing a dangerous assignment.'" The employee would lose, at least for
the time being, his current income, acquired seniority, and his pension
rights. 42
 If the Secretary files a complaint on the employee's behalf, the em-
ployee can regain these lost benefits only if he can prove: first, that he acted in
good faith; second, that he had no reasonable alternative; third, that the situa-
tion he faced was one which would cause a reasonable person under the same
circumstances to conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious injury;
and fourth, that there was insufficient time to resort to regular enforcement
channels. 43
 These four requirements place a substantial burden on an em-
ployee.
Although the Whirlpool decision is a victory for advocates of safety in the
workplace, the above scenarios suggest that an employee assigned to a
dangerous task is still faced with a dilemma. The possibility of losing pay or of
being fired are certainly adequate constraints to prevent employees from mak-
ing frivolous claims of life-theatening danger. Unfortunately, even after the
Whirlpool decision, an employee faced with a highly dangerous task still might
be deterred from refusing to perforrri the task because of the risk to his liveli-
hood. It is to be hoped that the lower federal courts will hold that the failure to
pay an employee does constitute "discrimination" under the Act and that they
will not place too heavy a burden of proof on the safety-conscious employee
who has been fired for refusing to place his life in danger. Without this kind of
assistance from the federal judiciary, the regulation upheld in Whirlpool will be
of little practical value because of the continuing risk of sanctions against em-
ployees who assert the right that it creates.
V. RLA — PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN UNFAIR REPRESENTATION SUITS:
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust*
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Railway Labor Act' (RLA) as im-
posing upon the union a duty to represent fairly the interests of all its
members. 2
 A union breaches this duty when it acts in an arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or bad faith manner toward employees, such as when it "arbitrarily ig-
nore[s] a meritorious grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunctory fashion."'
While employees have a right, implied from the RLA, to bring unfair repre-
sentation suits in the federal district courts, Congress has not specified what
types of damages are available' under this Act. Without legislative guidelines,
the courts of appeals have developed different standards as to when punitive
damages may be imposed. The Third Circuit has indicated that punitive dam-
+ 1 593 F.2d at 734-35.
42 Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
By Bill R. Fenstemaker, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 45 U.S.C. SS 151-164 (1976).
2
 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). See
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
442 U.S. at 47.
4
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ages in unfair representation suits may be impermissible,' while the Eighth
Circuit has awarded punitive damages only upon a finding that the union has
expressed malice toward the employee. 6
 In contrast to these two approaches,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW) v. Foust,' recently chose to follow the Fourth Circuit's view
that punitive damages are proper where a union acts in wanton, malicious or
callous disregard.of an employee's right. 8
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court granted certiorari' to resolve
the conflict between the circuits. The Court in its review of IBEW v. Foust"'
held that under the RLA, punitive damages may not be imposed upon a union
which breaches its duty of fair representation by failing to pursue a grievance in
a proper manner." The Court's holding in Foust is significant in that it denies
recovery of punitive damages in all unfair representation actions under the
RLA." The per se denial of punitive damages eliminates the need for inquiry
into the degree of the union's culpability. Once a breach is established,
damages are awarded in a compensatory manner, with no reference to whether
the union acted with intentional malice or mere negligence.
A review of the facts of IBEW v. Foust is necessary for a full understanding
of the significance of a rule which denies punitive damages per se. The respond-
ent in IBEW v. Foust was a member of the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers. 13
 He was injured on the job, received a medical leave of absence,
and subsequently was discharged after failing to make a proper request for an
extension of his leave.' 4
 Respondent's attorney then wrote to the union's dis-
trict chairman to ask the union to initiate grievance proceedings on behalf of
the respondent. 15
 This letter was recieved by the district chairman fifty-two
days after the dismissal." Although the district chairman was aware that
IBEW's collective-bargaining agreement required presentation of grievances
"within 60 days from the date of the occurrence on which the claim . . . is
based,"" he did not immediately prepare a grievance letter." Instead, he con-
tacted the union's general chairman, who insisted that respondent make a per-
Deboles v. TWA, 552 F.2d 1005, 94 L.R.R.M. 3237 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 837, 96 L.R.R.M. 2514 (1977). While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to decide
what circumstances would justify punitive damages, the Court did indicate that such damages
would not be proper in the absence of actual injury resulting from the union's wrongful conduct.
Id.
Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, 514 F.2d 442, 88 L.R.R.M. 3169 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
442 U.S. 42 (1979).
" Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 90 L.R.R.M. 3265 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958, 92 L.R.R.M. 2168 (1976).
9 IBEW v. Foust, 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
442 U.S. 42 (1979).
" Id. at 52.
IS Id.
' 5 Id. at 43.
H Id. at 43.
15 Id. at 44.
IS Id.
17 Id.
' 6 Id.
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sonal written request for the union's assistance.° A letter to this effect was
drafted by the general chairman and mailed to the district chairman. Sixty-one
days after the discharge, the letter was forwarded to the respondent" When
the grievance claim was submitted finally, the employer denied respondent's
claim on the ground that IBEW had not complied with the sixty-day require-
ment. 2 '
The respondent then brought this suit in the Federal District Court for the
District of Wyoming, alleging that the union breached its duty of fair represen-
tation in its handling of the grievance." The Wyoming district court instructed
the jury that they could award punitive damages if they found that the union
had acted " 'maliciously, or wantonly, or oppressively.' "23 The jury found
for the respondent and awarded him $40,000 actual damages and $75,000
punitive damages. 24 The union subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. 25 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
district court in part and remanded on the issue of whether punitive damages
were excessive." The court of appeals held that "[w]anton conduct or reckless
disregard for the rights of the employees" justifies the award of punitive dam-
ages against the union. 27
Because this standard differed from those used by the Third and Eighth
Circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari" to decide what circumstances
justify awarding punitive damages against a union that breaches its duty of fair
representation under the RLA." The Court held that under the RLA, punitive
damages could not be assessed against a union which breached its duty of fair
representation. 31) According to the Court's reasoning, since Congress had not
specified what remedies were available under the RLA in unfair representation
suits, it was the Court's function to "implement a remedial scheme that will
best effecutate the purposes of the Railway Labor Act. " 31 In fulfilling this func-
tion, the Court stated four reasons which supported denial of punitive damages
in every case of union breach of representation.
First, the Court reviewed the cases of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 32
and Vaca v. Sipes 33 and discerned that the fundamental purpose of unfair repre-
sentation suits is to compensate the employee. 34 In addition, the Foust Court
stated that the compensation principle as applied in Vaca is meant not only as a
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 719, 97 L.R.R,M, 3040, 3047 (10th Cir. 1978).
IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. at 45.
Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d at 711, 97 L.R.R.M. at 3041.
Id. at 719, 97 L.R.R.M. at 3047.
Id.
IBEW v. Foust, 439 U.S. at 892 (1978).
IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 47.
323 U.S. 192 (1944) (relief should be fashioned to make the injured employee whole).
386 U.S. 171 (1967) (damages and equitable relief allowed to ensure full compensa-
" IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. at 48-49.
19
20
21
22
2.3
24
25
27
29
30
31
32
:1
tion).
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measure of relief to the injured employee, but as a limit on the union's liabil-
ity." The Court sought to limit the union's liability in order to protect their
limited funds." In the Court's view punitive damages would exceed the com-
pensatory limitation, and, therefore, should not be allowed in unfair represent-
ation suits."
The Court's second reason for denying punitive damages, was that federal
labor policy generally is remedial and thus disfavors awards of punitive dam-
ages." In support of this view, the Court cited its rejection of punitive damages
in certain unfair labor practice cases under the National Labor Relations Act 39
and in actions under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act.°
The third reason expressed by the Foust Court in favor of the per se rule not
permitting punitive damages, was that such damages, if allowed, could deplete
union treasuries and thus impair the effectiveness of unions as collective-bar-
gaining agents.'" The Court stated that because juries have such broad discre-
tion in determining the amount of punitive damages, the impact of recoveries
would be unpredictable and potentially substantial. 42
The final reason against punitive damages which the Court offered was
that these damages would curtail the discretion the union enjoys in handling
grievances and thus would undermine peaceful labor negotiations. 43 According
to the Court, the fear of punitive damages would force unions to "process
frivolous claims or resist fair settlements."'" This in turn would weaken the
employer's confidence in the union and disrupt collective bargaining.'" The
Court thus summarized that because general labor policy does not favor puni-
tive damages and because these damages would have substantial adverse ef-
fects on the unions, a union should not be liable for punitive damages when it
breaches its duty of fair representation.'" Accordingly, the court of appeals'
decision, insofar as it allowed punitive damages, was reversed. 47
Justice Blackmun, with whom Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Stevens joined, concurred in the Foust result." Justice Blackmun,
however, rejected the majority's per se rule, which disallowed punitive damages
for all breaches of the duty of fair representation. 49 The concurring Justices
found the per se rule unacceptable because it did not allow for consideration of
" Id. at 49.
" Id. at 49-50.
" Id.
" Id. at 52.
" Id. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). The National Labor Rela-
tions Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. 55 151-168 (1976).
4° Id. See Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 337 U.S. 252 (1964). Section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. 	 187 (1976).
" 1BEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. at 50-51.
49 Id. at 50.
43 Id. at 51-52.
" Id. at 52.
46 Id. at 51.
46 Id. at 52.
47 Id.
49 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 53.
100	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 22:40
how egregious the breach may have been." According to the concurring
Justices, "ti]f a union's conduct should reveal intentional racial discrimina-
tion, deliberate personal animus, or conscious infringement of speech and as-
sociational freedoms . . . no principle of federal labor policy . . . stands in the
way of punitive award."" The proper disposition of this case, in Justice
Blackmun's view, would have been to hold that the trial judge erred in sub-
mitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. 52
 In defense of this position,
Justice Blackmun examined the four rationales of the majority and found them
all unpersuasive.
Justice Blackmun asserted that the compensation theory expressed in Vaca
and Steele does not limit the employee's ability to recover damages. 53
 The ma-
jority was incorrect, according to Justice Blackmun, when it "converted the
floor beneath the injured employee's remedies into a ceiling on top of them. "54
The concurring Justice explained that the Vaca Court's limitation on union
liability is also inapplicable to this case because Vaca involved a situation where
all of the worker's damages were attributable to the employer and consequent-
ly, the case stands only for the proposition that a union which is not liable for
compensatory damages is also not liable for punitive damages." Therefore, the
concurrence did not find support in Vaca and Steele for a compensation theory
which would disallow punitive damages.
The concurrence was equally unpersuaded by the Court's view that the
remedial nature of federal labor policy is inhospitable to punitive damage
awards. Justice Blackmun viewed the two major cases, cited by the Court as
support for this theory, as having no pertinence in the present situation. 56
 He
explained that the first only held that punitive damages were beyond the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's authority as a matter of jurisdiction and the
second only stood for the proposition that, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, section 30357
 expressly disallows punitive damages. 58
 Neither of these
cases, Justice Blackmun asserted, concerned unfair representation suits and
therefore they were not valid precedent. 59
Addressing the final two rationales offered by the Court in support of its
per se rule, the concurrence stated that there would be no unacceptable risk of
injury to union treasuries if punitive awards were allowed only in the rare cases
where the union has behaved notoriously. 60
 The concurrence noted that even if
a risk existed, concern over a union's financial condition is not proper support
50
 Id.
31
 Id, at 60.
" Id. Justice Blackmun stated that the union's conduct in IBEW v. Foust was nothing
more than neglience and since punitive damages were not proper the case provided an inappro-
priate basis for the holding that punitive damages are always unavailable. Id.
53 Id. at 55.
" U. at 54.
." Id. at 55.
sn U. at 56. The two cases are Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) and Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
" 29 U.S.C.	 187 (1976).
" IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. at 55-56.
" Id.
6" Id. at 57.
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for a "proscription of punitive damages where the union's fault is egregious. "61
Finally, the concurring Justices stated that the rationale that punitive damages
would curtail the union's discretion and thus weaken its ability to bargain ef-
fectively is far too tenuous an argument. 62
 Even if it were not tenuous, Justice
Blackmun commented that, in truly egregious breaches a chilling effect on the
union's discretion would not be bothersome. 63 Thus, while the concurring
Justice agreed that punitive damages were not warranted under the present
facts, they stated that instead of creating an "across the board" rule prohibit-
ing damages, punitive damages should only be prohibited in situations where
the union's breach was not outrageous."
The position of the concurring Justices is more persuasive once the nature
of the union-employee relationship is analyzed. Because the union is the exclu-
sive representative of the employee, it owes a duty to represent fairly the
employee's interests. This duty was first recognized in Steele where the Court
reasoned that when Congress gave the unions the power to be the exclusive
representatives of bargaining units, it subordinated the employee's individual
interest to the interests of the union as a whole. 65
 This grant of union authority,
the Court held, imposed on the unions a correlative duty to use the authority
fairly. 66
 When this duty is breached, either intentionally or maliciously, strong
sanctions against the punitive damages for unfair representation ignores the
fiduciary nature of the union-employee relationship which arises from the re-
quirement of exclusivity.
A further rationale for the imposition of punitive damages in unfair repre-
sentation suits is found in the special nature of these suits. Because unfair
representation suits involve union-employee disputes instead of union-
employer disputes, the Foust majority should not have viewed the denial of
punitive damages for unfair representation as merely an extension of the
refusal to impose punitive damages for Taft-Hartley unfair labor practices 67 or
secton 303 secondary boycotts. 68 The special union-employee relationship is
not involved in either of these offenses. Instead these suits usually involve ac-
tions by employers against the unions. A closer analogy to unfair representa-
tion suits would be the availability of punitive damages under Section 102 of
the Landrum-Griffin Act. 69 This Act seeks to protect the union member's "bill
of rights." 70
 In this regard, it is similar to unfair representation suits in that the
6 ' Id.
62 Id.
" Id. at 58.
64 Id. at 60. The impact of IBEW v. Faust is lessened by Justice Blackmun's compelling
assertion that the union "betrayed nothing more than negligence" and therefore there is no basis
for a sweeping prohibition of punitive damages when a union commits wanton, malicious or op-
pressive acts. Id, at 53. The majority responded to this view by stating that the degree of the
union's culpability, essentially an evidentiary question, was found by the jury to be either mali-
cious, wanton, or oppressive and, therefore, the record does support the per se rule. Id. at 48 n.7.
66 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-04 (1944).
66 Id. at 202-03.
67 See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
68 See Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
" 29 U.S.C. 412 (1976).
7° 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1976). The Court in IBEW v. Foust refused to express a view on the
propriety of punitive damages in suits under the Landrum-Griffin Act. 442 U.S. at 47 n.9.
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employee is suing the union for a wrong done to the employee. In every federal
court of appeals which has addressed the issue, punitive damages were allowed
under the Landrum-Griffin Act when the union's conduct was malicious,
reckless or wanton." Similarly, punitive damages should be allowed for a
malicious or intentional breach of the union's duty of fair representation under
the Railway Labor Act.
The stability of the per se rule of Foust is open to the same question because
it was announced in a five to four decision. At present, however, at least two
things are certain. First, all of the Justices agree that when a union is merely
negligent in breaching its duty of fair representation under the RLA, punitive
damages are not appropriate. Second, no matter what the future rule may be,
under the current law punitive damages are not allowed in any unfair repre-
sentation suit under the RLA.
" Keene v. Operating Engineers Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375, 97 L.R.R.M. 3215 (5th
Cir. 1978); Morissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 92 L.R.R.M. 3211 (2d Cir.
1976); Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council, 529 F.2d 815, 91 L.R.R.M. 2349 (9th Cir. 1976).
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 103
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. SUITS INVOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Timely Filing
1. Timely Filing Under Section 626(d) of the ADEA: Ciccone v. Textron, Inc. *
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967' (ADEA) is designed
to promote the employment of older persons 2 by prohibiting employers from
discriminating against employees on the basis of age. 3 In order to bring a
private action to enforce the Act's provisions, a complainant first must satisfy
several procedural requirements. 4 In particular, a complainant must file a
charges with the EEOC 6 at least sixty days prior to instituting an action in
federal court' and within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act oc-
curred. 8 The 180-day period is expanded to 300 days 9 where the alleged unlaw-
ful practice occurs in a so-called deferral state.'° Another provision of the
ADEA provides that a complainant in a deferral state must wait 60 days after
* By Wayne Alan Weiner, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
• The Act extends protection to persons aged 40-64. See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
3 See 29 U.S.C. Si 621 (1976).
• See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d)(1) & (2), 633(b) (1976).
5 Section 4(b)(1) of the 1978 amendments to the ADEA amends § 7(d) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 626(d), to provide that merely a "charge" rather than a notice of intent to sue he filed
with the Secretary of Labor. See Pub. L. No. 95-256 (1978). Hereinafter the words "charge' ' and
"notice" will be used interchangeably.
Discrimination charges no longer can be filed with the Secretary of Labor. See 29
U.S.C. § 626(d). As of July 1, 1979, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
administers the ADEA. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978). Discrimina-
tion charges now must be filed with the EEOC within the applicable federal time periods. For
purposes of this article, however, the Department of Labor will be used as the agency for filing a
federal charge of age discrimination.
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 8 infra.
" 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1976). Section 626(d)(1) & (2) provides as follows:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the
individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an intent to
file such action. Such notice shall be filed —
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice oc-
curred, or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within three hundred
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or within thirty days after
receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State
law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving notice of intent to sue, the Secretary shall promptly notify all per-
sons named therein as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek
to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation,
conference, and persuasion.
9 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976). See note 8 supra.
10 A deferral state is one which has a law "prohibiting discrimination in employment
because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such
discriminatory practice.. . ." See 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976), reprinted at note 11 infra. Section
633(b) requires that there be a sixty-day waiting period after proceedings are commenced with
the appropriate authorities in a deferral state before a federal court action can be instituted.
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commencing appropriate state administrative proceedings before he can bring
a federal suit." There has been some confusion among the courts concerning
the effect of this latter provision. Some courts have viewed it as requiring the
commencement of state administrative proceedings prior to bringing a federal
court action. 12 Others have viewed it as providing an option to resort to those
proceedings and thus have held that the 60-day waiting period is applicable
only if the option is exercised. 13
In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans," the Supreme Court settled this contro-
versy. In Evans, the Court held that, under the deferral state provision, resort
to available state administrative proceedings is mandatory before the institu-
tion of a federal suit." The Evans Court also decided, however, that a com-
plainant is not required to commence these proceedings within the time limits
specified by state law. Thus, if a federal suit had already been improperly in-
stituted, it would be held in abeyance in order to allow a complainant to com-
mence state proceedings." The question that the Court's decision in Evans
leaves unanswered is whether the expanded 300-day period for filing notice
under section 626(d)(2) applies to all complainants in deferral states or only to
those who actually have instituted proceedings with appropriate state
authorities within the 180-day time limit. Since the time period for filing a
charge with the EEOC potentially bars a complainant's access to the courts, a
particular court's construction of this provision can have a decisive impact
upon the availability of the statutory remedy to victims of age discrimination.
During the Survey year, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First
and Ninth Circuits were confronted with the issue of the proper construction of
section 626(d)(2) of the ADEA. In Ciccone v. Textron, inc., 17 the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit held that a complainant in a deferral state must file a
11 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976). This section provides as follows:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or
authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory prac-
tice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated: Provided, That such sixty-day
period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after
the effective date of such State law. If any requirement for the commencement of
such proceedings is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the
filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is
based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes
of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appro-
priate State authority.
29 U.S.C. 1 633(6) (1976).
" See, e.g7, Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693, 10 FEP Cas. 625, 626 (9th
Cir. 1975); Gager v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 16, 7 FEP Gas. 71, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1974).
" See, e.g., Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 17, 7 FEP Cas. 71, 73 (3d Cir.
1974) (Garth,J., concurring) (complainant need not exercise available state remedies); Vazquez
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1357, 12 FEP Cas. 686, 689 (D.P.R. 1975) (prior
resort to state proceedings is not prerequisite).
14 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
15 Id. at 753.
' 6 Id.
17 616 F.2d 1216, 22 FEP Cas. 497 (1st Cir. 1980).
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charge of age discrimination with the appropriate state authority within 180
days after the alleged act in order to qualify for the expanded 300-day period
for filing a charge" with the Department of Labor under that section.' 9 Con-
versely, in Bean a. Crocker National Bank," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that, in a deferral state, a complainant need not commence state proceed-
ings within 180 days in order to qualify for the extended 300-day time period. 2 '
Thus, on the one hand, under the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Ciccone, a complainant in a deferral state must elect to commence state proceed-
ings within a 180-day time period after the discriminatory act or he will be
barred from claiming qualification for the expanded filing period under section
626(d)(2). On the other hand, under the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in Bean, no such bar to qualification under that section exists.
In Ciccone, the plaintiff, a fifty-three-year-old male, was discharged front
his job with the defendant, Textron, Inc. 22
 Approximately seven months later,
believing that the position he once held was vacant, the plaintiff wrote to the
president of Textron to inquire about reemployment with the defendant." The
president responded negatively to the plaintiff's inquiry, but promised to con-
tact the plaintiff if any other position became available. 24
 Approximately 205
days after the defendant's refusal to rehire him," the plaintiff filed charges of
age discrimination with the Department of Labor and the state agency desig-
nated for that purpose. 26
 The plaintiff alleged that his discharge and the de-
fendant's refusal to rehire him constituted discriminatory acts in violation of
the ADEA. 2 ' Sixty days passed without action by either the state or the federal
authorities on the plaintiff's claim. 28 Subsequently, the plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant in district court alleging age discrimination under the
ADEA. 29
 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 30 based on the
18 Sec note 5 supra.
19
 616 F.2d at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 500.
20
 600 F.2d 754, 20 FEP Cas. 533 (9th Cir. 1979).
21 Id. at 759, 20 FEP Cas. at 536.
22 616 F.2d at 1217, 22 FEP Cas. at 498.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25
 This filing was also 433 days after the plaintiff's initial discharge. Id.
26
 This state agency was created pursuant to Rhode Island's age discrimination law. See
R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 28, ch. 6, 55 1-16 (1978), which declares age discrimination to be unlawful
and establishes a procedure for the processing of complaints. The court in Ciccone, however, did
not find it necessary to decide whether Rhode Island was, by virtue of this statute, a deferral state
for purposes of 29 U.S.C. 5 633(b). The Court reasoned that, regardless of whether Rhode
Island was a deferral state, the plaintiff had failed to commence state proceedings within 180 days
of the discriminatory act pursuant to section 626(d). Since, under the court's view, a plaintiff in a
deferral state must commence state proceedings in order to qualify for the extended time period
pursuant to section 626(d)(2), the plaintiff could not prevail even if Rhode Island turned out to be
a deferral state for purposes of section 633(b). Thus, the court avoided deciding this issue. See 616
F.2d at 1221 n.6, 22 FEP Cas. at 500 n.6.
27 616 F.2d at 1217, 22 FEP Cas. at 498.
78 Id.
" Id.
" In support of the motion to dismiss, the defendant filed an affidavit from its senior
vice president stating that the plaintiff's employment position had been discontinued and the
duties of the job reassigned to other employees. Id.
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plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the timely filing requirements of the
ADEA. 3 ' The district court decided that the plaintiff's action was barred under
section 626(d)(1) because, under that section, the plaintiff had failed to file his
charges with the Department of Labor within 180 days of the last discrimina-
tory act. 32 Finding that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate special facts to
justify equitably tolling the time period, 33 the district court granted the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss. 34
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 35 The
court held that the plaintiff had failed to file with the state agency within the
180-day limit required under its interpretation of section 626(d)(2). 36 The court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that, since the state in which the alleged viola-
tion arose was a deferral state within the meaning of section 633(b), 37 he there-
fore was entitled to 300 days in which to file his charge with the Department of
Labor under section 626(d)(2) without actually having filed with the state agen-
cy. 38 The court, instead, found that under section 626(d)(2) a plaintiff must file
charges with the deferral state agency within 180 days of the alleged violation in
order to qualify for the extended 300-day period. 39 The Ciccone court reached
this result by reasoning that the expanded filing period under section 626(d)(2)
is, according to the language of the section, only available "in a case to which
section 633(b) . . applies . . . ." 40 Section 633(b), however, merely provides
3 ' Id.
'" The district court held that the proper deadline for filing with the Department of
Labor was the 180-day period under 29 U.S.C. 626(c1)(1). Under this time period, the
plaintiff's claims based on both his discharge and the refusal to rehire were time barred. See note
25 supra. The district court noted that, if the 300-day period of section 626(d)(2) applied, then the
plaintiff might prevail if the refusal to rehire constituted a separate violation. On this issue, the
district court held that the defendant's refusal did not constitute a separate violation since the
plaintiff's position had been abolished by the time he applied for reemployment. See Powell v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485, 489, 8 FEP Cas. 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusal to rehire
cannot constitute a new violation in the absence of a job to be filled). The court of appeals noted
that the district court ultimately rested its decision on the premise that 180 days was the ap-
plicable time period. In order to determine whether the district court had erred in not applying
the expanded period of 300 days under 626(d)(2), the court of appeals assumed, without decid-
ing, that the refusal to rehire would constitute a separate violation. 616 F.2d at 1218, 22 FEP
Cas. at 499.
" 616 F.2d at 1218, 22 FEP Cas. at 199. On this issue, the district court permitted
limited discovery. The defendant took the plaintiffs deposition. During the course of the deposi-
tion, the plaintiff stated that he had learned from employees of the defendant that his former posi-
tion had been filled by a younger man who had been given a new title. On this basis, the plaintiff
moved Mr reconsideration of the district court's finding that the refusal to rehire did not amount
to a separate violation. The district court refused to reconsider its holding until the plaintiff estab-
lished that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the 180-day time period. Id. 22 FEP Cas. at
498-99.
34 Id. 22 FEP Cas. at 499.
" Id. at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 502.
36 Id. at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 500.
Because the court ultimately held that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the time
requirement of 29 U.S.C. 626(d)(1) (1976), the court refused to decide whether Rhode Island
was a deferral state. See note 26 supra.
" 616 F.2d at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 501.
v Id. at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 500.
" Id.
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that "Iiin the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a deferral
state], no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expira-
tion of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State
law .. . ." 41 Thus, that section speaks only to the waiting period that must be
complied with in order for a deferral-state complainant to commence federal
action. It, therefore, does not resolve the issue whether such a complainant
must actually commence state proceedings within 180 days of the alleged dis-
criminatory act, the time in which a nondeferral-state complainant must file his
federal charge, in order to qualify for the expanded 300-day period in which to
file his charge with the Department of Labor. As the Ciccone court recognized,
the two statutory sections can be read, simplistically, as providing that the
300-day filing period is automatically available to all plaintiffs residing in a
deferral state even if they fail to initiate a state charge within 180 days. 42 Ac-
cording to the court, however, the only "sensible" inference is that section
633(b) does not "apply" under the terms of 626(d)(2), "unless the complain-
ant has diligently sought a state administration remedy — if not within the
state's limitations period, then at least within the generally longer 180 clays af-
forded plaintiffs in a nondeferral state."" In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that to read the section otherwise would furnish the plaintiff
with a windfall of an additional 120 days simply because his claim fortuitously
arose in a deferral state." In the court's view, this windfall would not further
the purpose of the extended filing period which is to give plaintiffs a grace
period within which to pursue state remedies before being compelled to in-
stitute a federal charge. 45 Thus, the court concluded that "[i]t is only if one
uses time to let the state try its hand that he needs more time to notify the
Secretary of Labor . . . "46
The Ciccone court also rejected the plaintiff's reliance on the recent
Supreme Court decision in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans.'" In Evans, the Supreme
Court held that, under section 633(b), before a complainant can bring a suit in
federal court, he must first resort to appropriate state administrative proceed-
ings, if available." The Court ruled, however, that a complainant was not re-
quired by that section to commence the state proceedings within the time limits
specified by state law in order to satisfy this requirement." According to the
plaintiff in Ciccone, Evans implied that the extended filing period of section
626(d)(2) should be available regardless of the plaintiff's untimely resort to
" See note 11 supra.
" 616 F.2d at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 500.
"	 In this case, Rhode Island had a four month statute of limitations. See R.I. GEN.
LAWS, tit. 28, ch. 6, § 10 (1978).
" 616 F.2d at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 500, 501. See Olsen v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511
F.2d 1228, 1231-32, 10 FEP Cas. 27, 29 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (with regard to Title VII).
" 616 F.2d at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 501.
46 Id. at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 501 (quoting Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949,
955, 17 FEP Cas. 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978)). See also Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d
187, 192 n.5, 16 FEP Cas. 510, 513-14 n.5 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
. 47 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
" Id. at 753.
" Id.
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state proceedings. 5 ° In refusing to accept this argument, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court in Evans said nothing to indicate that
a deferral-state plaintiff who waited more than 180 days before filing any ad-
ministrative charge would nonetheless be entitled to the extended filing
period." On the contrary, the Ciccone court found that the only language in
Evans that touched on this point suggested the opposite result." Thus, the court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint."
In Bean v. Crocker National Bank," a similar case occurring in a deferral
state, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals read the Supreme Court's decision in
Evans to support a result opposite to that of the Ciccone court. In Bean, the plain-
tiffs were discharged from their jobs with the defendant, the Crocker National
Bank." Less than 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination occurred,
nine plaintiffs filed a charge with the Department of Labor but failed to com-
mence available deferral-state proceedings. 56
 Two other plaintiffs failed to file
either a federal charge or to commence state proceedings within this period."
After notification by the Department of Labor that conciliation efforts had
failed, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit in federal district court. 58 The
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
nine plaintiff's' failure to commence state proceedings pursuant to section
5" 616 F.2d at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 501. The plaintiff conceded that the Supreme Court
in Evans had held that resort to state remedies pursuant to 633(b) is required before the plaintiff
can proceed with a federal action. Nevertheless, the plaintiff pointed out that the Court decided
that the filing of state charges need not be timely under state law because the federal suit could be
held in abeyance until such charges were filed. Based on this part of the holding, the plaintiff con-
tended that the extended filing period of 5 626(d)(2) should be available without regard to the
timeliness of his resort to state remedies. This conclusion, according to the plaintiff, followed
from the fact that, under Evans, he could commence state proceedings at a date subsequent to fil-
ing his federal charge. Id.
51 Id.
" Id, The Ciccone court noted that, in answering the argument that its decision to
disregard state statutes of limitations would encourage complainants to sidestep state procedures.
The Supreme Court in Evans stated:
In any event, even if the risk of bypass of state agencies were real, which it is not,
Slates could readily avoid the possibility by extending their limitations periods to
180 days and by tolling their statutes of limitations upon the filing of a timely
charge with the Department of Labor.
441 U.S, at 764 n.11.
According to the Ciccone court, this statement implies that the state limitations period on
filing state charges will he harmonized with the federal period for filing such charges if both are
set at 180 days, The. court stated that this statement did not imply "that state and federal charges
can be filed concurrently more than 180 days after an alleged violation.''' 616 F.2d at 1221, 22 FEP
Cas. at 501 (emphasis in original).
53
 616 F.2d at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 502. There was no dissent.
" 600 F.2d 754, 20 FEP Cas. 533 (9th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 756, 20 FEP Cas. at 534.
36 Id. The plaintiffs, however, failed to file charges with the California Fair Employment
Practice Commission. According to the district court in this case, this state agency was a deferral-
state authority within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 633(b) (1976). Id. at 757, 20 FEP Cas. at 534.
See Berry v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 13 FEP Cas. 673, 676-77 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
57
 600 F.2d at 756 n.5, 20 FEP Cas. at 534 n.5. One plaintiff filed nonce 229 days after
his discharge. The other plaintiff failed to file any notice.
w Id. at 756-57, 20 FEP Cas. at 534.
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633(b) deprived the court of jurisdiction over their suit." The district court
reached this conclusion by finding that section 626(d) required the plaintiffs to
resort to state remedies, pursuant to section 633(b), as a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to maintaining their federal suit. 6° In addition, the district court dis-
missed the action of the two other plaintiffs because neither had filed a charge
with the Department of Labor in compliance with the requirement of 180 days
under section 626(d). 61 The court reasoned that in order for the plaintiff in a
deferral state to qualify for the expanded 300-day period in which to file a
federal charge, he must have commenced state proceedings within 180 days of
the alleged ADEA violation. 62
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the case." First, with respect to the plaintiffs who had filed timely notice with
the Department of Labor but had failed to commence state proceedings, the
court held that this failure did not bar a federal court action. 64 The Bean court
reasoned that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Evans, the federal suit
could be held in abeyance until the plaintiffs had the opportunity to commence
state proceedings. 65 Second, with respect to the plaintiffs who had failed to file
notice within 180 days or to commence state proceedings, the court held that
the same reasoning applied and allowed their federal suits to proceed. 66 Read-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Evans to sanction a plaintiff's untimely
commencement of deferral-state proceedings, 67 the Bean court decided that a
complainant in a deferral state may provide notice within 300 days of the al-
leged discriminatory act regardless of whether state proceedings have been
timely commenced." Thus, the court ruled that all of the plaintiffs had filed
their federal notice in a timely fashion within the applicable 300-day period of
section 626(d)(2). 69
The inconsistent results between the Ciccone and the Bean courts stem from
the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in Evans, on which each court relied,
can be read to permit each of their different statutory interpretations. Had the
Supreme Court limited its decision in Evans to the holding that a complainant
in a deferral state must resort to state administrative proceedings under section
633(b), this inconsistency between the two circuit courts might not have occur-
59 Id. at 757, 20 FEP Cas. at 534.
6° Id.
Si Id. See note 57 supra.
62 See 600 F.2d at 757, 20 FEP Cas. at 535.
63 Id, at 760, 20 FEP Cas. at 537.
64 Id. at 757, 20 FEP Cas. at 535.
" Id., 20 FEP Cas. at 534.
66 Id. at 759, 20 FEP Cas. at 536.
67 Id. at 757, 20 FEP Cas. at 534-35. In Evans, the Supreme Court, after deciding that a
complainant must resort to appropriate administrative remedies in deferral states before seeking
federal relief, held that the failure to file a complaint with a deferral-state agency within the
state's statute of limitations does not bar federal court action. See 441 U.S. at 764.
68 600 F.2d at 759, 20 FEP Cas. at 536.
69 Id. at 760, 20 FEP Cas. at 537. As to the plaintiff who never filed federal charges, the
court allowed him to participate in the class action as an unnamed class member. The court inter-
preted the Supreme Court's decision in Evans as suggesting that unnamed parties in a class action
may join in the litigation without having personally complied with the notice requirement of 29
U.S.C. 626(d). Id. at 760, 20 FEP Cas. at 536-37 (citing 441 U.S. at 758 n.6).
110	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:40
red." Instead, however, the Evans Court created confusion by adding that a
complainant's failure to institute state proceedings within the state's statute of
limitations would not bar a federal court action because the federal suit would
be held in abeyance until the complainant could commence state action. 71
Thus, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Ciccone read Evans to require that a'
complainant commence deferral-state proceedings no later than 180 days after
the alleged violation in order to qualify for the expanded time period." In con-
trast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bean interpreted this holding to
mean that it is not necessary for a complainant in a deferral state to commence
state proce'edings within 180 clays of the alleged violation in order to qualify for
the extended filing period under section 626(d)(2). 73
It is submitted that, with respect to the two courts' interpretations of the
timely filing requirements of the ADEA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Ciccone is the correct one. One reason why the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals' holding in Bean is less persuasive than Ciccone is that it is not in
keeping with the congressional purpose behind either section 626(d)(2) or sec-
tion 633(6). The evident purpose underlying section 626(d)(2) is to prevent the
penalization of those complainants who pursue available state remedies before
filing their federal charge with the EEOC. 74 This statutory provision gives
these complainants a grace period for filing federal notice. If the holding in
Bean is followed, those complainants who purposely bypass available state
remedies and proceed directly to the federal remedy are given a windfall of 120
days to file a federal charge. This windfall has absolutely no relation to the pur-
pose behind the expanded time requirement, but rather is based solely on the
fortuitous circumstance that the claim arises in a state which has laws to protect
the complainant. Ironically, under the Bean decision, these state laws would
serve little purpose other than to enable a complainant to qualify for the ex-
tended filing period under federal law so he can pursue his federal remedy.
Moreover, this consequence of reducing the usefulness of state remedies is con-
trary to the congressional purpose of section 633(b) which is to make resort to
federal relief unnecessary by providing deferral state agencies with a limited
opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination." As the
Supreme Court in Evans stated, "[u]nless [633(b)] is to be stripped of all mean-
ing, state agencies must be given at least some opportunity to solve problems of
" Under 29 U.S.C.	 626(d)(2) and 633(b) (1976), it is not clear whether the extended
filing period is limited to individuals who file charges with deferral-statute authorities. See notes 8
& 11 supra. If section 633(b) requires mandatory resort to state proceedings and applies only to
those complainants who so comply, then the application of section 626(d)(2) is clarified. Only
those complainants who actually resort to state proceedings within the 180-day time period of sec-
tion 626(d)(1) will be able to obtain the benefits of an extended filing period for federal charges.
Absent such resort, complainants should not be allowed to claim qualification for the expanded
300-day filing period under section 626(d)(2).
441 U.S. 764 (1979).
" Sec note 52 supra.
" 600 F.2d at 759, 20 FEN Cas. at 536. See 441 U.S. at 764.
" See 616 F.2d at 1220, 22 FEP Cas. at 501. See also Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573
F.2d 949, 955, 17 FEP Cas. 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated in light of Evans, 442 U.S. 908
(1979).
75 See 441 U.S. at 755.
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cliscrimination." 76 Thus, by removing the incentive to utilize available state
remedies as a result of allowing claimants to bypass such remedies and still ob-
tain a time extension to file a federal charge, the Bean court has frustrated the
purpose behind the two statutory sections.
A second reason why the Bean decision is less persuasive than that of Cic-
cone is that the Supreme Court's holding in Evans, on which the Bean court
relied, does not support the statutory interpretation adopted by that court. On
the contrary, while Evans is, to be sure, less than conclusive on the issue," it
would appear to be consistent with the Ciccone court's holding that, in order to
qualify for the expanded 300-day filing period under section 626(d)(2), a com-
plainant first must have commenced available state proceedings. To see why
this result follows, it is necessary to understand exactly what the Supreme
Court held in Evans. First, the issue presented in both Ciccone and Bean did not
arise in Evans because there, in contrast, the plaintiff had filed his federal
charge with the Department of Labor within 180 days of the alleged violation,
pursuant to section 626(d)(1), but had failed to commence available state pro-
ceedings, under section 633(6), within the applicable state statute of limita-
tions. 78 The contention in Evans was that the plaintiff, under section 633(b),
need not commence state proceedings at al1. 79 The Supreme Court rejected this
contention, holding that resort to state remedies, whether timely or not, was a
prerequisite to maintaining a federal suit under section 633(b). 8° Therefore,
the Court's decision in Evans was limited only to the proper construction of sec-
tion 633(h) and not to that of section 626(d)(2). Indeed, as the Ciccone court
pointed out, the Supreme Court in Evans said nothing to indicate that a
deferral-state plaintiff who waited more than 180 days to file either a state or
federal charge would nonetheless be entitled to the extended filing period under
section 626(d)(2)."
Second, the Evans Court's decision to allow the plaintiff to commence
deferral-state proceedings, even if untimely under the state's statute of limita-
tions, by holding the federal court in abeyance," does not weaken the conclu-
sion that the claimant must first commence deferral-state action. The Court in
Evans was concerned with the effect of a state statute of limitations on a com-
plainant 's access to federal relief. 83 Consequently, the Court's holding that the
state's limitation period was irrelevant applies only to its conclusion that "state
procedural defaults cannot foreclose federal relief and that state limitations
periods cannot govern the efficacy of the federal remedy. "84 The Evans Court
was not deciding the issue of a complainant's right to federal relief when he
fails to comply with the federal limitations period under section 626(d)(1)-(2).
Viewed in this light, it is almost unthinkable that the Supreme Court in Evans
76 441 U.S. at 757.
" See 616 F.2(1 at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 501.
" See 441 U.S. at 754.
See id, at 755,
8" Id. at 758.
al See 616 F.2d at 1221, 22 FEP Cas. at 501.
82 See 441 U.S. at 764.
84 See 441 U.S. at 758-59.
" 441 U.S. at 762.
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intended to add a judicial gloss to section 626(d)(2) that would have the
undesirable effect of benefitting complainants whose claims fortuitously arose
in a state which prescribed relief while, at the same time, creating a disincen-
tive for such complaints to utilize these state remedies. Accordingly, in contrast
to the Bean court, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Ciccone correctly con-
strued section 626(d)(2) by holding that, in order to qualify for the extended fil-
ing period under that section, a complainant must commence state proceedings
within the 180 day period afforded complainants in nondeferral states under
section 626(d)(1).
The split between the Bean and the Ciccone courts illustrates the difficulty
the courts are having in resolving questions of statutory interpretation concern-
ing the time requirements of the ADEA. Without a definitive decision by the
Supreme Court on these issues, the present state of confusion is likely to con-
tinue. Therefore, attorneys must be particularly attentive to the construction of
these time periods adopted by the courts in their respective circuits.
2. Timely Filing Under Section 2000e-5(e) of Title VII: Chappell v. Emco Machine
Works Co.*
Congress has established a number of procedural requirements that a
complainant must satisfy before he can gain access to the courts and the EEOC
to enforce the provisions of Title VII.' One such requirement is that a com-
plainant must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of an alleged dis-
criminatory act.' Although the relevant provision of Title VII clearly specifies
the length of time within which a complaint must be filed, it otherwise "leaves
much to be desired in clarity and precision."' This is especially true with
respect to proper application of the time limit when the complainant has pur-
sued other remedies prior to filing with the EEOC. Courts confronted with this
problem of interpreting Title VII's time limits have adopted varying ap-
proaches. Some courts adhere strictly to the filing period specified in the
By Wayne Alan Weiner, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). See generally B. Set LET & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, ch. 28 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), which now provides as follows:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge
(including the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment
practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within
ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with
respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a
State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to
institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof,
such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hun-
dred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within
thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the
proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such
charge shall be filed by the Commissioner with the State or local agency.
Id. This section amends 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) by extending the filing period from 90 to
180 days.
Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889, 1 FEP Cas. 861, 862 (9th Cir.
1969).
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statute; 4 others conclude that certain equitable considerations may justify toll-
ing the time period.' Since the time limitation for filing a complaint with the
EEOC potentially bars a claimant's access to the remedial processes of the
EEOC and ultimately to the courts, a particular court's construction of this
provision can have a decisive impact upon the availability of the statutory
remedy to victims of discrimination.
During the Survey year, in Chappell u. Emco Machine Works Co., 6 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was confronted with the issue of tardy filing
following intermediate remedies. In Chappell, the court held that the 180-day
requirement for filing a charge with the EEOC under section 2000e-5(e) of
Title VII is indeed subject to equitable modifications.' Nevertheless, the court
found that these exceptions were inapplicable where a plaintiff had detrimen-
tally relied on a state official's8 promise to file her EEOC complaint. 9
Significantly, therefore, although the Chappell court was willing to recognize
certain equitable exceptions to the time period for filing a charge with the
EEOC, the decision in Chappell indicates that these exceptions will be narrowly
construed.
In Chappell, the plaintiff, a female employee of the defendant, the Emco
Machine Works Company, alleged that she had been discharged from her job
as a result of sex discrimination." After her discharge, she visited the Texas
Employment Commission" to complain about her treatment by the
defendant." At that time, one of the Commission's employees promised her
that he would promptly file a complaint on her behalf with the EEOC." For a
period of approximately five months thereafter, the plaintiff repeatedly con-
tacted the employee regarding the status of her EEOC complaint and, each
time, was assured that the complaint had been filed. 14 Subsequently, the plain-
tiff hired an attorney who discovered that the EEOC had not received her corn-
• See, e.g., Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines. Inc., 558 F.2d 803, 806, 15 FEP Cas. 671, 674
(5th Cir. 1977) (time periods are jurisdictional prerequisites); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310
F. Supp. 891, 896, 2 FEP Cas. 398, 401 (D. Me. 1970) (time periods are not subject to equitable
considerations).
5 See, e.g., Bethel v.,Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 641 n.64, 18 FEP Cas. 789, 795 n.64 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (time periods are not jUritidktional prerequisites and are subject to equitable modifica-
tions); Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249, 1252, 5 FEP Cas. 251, 253 (8th
Cir. 1972) (time periods may be equitably tolled).
6 601 F.2d 1295, 20 HP Cas. 1059 (5th Cir. 1979).
7 Id. at 1301-02, 20 EH' Cas. at 1064.
• The State agency involved was not an officially designated agency pursuant to Title
VII. A state fair employment practice agency (FEP) must be formally designated by the EEOC,
see 29 C.F.R. 5 1601.13 (1979), in order to toll the timely filing requirement by its intervention.
The agency must have slate or local authorization to administer state or local fair employment
practice legislation. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c) (1976). For a listing of approved stale and local
agencies, see 29 C.F.R. 5 1601.74 (1979).
• 601 F.2d at 1304, 20 FEP Cas. at 1066.
" Id. at 1297, 20 FEP Cas. at 1060.
Since this agency was not a FEP agency under Title VII, the plaintiff had m comply
with the 180-day limitation period of 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976). See note 2 supra.
12 601 F.2d at 1304, 20 FEP Cas. at 1066.
' 3 Id, at 1296, 20 FEN Cas. at 1060.
Id, at.1297, 20 FEN Cas. at 1060.
114	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:40
plaint.' 5 More than five months' 6 after her initial visit to the Texas Employ-
ment Commission, the EEOC received the plaintiff's complaint from the agen-
cy." It decided that the complaint was.timely filed, processed it and found that
Emco had discharged the plaintiff on the basis of scx.'g After receiving a "right
to sue" letter from the EEOC,' 9 the plaintiff brought suit in federal district
court, alleging that her discharge violated Title VII. 20 The district court,
however, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the timely filing requirement of sec-
tion 2000e-5(e) of Title VII. 21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 22 The
court specifically rejected the defendant's absolute contention that the 180-day
limitations period is a "jurisdictional" prerequisite and, therefore, never sub-
ject to equitable tolling." It held instead that equitable considerations, in cer-
tain circumstances, can modify the demands of the timely filing requirement of
section 2000e-5(e) regardless of certain prior judicial characterizations of that
section as "jurisdictional."" The court noted that modification of such time
limits had previously been found justifiable in three distinct situations. First,
recent Supreme Court decisions have upheld the tolling of the time period dur-
ing the pendency of an action mistakenly brought before a state court which
had subject matter jurisdiction, but which, under state law, was the wrong
forum." Second, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had allowed the
15 Id.
'" No reason was given for the delay. Judge Wisdom in his dissent noted that the em-
ployee of the Texas Employment Commission stated in an affidavit that his records reflected that
the complaint was forwarded to the EEOC on the day of the plaintiff's initial visit to the agency.
EEOC records, however, showed the complaint was received some five months later. As Judge
Wisdom observed, the fault For the delay "lies with the state agency, the EEOC district office, or
the United States mails, in recent years not distinguished for efficiency." 601 F.2d at 1305, 20
FEP Cas. at 1066.
Id. at 1304, 20 FEP Cas. at 1066. Under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e) (1976), the 180-day
time period starts to run on the day of the alleged act of discrimination. See note 2 supra. This
date was August 31, 1973. Because the EEOC did not receive her complaint until March 5, 1974,
the plaintiff failed to comply with this requirement by four days.
" The EEOC "Determination" contains a finding of' timeliness, 601 F.2d at 1306, 20
FEP Gas. at 1067 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). The EEOC generally is very reluctant to find that a
charge is untimely filed. See 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 55 204.3, 208.1 0976),
This is the notification by the EEOC that conciliation procedures have failed and that
the plaintiff may bring a civil action against the employer. See 42 U.S.C. 2000c-5(t)(1) (1976),
amending 42 U.S.C. S 2000c-5(e) (1970).
" 601 F.2d at 1297, 20 FEP Cas. at 1060.
2 I Id.
22 Id. at 1304, 20 FEP Cas. at 1066.
" Id. at 1301-02, 20 FEP Gas. at 1064. The defendant had argued that since the 180-day
limitations period is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII action, the court was foreclosed,
by the plaintiff's untimely filing, from determining whether equitable considerations justified
tolling the time period. Id.
See id.
" See Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S.
229, 137-38 (1976); Burnett v. New York Cent, R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1965); see also
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
In Robbins, the Supreme Court held that the statutory period for filing a complaint with
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commencement of the 180-day time period to be deferred until the claimant
knew or should have known the facts which would give rise to his Title VII
claim. 26 Third, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also had permitted equitable
modification of the time period where the EEOC misleads a complainant about
the nature of his Title VII rights. 27
After examining these situations, however, the court concluded that the
facts of Chappell failed to fit into any of the three categories. 28 The plaintiff had
not filed a lawsuit on her Title VII claim in any court before the expiration of
the 180-day period. 29 She had not alleged that the period for filing her com-
plaint had elapsed before she became aware of the facts supporting her claim."
Additionally, she had not contended that the EEOC had misled her concerning
her rights under Title VII. 3 ' The court declined to extend the tolling principle
beyond these situations to cover the plaintiff's case." The court reasoned that if
the EEOC was not tolled during the pendency of arbitration procedures. The Court reasoned
that Title VII and union grievance procedures were independent remedies and, thus, the statu-
tory period under Title VII continued to run. The Court, however, distinguished Burnett, a prior
decision that found tolling appropriate, as involving a plaintiff asserting the same statutory claim
in a different forum. In Burnett, the plaintiff had incorrectly filed a suit in a state court which had
jurisdiction over the suit but was the wrong forum under the state's venue law. After dismissal of
the suit at the state level, the plaintiff brought suit in federal district court against the same party
alleging the same cause of action. The Burnett Court held that the filing of the plaintiff's state ac-
tion was sufficient to toll the statutory period contained in the Employer's Liability Act.
The rationale for this exception to the "jurisdictional" requirement of Title VII, the
court of appeals in Chappell reasoned, was that the policy of repose inherent in the timely filing re-
quirement was satisfied because the initial state action was filed against the same parties served in
the federal action and alleged an identical cause of action. The court of appeals interpreted the
Robbins Court's recognition of the Burnett decision as illustrating one situation where the Supreme
Court will allow equitable considerations to toll Title VII's timely tiling requirements. 601 F.2d
at 1299, 20 FEP Cas. at 1062.
" See Bickham v. Miller, 584 F,2d 736, 738, 18 FEP Cas. 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1978)
(reaffirming Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931, 11 FEP Cas. 235,
240 (5th Cir. 1975), which had held that commencement of the running of the period should be
delayed until a "complainant learns or could be reasonably expected to learn of the discrimina-
tory act." Id. at 931, 11 FEY Cas. at 240).
According to the Chappell court, the rationale behind this equitable exception to the time
period was that it is "unfair to allow a defendant to conceal facts that support the plaintiff's cause
of action and then to rely on the statute of limitations to bar the suit when a duly diligent plaintiff
was unable to discover those facts. — 601 F.2(1. at 1303, 20 FEP Cas. at 1065 (citation omitted).
27 See White v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 581 F.2d 556, 562, 18 FEP Cas. 204.
208 (5th Cir. 1978) (EEOC letters sent to plaintiff informing her that all time requirements had
been met were sufficiently misleading to toll the time period under a state statute of limitations
found to be applicable under 42 U.S.C. 2000c-5(c) (1976)); Page v. United States Indus,. Inc.,
556 F.2d 346, 351, 15 FEP Cas. 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1978) (although the statutory period com-
menced to run from date of first letter from EEOC to plaintiff informing her of the right to sue,
second letter stating that period commenced on date of receipt of this letter was so misleading as
to permit tolling of time period).
28 601 F.2d at 1303, 20 FEP Cas. at 1065.
29 Id.
SO At
Id. The court stated that, in this regard, the plaintiff's only contention was that she
was entitled to rely on the state employee's representations that her EEOC complaint had been
filed. Id.
32 Id.
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it found the plaintiffs reliance on the state employee's representations to toll
the period:
there would be no logical reason for denying tolling to a person who
has relied on a lawyer or a relative or an acquaintance to file his com-
plaint. A holding of this breadth would seriously undermine the
policy of repose inherent in the timely filing period, a policy designed
to protect employers from stale claims."
By placing limitations on the time in which a plaintiff can initiate the remedial
process, Congress has spared employers from the prejudicial effects resulting
from unfair surprise, faded memories and lost evidence. 34
 Thus, not wanting to
create a situation that ultimately would work to the prejudice of employers, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint."
In contrast, the dissent would have deferred to the EEOC's favorable
determination of timeliness. 36
 Stating that the plaintiff was the victim of a
"bureaucratic tangle," '" the dissent argued that equitable modification of the
180-day period was warranted to advance the broad remedial purposes of Title
VII. 38
 Noting that the plaintiff's reliance on the state employee's assurances
was reasonable," that there was no real prejudice to the defendant caused by
the delay in filing the complaint," and that the EEOC had found a clear in-
13 Id.
' 4 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 467-68 n.14 (1975); see also
Note, Limitation Periods for Filing a Charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under
Title VII of the Cioil Rights Act of 1964, 56 B.U. L. REV. 760, 764 (1976).
" 601 F.2d at 1304, 20 FEP Cas. at 1066. The court of appeals also found it to be im-
material that the defendant had alleged no prejudice because of the mere four-day delay in filing
the complaint. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that her complaint was
filed, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), when the state agency received it.
Rather, the court held that the complaint must be filed with the EEOC under the statutory
scheme. Finally, the court refused to defer to the EEOC's determination that the plaintiff had
satisfied the time requirement, and concluded, instead, that the court must make an independent
determination of whether jurisdiction exists. If jurisdiction could not be found, the court was
without the power to adjudicate the case. 601 F.2d at 1303-04, 20 FEP Cas. at 1065-66.
" Id. at 1306, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067-68.
" Id. at 1304, 20 FEP Cas. at 1066.
Id. at 1305, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067. The dissent noted that state agencies occupy a
special role in the statutory scheme of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c)-5(d) (1976). The
dissent found it indefensible to insist on formalistic distinctions between the EEOC and a state
agency, such as the Texas Employment Commission, which, while not a FEP agency under Title
VII, was created to assist an individual in processing his complaint, 601 F,2d at 1305, 20 FEP
Cas. at 1067.
3 ' Id. at 1306, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067-68. The dissent argued that it was reasonable for the
plaintiff to suppose that the delay in response was attributable to "the slow turning of
bureaucratic wheels." Id, 20 FEP Cas. at 1068.
" Id. 20 FEP Cas. at 1067. In this regard, the dissent argued that there may even have
been no delay in terms of the effect of the statutory time requirement on the defendant. To reach
this result, the dissent noted that the statute prescribes a 10-day period in which the EEOC must
notify a defendant after a complaint has been filed with its office. See note 2 supra. Adding this
period to the maximum of the 180-day period, the dissent calculated that the maximum time
limitation for these events equaled 190 days. The dissent then reasoned there had been no delay
because March 11, 1974, the day on which the defendant received notice from the EEOC, was
the 190th day from the date the complaint was filed. 601 F.2d at 1306, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067.
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 117
stance of sex discrimination, 4 ' the dissent would have extended the principle of
equitable modification resulting from a situation involving misrepresentations
by the EEOC 42
 to cover this case involving similar action by its state counter-
parts."
It is submitted that, although the court in Chappell correctly concluded that
the time limitations of Title VII are subject to equitable tolling, its decision to
dismiss the plaintiff's complaint was wrong for several reasons. First, the
court's holding in Chappell is inconsistent with analogous precedent. In Dartt v.
Shell Oil Co., 44
 a case likewise involving a plaintiff's detrimental reliance on the
representations of an employee of a federal agency, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals permitted equitable tolling of a similar time period under the Age
Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA)." In Dartt, the plaintiff, suspecting
age discrimination as the cause of her discharge, contacted an attorney who
referred her to the Federal Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor.'" The plaintiff met with the director of this federal agency. 47
 The direc-
tor interviewed the plaintiff and instructed her that his agency would investi-
gate." When asked how long this investigation would take, he responded that
it might take a year." Although not required to do so by statute, it was the
customary practice of the director to advise claimants of the 180-day notice of
intent-to-sue requirement." In this case, however, the director did not so ad-
vise the plaintiff. 5 ' Approximately seven months later, the director informed
the plaintiff in writing that there would be some delay in completing the
investigation. 52
 For the first time, he discussed the plaintiff's right to sue and
the 180-day notice requirement under the ADEA." The plaintiff immediately
retained a lawyer and brought suit against her employer in federal district
court. 54
 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because of her
failure to comply with the 180-day notice limitation of the statute."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held
4 ' Id.
42 See text and note at note 27 supra.
43 601 F.2d at 1305-06, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067-68.
44
 539 F.2d 1256, 13 FEP Cas. 12 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 434
U.S. 99 (1977).
4' Id. at 1262, 13 FEP Cas, at 16. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1976), provides in
pertinent part:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the
individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days notice of an intent to file
such action. Such notice shall be filed
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice oc-
curred . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976).
" 539 F.2d at 1258, 13 FEP Cas. at 13.
47 Id.
4F1
49 Id.
'° Id. at 1262, 13 FEP Cas. at 16. See note 45 supra.
5I id.
" Id. at 1258, 13 FEP Cas. at 13.
" Id.
54 Id.
" Id. 13.FEP Cas. at 12.
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that, under these circumstances, the time period should be tolled. 56 Acknowl-
edging that several courts had held the 180-day notice requirement to be
"jurisdictional,'' the Darn court nevertheless rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that Congress had intended the failure to comply with this requirement to
be an absolute bar to bringing an action. 58 The court reached this conclusion
by relying on cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 59
These cases had construed limitations of Title VII as analogous to statutes of
limitations and, therefore, subject to equitable tolling principles. The Darn
court reasoned that the ADEA, like Title VII, was designed to be remedial
legislation and was thus entitled to a liberal construction to effectuate the con-
gressional purpose of eliminating employment discrimination." Because the
complainants under the ADEA most likely would be laymen, the Darn court
thought they should not be held to strict compliance with the Act's time limita-
tions when reasonably attempting to enforce their statutory rights." Finding
that equitable tolling would be consistent with the congressional purposes
underlying the ADEA notice requirement 62 and that the plaintiff had not un-
reasonably slept on her rights," the Dartt court granted relief."
The Chappell court, however, rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Dartt. The
court reasoned that a split decision by the Supreme Court on appeal in that
case denied Dartt any precedential value.'" Although admittedly not controlling
precedent, the legal reasoning underlying the decision in Dartt nevertheless
seems equally applicable to the facts of Chappell. Like the ADEA, the statutory
scheme at issue in Dartt, Title VII contemplates that complaints will be initi-
ated with the EEOC by lay persons unfamiliar with the complexities of the ad-
ministrative procedure."' The court, therefore, should be flexible in appropri-
w Id. at 1262, 13 FEN Cas. at 16.
52 See, e.g., Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 525 F.2d 1367, 1370, 11 FEP Cas. 539, 541 (6th
Cir. 1975); Hiscott v. General Eke. Co., 521 F.2d 632, 633-34, 11 FEP Cas. 292, 293 (6th Cir.
1975).
" 539 F.2d at 1259, 13 FEP Cas. at 13-14.
59 See Reel) v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928, 11 FEP Cas,
235, 238 (5th Cir. 1975); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891-92, 2 FEP Cas.
377, 379 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 539 F.2d at 1260, 13 FEP Cas. at 15.
61 Id. at 1260-61, 13 FEN Cas. at 15.
62 Id. at 1261, 13 FEP Gas. at 16. The court stated that these purposes were: "(1) To
provide the Labor Department with an opportunity to achieve a conciliation of the complaint
while it is still fresh, and (2) to give early notice to the employer of a possible lawsuit.. . ." The
court found that these purposes had been satisfied despite the tardy filing of notice since the
employer was contacted by the agency soon after the plaintiff's initial interview and since the
agency had attempted to conciliate the complaint with the employer before it received the plain-
tiff's notice of intent-to-sue. Id. at 1261-62, 13 FEP Cas. at 16.
63 Id. at 1262, 13 FEP Cas. at 16. In this regard, the court stated: "We cannot fault [the
plaintiff] in her efforts to present her cause. She promptly sought private,legal advice and twice
promptly followed that advice. Short of anticipating an administrative dereliction by the Wage and
Hour Division, despite her prodding of that agency, it was not to be expected that lapse of time
would void her cause." Id. (emphasis supplied).
64 Id.
65 601 F.2d at 1302 n.6, 20 FEP Cas, at 1064 n.6. This court, however, failed to respond
to the plaintiff's argument that the intrinsic reasoning of Dartt should be followed.
66 See Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F,2d 829, 832, 19 FEP Cas. 1347, 1349 (3d
Cir. 1979).
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ate cases when reviewing the failures of aggrieved persons to comply with the
procedural technicalities of Title VII. Under this reasoning, since the delay in-
volved was a mere four days, the court in Chappell should have granted the
plaintiff equitable relief.
The second reason why the court's holding in Chappell is incorrect is that
such a holding is inconsistent with the congressional purpose of Title VII. As
the Darii court recognized, an important factor for determining if a court
should exercise its equitable powers to toll a time limitation is whether to do so
would be consistent with the congressional purpose of the relevant statute. 67 It
is submitted that Chappell was an appropriate case for granting relief under this
analysis.
The basic purpose behind the time periods of Title VII is to protect em-
ployers from unfairness resulting from a plaintiff's unreasonable delay in filing
a complaint." In Chappell there was neither unfairness to the employer nor an
instance of unreasonable delay by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's reliance on the
assurances of an employee of a state agency, whose customary practice it was to
file this type of complaint with the EEOC, was not an example of a plaintiff
sleeping on her rights. The complaint was filed a mere four days after the
statutory time period had lapsed and this minimal delay resulted in no pre-
sumptive or actual prejudice to the defendant. 69
 Therefore, consistent with the
congressional purpose behind the time limitations of Title VII, the Chappell
court could have granted the needed equitable relief to the plaintiff with very
little cost either to doctrine or to the defendant.
The third reason why the holding in Chappell is incorrect is that the facts of
that case involved an appropriate instance of reliance by a plaintiff which could
be distinguished easily from inappropriate examples of reliance. The Chappell
court based its decision to deny equitable relief to the plaintiff, primarily, on its
own inability to distinguish appropriate instances of reliance on third party's
undertaking to file a complaint on behalf of a claimant. The court was appre-
hensive about extending the doctrine that equitable considerations can toll
Title VIPs time periods to inappropriate examples of a plaintiff's reliance on a
third party's promise to file a complaint.'"
It is submitted, however, that the fact situation of Chappell clearly involved
an appropriate instance of reliance which, consequently, justified an equitable
modification of Title VII's time periods. The Texas Employment Commission,
although not charged under state law with filing EEOC complaints, was statu-
torily charged with assisting persons in obtaining relief under the state's unem-
ployment compensation laws.n As part of its customary course of business, this
state agency routinely filed complaints with the EEOC on behalf of complain-
ants." Although under no duty originally to assist persons like the plaintiff,
67 539 F.2(1 at 1261, 13 FEP Cas. at 16.
6 ' See text and note at note 34 supra.
69 Sec note 40 supra.
7° See text al note 33 supra.
7L See 15 TEx. REV C/V, STA1, ANN., art. 5221 b-9 to -10 (Vernon 1971). In his dissent,
Judge Wisdom apparently misconstrued the agency's enabling statute because he concluded that
this agency was "charged with assisting claimants in obtaining remedies for employment dis-
crimination. . . ." 601 F.2d at 1305, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067.
72 601 F.2d at 1305, 20 FEP Cas. at 1067 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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where the agency undertook the duty to file EEOC complaints for grievants,
the plaintiff in Chappell was entitled to rely on the agency employee's represent-
ations that her complaint had been filed promptly." The plaintiff's reliance,
under these circumstances, clearly is distinguishable from her reliance on a
third party who is under absolutely no obligation to file her complaint. There-
fore, the plaintiffs reliance in Chappell can hardly be considered unreasonable.
Accordingly, the court should not have dismissed her complaint.
In conclusion, under the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Chap-
pell, a plaintiff's reliance on the representations on an employee of a state agen-
cy that his complaint has been filed with the EEOC will not toll the running of
the time period under section 2000e-5(e) of Title VII. To reach this result, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a strict approach to determine when
Title VII's time period are subject to equitable modification. Under this nar-
row approach, even plaintiffs with compelling cases for tolling the 180-day time
requirement cannot be assured of the availability of Title VII relief unless the
facts of their case fit within one of the three categories outlined by the Chappell
court." If other courts adopt this approach in applying the theory of equitable
modification to the time requirements of Title VII, the availability of relief
under Title VII for instances of employment discrimination will be significant-
ly reduced.
B. Class Actions
1. Notice Under Rule 23(b)(2): Johnson v. General Motors Corp. *
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class actions
brought in federal court. Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule authorizes class actions
where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole."'
Rule 23(b)(2) actions have become common in employment discrimination
litigation 2
 brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3
 As a result,
An apt analogy is provided by cases which impose tort liability on an insurance com-
pany where its agent voluntarily undertakes to promptly obtain an insurance policy for a plaintiff
but is negligent in so doing. The rationale of such cases is that the agent has assumed a duty of
care toward the plaintiff and that the plaintiff should be entitled to rely on the agent's representa-
tions that a policy has been acquired. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 349 F.2d
941 (8th Cir. 1965); Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 P.459 (1911); Siegel v. Spear &
Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1925).
1 * See text and notes at notes 24-27 supra,
* By Mary DeNevi, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) actions are particularly appropriate in civil
rights cases. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Cw. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Ad. Comm. Note]. Rule 23(b)(2) is not, however, limited to civil rights ac-
tions. Id.
2
 See, e.g., Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881, 15 FEP Cas. 478 (5th Cir.
1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 9 FEP Cas. 211 (3d Cir. 1975); Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 7 FEP Cas. 1115 (5th Cir. 1974).
42 U.S.C. S 2000e (1976).
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the evolution of Title VII law has affected Rule 23(b)(2). For example, Title
VII cases which recognize the availability of back pay awards 4 have led courts
to determine that monetary relief, as welt as injunctive or declaratory relief,
can be awarded in Rule 23(b)(2) actions. 5
The availability of monetary relief in a Rule 23(b)(2) action has in recent
years brought into question the res judicata effect of a (b)(2) judgment. Although
all members of a (b)(2) class need not be given notice that claims concerning
them arc being litigated, 6 Rule 23 provides that the judgment, "whether or not
favorable to the class," nevertheless includes them.' Thus, absent class
members may be barred from bringing a subsequent action challenging the
practices complained of in the original suit. Because of this possible res judicata
effect of a 23(b)(2) judgment,' several courts have suggested in dictum that,
when monetary relief is at stake, absent class members should receive some
form of notice before they can be bound by the judgment. 9 During the Survey
year, the question arose whether a person who did not receive notice of a
23(b)(2) action for injunctive and declaratory relief could later bring an action
for monetary damages springing from the practices at issue in the first suit.
In Johnson v. General Motors Corp. ,'° the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that, although notice is not necessary to bind absent class members to
a 23(b)(2) judgment for injunctive and declaratory relief, due process requires
notice before the individual monetary claims of absent class members may be
barred." The practical effect of Johnson will be to encourage the provision of
notice in all 23(b)(2) actions in which monetary relief, as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief, may be appropriate.
' See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Johnson v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 7 FEP Cas. 627 (5th Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 9 FEP Cas. 211 (3d Cir.
1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 7 PEP Cas. 1115 (5th Cir. 1974).
6 Rule 23(d) provides in pertinent part:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders:. . . (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or other-
wise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and pre-
sent claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action.
FED. R. CR'. P. 23(d)(2) (emphasis added).
7 17 En. R. CR', P. 23(0(3).
While members of a (h)(2) class action which proceeds to a final ,judgment may be
barred from bringing a later action, this result is not automatic. The Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 23 indicates that, although such a judgment will "include — all members. "subdivision
(c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court conducting the action cannot pre-
determine the res judicata effect of the judgment,'' and that the res judietaa efh-et can be tested only
in a subsequent action. Ad. Comm. Note, supra note 1, at 106.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Ind., Inc.. 517 F.2d 826. 878. 11 FEE'
Cas. 167, 208 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.. 494 F.2d 211, 257, 7
FEP Cas. 1115, 1151 (5th Cir. 1974).
in 598 F.2d 432, 20 FEP Cas. 239 (5th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 433, 20 PEP Gas, at 240. Judge Clark delivered the opinion of the court, joined
by Judges l'hornberry and Fay. Judge Fay filed a specially concurring opinion. There were no
dissents.
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The plaintiff in Johnson, a black employee at a General Motors Assembly
Plant in Georgia, had instituted a Title VII class action in federal district court
against his employer. 12
 The complaint defined the class as all past, present and
future black employees at the plant, and alleged that General Motors discrimi-
nated against them in its job advancement practices." Johnson sought both in-
junctive and monetary relief." The district court had held that Johnson was a
member of the plaintiff class in a prior suit brought by black employees at the
same plant, and that his action was barred by the res judicata effect of that deci-
sion. 15
The prior action, Rowe v. General Motors corp., to
 had resulted in a final
order in favor of members of the plaintiff class, who alleged racial discrimina-
tion in the procedures utilized in promoting hourly-paid employees to salaried
positions." Although Rowe was never formally certified as a class action, it was
treated as a 23(b)(2) action. 18
 No notice had been given to absent class
members in Rowe. 19
In appealing the district court's decision in Johnson, the plaintiff con-
tended, inter alia, that this lack of notice defeated the res judicata effect. of Rowe. 20
1 ? Id. Johnson filed an EEOC complaint against General Motors in 1973. After receiv-
ing a right-to-sue letter, he brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. $ 2000e-1 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. S 1981 (1976). Id.
13 Id. at 433-34, 20 FEP Cas. at 240. The complaint alleged wide-ranging discrimina-
tion in promotion, job assignment, job education and the dissemination of job openings. M
" Id. at 433, 20 FEP Cas. at 240.
15 Id, at 434, 20 FEP Cas. at 240.
457 F.2d 348, 4 FEP Cas. 445 (5th Cir. 1972).
" 457 F.2d at 351, 4 FEP Cas. at 446. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs had
not been the victims of racial discrimination. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that General
Motors did in fact discriminate against black employees, and remanded the case. Id. at 351, 360,
4 FEP Gas, at 446, 453. On remand, the district court entered a final order requiring General
Motors to halt its discriminatory practices. See Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d at
434, 20 FEP Cas. at 240,
18
 598 F.2d at 434, 20 FEP Cas. at 240-41. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
at 359 n.24, 4 FEP Cas. at 452-53 n.24.
" 598 F.2d at 436, 20 FEP Cas. at 241.
20 Id. at 434, 20 HP Cas. at 240. Johnson raised several other claims in his attempt to
avoid the res judicata effect of Rowe. The court did not find these claims to be persuasive. First,
Johnson argued that the district court's failure to certify Rowe as a class action destroyed the res
judiecaa effect of the judgment. Id. The court answered that failure to comply with subdivision
(c)(1) of Rule 23, which requires a court to determine by order whether a class action is to be
maintained, was nut sufficient to annul the effect of the judgment, since the district court and the
Fifth Circuit made it clear that they were treating Rowe as a class action. Id. at 435, 20 FEP Cas.
at 241 (citing Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447, 6 FEP Cas. 677, 681 (5th Cir.
1973)). Second, Johnson argued that the district court's failure to describe the class in the final
order, as required in subdivision (c)(3) of Rule 23, destroyed the res judicata effect of the judg-
ment. 598 F.2d at 434, 20 FEP Cas. at 240. The court found that this was not a fatal flaw, since
the final decree described the class by implication. Id. at 435, 20 FEP Gas. at 241. Finally,
Johnson alleged that the representation of the plaintiff class in Rowe was inadequate because the
three named plaintiffs in the suit settled their individual monetary claims for $1000 each, but
failed to pursue money damages for the rest of the class. Id. at 434, 20 FEP Cas. at 240. The
court found that its holding that Johnson could pursue monetary claims made it unnecessary to
rule on this issue. Id.
In his specially concurring opinion, Judge Fay agreed that Johnson's claims should not
he barred by Rowe. He noted that "[ijf writing on a clean slate, I would hold that Rowe was never
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The Fifth Circuit agreed. 21
 The court acknowledged that Rule 23 does not re-
quire notice in 23(b)(2) actions," but found that the district court's reliance on
this principle in dismissing Johnson's suit was "misplaced."" The court
remarked that the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23 provides that notice,
whether mandatory or discretionary, is designed to fulfill the requirements of
due process, 24
 and concluded that "Ibjefore the bar of res judicata may be ap-
plied to the claim of an absent class member, it must be demonstrated that in-
vocation of the bar is consonant with due process. "25
The Johnson court's holding was facilitated by its decision in an earlier
case, Bogard v. Cook. 26 The plaintiff in Bogard sought damages for injuries aris-
ing from unconstitutional practices in a Mississippi prison." Bogard had been
a member of a class in a prior 23(6)(2) action against the same prison, in which
the plaintiff class obtained injunctive and declaratory relief from many of the
same practices complained of in Bogard. 28
 Although Bogard had received notice
of the prior action, the Fifth Circuit determined that the notice was not ade-
quate because it did not alert class members to the possibility that they could
seek individual monetary damages.'" The court therefore held that Bogard's
claim was not barred by res judicata. 3°
The Johnson court determined that Bogard largely controlled the instant ac-
tion.'" The court remarked that, unlike Bogard, Johnson had • received no
notice of the prior action through which the district court had barred his
claims." The Fifth Circuit noted that notice and an opportunity to be heard
are "fundamental requisites of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due
process," 33
 and concluded that due process required that Johnson be allowed
to pursue his claims for monetary damages. 34 The Johnson court further stated
a class action because it was never certified as such." Id. at 439, 20 FEE) Cas. at 244. Judge Fay
was concerned about "the consequences inherent in ignoring the requirements of Rule 23." Id.
The requirement to which he was referring, FED. R. CR, . P. 23(c)(1), provides:
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
31
 598 F.2d at 437, 20 FEP Cas. at 242-43.
22 See text at note 6 supra.
2' 598 F.2d at 436, 20 FEP Cas. at 242.
24 Ad. Comm. Note, supra note 1, at 107.
25
 598 F.2d at 436, 20 FEP Cas. at 242.
26 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 401.
" Id. at 406-07. The prior action is Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss.
1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 586 F.2d at 408.
3° Id. at 408-09.
31
 598 F.2d at 437, 20 FEP Cas. at 424.
32 Id,
" Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974)).
1 * 598 F.2d at 437, 20 FEP Cas. at 242-43. The court noted that its decision in Johnson
raised several issues for the determination of the district court on remand: first, whether
Johnson's suit would meet the requirements of Rule 23, and whether, Johnson would be an ade-
quate class representative; second, whether Johnson and his class might be entitled to further in-
junctive and declaratory relief beyond the scope of the Rowe judgment; and, third, whether
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that its holding "does no violence to the general rule making notice only discre-
tionary in Rule 23(b)(2) cases:"" The court noted that the rule was premised
on the notion that 23(b)(2) actions would seek only injunctive or declaratory re-
lief," and that in such actions "the due process interests of absent members
will usually be safeguarded by adequate representation alone."" The court
determined, however, that recent case law developments made it possible to
seek monetary relief in (b)(2) actions as well," and that in cases seeking both
equitable and monetary relief "the balance swings in favor of the provision of
some form of notice.' '39
As will be demonstrated, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Johnson may prove
beneficial to the plaintiff class which Johnson represents, by allowing members
to petition the court for monetary damages. In addition, the court's holding
may benefit both plaintiffs and defendants in future actions in the Fifth Circuit
and other jurisdictions which adopt Johnson's reasoning. Nevertheless, the
opinion presents potential disadvantages to both groups. Furthermore, the
Fifth Circuit left several important questions unanswered in Johnson.
The Fifth Circuit's holding seems appropriate in the factual setting of the
case. While the injunctive and declaratory relief awarded in the Rowe litigation
was designed to benefit the black hourly-paid employees in their future ad-
vancement to salaried positions," it did not afford them an opportunity to peti-
Johnson and other class members might be entitled to relief under the district court's continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the Rowe decree. 598 F.2d at 438-39, 20 FEP Cas. at 243-44.
35 598 F.2d at 437, 20 FEP Cas. at 243.
36 PI The court examined the reasoning of two Supreme Court cases which had held
notice mandatory in actions brought under Rule 23(6)(3), and determined that these cases ex-
plicitly equated monetary relief with (b)(3) actions and injunctive and declaratory relief with
(b)(2) actions. Id. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n.4. (1974) (absence of claim for
monetary relief disclosed that a 23(6)(2) action was contemplated; no notice required); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 n.14 (1974) (the mandatory notice provision for Rule
23(b)(3) actions is inapplicable to class actions for injunctive and declaratory relief maintained
under subdivision (b)(2).").
37 598 F.2d at 437, 20 FEP Cas. at 243.
" Id. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257, 7 FEP Cas.
1115, 1151 (5th Cir. 1974) ((b)(2) actions not limited only to injunctive or declaratory relief;
monetary relief should also be available where appropriate); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
508 F.2d 239, 251, 9 FEP Cas. 211, 220 (3d Cir. 1975).
" 598 l',2d at 438, 20 FEP Cas. at 243.
*" The decree proposed by the Fifth Circuit when it determined that the Rowe plaintiffs
were entitled to relief was adopted "virtually verbatim" by the district court in its final decree.
598 F.2d at 435, 20 FEP Cas. at 421. h provided:
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant shall continue to take
certain affirmative action as hereinafter set forth designated, to implement defend-
ant's policy of equal employment opportunity at its GM Assembly Division Lake-
wood Plant, Atlanta, Georgia, and to discharge defendant's obligations under law
not to discriminate on the basis of race or color in the promotion.or transfer of
employees.
1.
Defendant shall continue its practice of periodically posting on bulletin boards
in conspicuous places throughout its Lakewood plant notices announcing the
formation of pre-foreman training classes or other training programs generally de-
signed to equip employees with necessary skills for advancement to supervisory or
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tion for monetary damages which may have occurred as a result of past dis-
crimination.'" The Johnson holding that monetary claims would not be barred
by the Rowe decision provides these employees, as well as those in the broader
class defined in Johnson," with such an opportunity. 43
 For many of these em-
ployees, monetary damages may prove to be a far more practical remedy than
an injunction promising that they will have greater opportunities for promo-
tions in the future.
Similarly, the provision of notice may benefit plaintiffs in future Title VII
cases where back pay is an issue, by informing them of a practical remedy
which can supplement injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition, the provi-
sion of notice may serve to protect defendant employers from duplicitous litiga-
tion, since the Johnson court implied that a class member who receives adequate
notice but does not pursue a claim will be barred from pursuing an individual
claim later."
Although the application of Johnson might thus protect plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike, practical and financial problems associated with provision of
notice may prove detrimental to both groups. While it may be relatively easy to
provide notice to a cohesive plaintiff class like the one in Johnson, where all class
members work together in a central location, problems may arise in cases in
which the plaintiff class is larger and more dispersed. In many civil rights
cases, for example, the plaintiff class may be "incapable of specific enumera-
other salaried jobs or to skilled trades work. Such notices shall remain posted for
reasonable periods and will set forth information indicating how interested
employees can make application for participation in such training programs.
II.
Defendant shall periodically post on bulletin boards in conspicuous places
throughout its Lakewood plant notices which shall contain information with
respect to the qualifications required for entry level non-supervisory salaried posi-
tions and how and where application can be made.
III.
Defendant shall continue its practice that no hourly rate employees and/or ap-
plicants for salaried employment at the Lakewood Plant shall be denied review or
consideration for salaried etnployment by the Management Development Com-
mittee solely for the reason that they are not supported by the recommendation of
their immediate supervisor.
457 F.2d at 360-61, 4 FEP Cas. at 453-54.
" The Rowe decision indicates that no blacks were hired on the production lines at the
General Motors plant at issue in Rowe andjohnson until 1962, and that promotion and transfer
procedures since that time had operated to "freeze" the past discrimination to a significant ex-
tent. 457 F.2d at 356, 4 FEP Cas. at 450.
" While the action in Rowe was pursued on behalf of hourly-paid black employees. 457
F.2d at 351, 4 FEP Cas. at 446, Johnson proposed to represent all black employees at the plant.
598 F.2d at 433, 20 FEP Cas. at 240.
" This opportunity, however, is contingent on the district court's Finding on remand
that Johnson is an adequate representative for the class. See note 33 supra.
" The Fifth Circuit stated: "Before an absent class member may be forrrer barred from
pursuing an individual damage claim, however, due process requires that he receive some form
of notice that the class action is pending and that his damage claims may be adjudicated as part of
it." 598 F.2d at 438, 20 FEP Cas. at 243 (emphasis added). Thus, the court implied that a class
member who does not receive notice but fails to pursue a claim would be "forever barred" from
future actions seeking monetary relief from the same defendant for the same practices.
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tion." 45
 Thus, it may be difficult to locate members of the class. Moreover,
once the class members are located, the party who is required to provide notice
may face a substantial, if not prohibitive, financial burden. 46
Despite the potential difficulty involved in locating and notifying absent
class members, Johnson nevertheless encourages courts to take a more ag-
gressive role in notification. In ordering notice pursuant to Johnson, courts will
have to answer mechanical questions, not resolved by Johnson, concerning the
timing, method, and expense of notice. These questions are similar to those
courts now face in actions brought under subdivision (b)(3) of Rule 23, 47 where
notice is mandatory." Courts first must determine when notice should be
given. The Johnson court indicated that "Fun some cases it may be proper to de-
lay notice until a more advanced stage of the litigation; for example, until after
class-wide liability is proven. " 49
 There may, however, be a due process objec-
tion to the timing suggested in Johnson, because notice after liability is proved
does not give absent members an opportunity to monitor the litigation in order
to assure that their rights are being protected by the class representatives."
This due process objection can be answered. Rule 23 provides that a class
action may not be maintained unless it is shown that "the representative par-
ties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."" Since ade-
' 5
 Ad. Comm. Note, supra note 1, at 102.
* 6 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 167 (1974) (cost of providing
mail notice to absent class members estimated at $225,000; postage at that time was $.06.)
" FED. R. Cw. P. 23(h)(3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (I)) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
The problems which courts face in providing notice in 23(h)(3) actions are discussed in
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 5 1788 (1972). They
include the timing and type of notice, who should bear the financial burden of notice, and
whether notice should be prepared and sent by the court or by counsel for the class.
45
 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court
will exclude him from the class"if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judg-
ment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through his counsel.
49 598 F.2d at 438, 20 FEY Cas. at 243.
5 ° Cf C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1786,
at 140-41 (discussing due process considerations in 23(b)(3) actions).
5' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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quacy of representation thus will have been determined at the outset of the liti-
gation, it would seem permissible to delay notice until after liability is proved,
particularly because monetary claims of individual members of a (b)(2) class
are secondary to the collective claim for injunctive or declaratory relief. 52 After
receiving notice, class members may then monitor more closely the portion of
the suit relating to monetary relief. 53
Once a court determines when notice is to be given, it must determine
what type of notice will be adequate. In a 23(h)(2) action, the notice must he
"the best . . practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. "54 The Johnson
court indicated that 23(b)(2) notice need not always "be equivalent to that re-
quired in (b)(3) actions," 55 but it would seem to be in the best interests of both
the plaintiff class and the defendant to request that notice be as extensive as
possible. Plaintiff class members who could not afford to bring a subsequent ac-
tion thereby would have an opportunity to litigate their monetary claims as
part of an established class, and the defendant would benefit from the reduced
possibility of later suits by plaintiff class members who did not receive notice
and can afford to bring an action for monetary damages. For the same reasons,
although the Supreme Court has held that a class action plaintiff should pay for
notice "as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit," 56 it may be
in the interest of the defendant to contribute to the cost in order to facilitate the
notification of the greatest number of class members possible.
A final question not resolved in Johnson is the res judicata effect of a (b)(2)
judgment on class members who did receive notice of the litigation but chose
not to litigate their monetary claims along with those of the other class
members. In an action brought under subdivision (b)(3) of Rule 23, class
members may "opt out" of the class in order to bring their own actions later,"
but Rule 23 does not contain a similar provision for (b)(2) class members. It is
unlikely that such a provision can be implied from the language of Rule 23,
from the Johnson opinion, or from the policy considerations behind the 23(b)(3)
"opt out" provision.
The failure of the authors of Rule 23 to include an "opt out" provision for
subdivision 23(b)(2), despite their including a provision for notice in some
23(b)(2) cases, 58 implies that (b)(2) class members cannot remove themselves
" Ad. Comm. Note, supra note 1, at 102. The Note provides that 23(b)(2) "does not ex-
tend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to immey
damages." Id.
If there is any doubt as to the adequacy of representation, the court may order notice
at an earlier stage under subdivision (d)(2). See text of 23(d)(2) at note 7 supra.
54
 FED, R. CR'. P. 23(c)(2).
" 598 F.2d at 438, 20 FEP Cas. at 243.
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974), Eisen was brought under
Rule 23(b)(3), but the Court's holding that the plaintiff must bear the cost of notice did not refer
specifically to (h)(3) actions. Rather, the Court stated that the plaintiff must pay for notice
"Iwihere, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary. — Id. at 178-79. Thus,
where the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant(s) its (b)(2) actions is truly adver-
sary, this mandate logically would apply to (b)(2) actions as well as (b)(3) actions.
" FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(2)(A) provides that the court will exclude a class member from
a (b)(3) class if he so requests.
se
	 note 6 supra.
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from the class and bring subsequent individual actions. Moreover, it is unlikely
that Johnson can be read to sanction an "opt out" provision for 23(b)(2) plain-
tiffs. By stating that a class member who does receive adequate notice of a
pending action may be "forever barred" from pursuing an individual claim, 59
the Johnson court suggests that plaintiffs who seek to exclude themselves from
the judgment nevertheless will be bound by it.
Furthermore, the policy behind the "opt out" provision of (b)(3) actions
does not apply to members of a (b)(2) class. In a 23(6)(2) action, the interests of
class members are not as closely linked as the interests of a 23(b)(2) class. In
23(b)(2) cases, although common questions predominate over questions affect-
ing only individual members, the claims and defenses of individuals similarly
situated may differ substantially. 60
 In fact, the individual interests of 23(b)(3)
class members may be so strong as to warrant denial of the class action. 6 ' The
ability of 23(b)(3) plaintiffs to exclude themselves from the judgment is de-
signed to protect the strong interest an individual may haVe in bringing his own
claim. 62
 In a (b)(2) action, by contrast, the behavior of the party opposing the
class has general application to all class members, and individual claims are
secondary to the request for injunctive or declaratory relief."
Although Johnson fails to answer questions regarding the timing, method,
financial burden and res judicata effect of notice in a (b)(2) action, the decision is
sound. Provision of notice reduces the possibility of recurring lawsuits, thus
vindicating two class action policy objectives — efficiency, and avoidance of
repetitious litigation." Notice also furthers a third class action policy objective
— the establishment of an effective procedure for protecting the rights of per-
sons whose economic position makes it unrealistic for them to maintain
separate suits. 65 Johnson will ensure that more potential plaintiffs are informed
about suits which may affect their rights, and in addition will provide them
" See text at note 44 supra.
See generally Ad. Comm. Note, supra note 1, at 103. For example, the Committee noted
that:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresenta-
tions may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite
the need, if liability is found, for separate determinations of the damages suffered
by individuals within the class. On the other hand, although having some common
core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was
material variation in the representations made or in the kinds of degrees of reliance
by the persons to whom they were addressed.
Id. (citations omitted).
6 Ad. Comm. Note, supra note 1, at 104-05.
62 Id. at 105.
63 Id. at 102.
64 The objectives of a class action are three-fold:
j1] The efficient resolution of the claims or liabilities of many individuals in a
single action, 12] the elimination of repetitious litigation and possibly inconsistent
adjudications involving common questions, related events, or requests for similar
relief, and [3] the establishment of an effective procedure for those whose
economic position is such that it is unrealistic to expect them to seek to vindicate
their rights in separate lawsuits.
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1754 (1972).
65 Id.
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with a practical monetary remedy to coincide with equitable relief. The unan-
swered questions in Johnson must be resolved by reference to these policy objec-
tives, as well as to the principle on which the decision was based — that notice
and an opportunity to be heard are fundamental requirements of due process. 66
2. Rule 23 Requirements and § 706 of Title VII: EEOC v. General Telephone Co.
of Northwest*
Section 706 of Title VII in the original Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives in-
dividuals the right to bring employment discrimination suits in their own
behalf.' In addition, this section has been construed by the courts as authoriz-
ing class action suits.? The 1972 amendments 3 to Title VII 4 empowered the
EEOC also to bring suit under 706(0(1) on behalf of an aggrieved individual.'
It is well established that class action suits brought by individuals under section
706 must comply with the class action requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the EEOC,
66 598 12 ,2d at 437, 20 FEP Cas. at 242.
By Patricia A. Asack, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Sec note 5 infra.
See, e.g., Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Co., 398 F.2d 496, 499, 1 FEP Cas. 328, 330 (5th
Cir. 1968).
3 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
42 U.S.C. 2000e-17 (1976).
42 U.S.C. 4'2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty
days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this
section, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a concilia-
tion agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil
action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has
been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to
the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the
case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent
in the appropriate United States district court. The person or persons aggrieved
shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or the
Attorney General in a case involving a governmental agency, or political subdivi-
sion.
See, e.g., Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R,D. 460, 473, 18 FEP Cas. 1645, 1654
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 268, 11 FEP Cas. 449, 452
(10th Cir. 1975).
Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites which must be met before members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties: 1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impractical; 2) there are questions of law or fact common to all members: 3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and, 4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Having met
these prerequisites, a class must come within one of the three categories of 23(b): 1) where
separate adjudication would create a risk of establishing inconsistent standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class or would effectively adjudicate the claims of other class members not
parties to the action; 2) where the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
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when it brings a class action suit under section 706, must also comply with
Rule 23.
Complicating the question of whether the EEOC must comply with Rule
23 when bringing a class action under section 706 is the fact that the EEOC has
not been required to comply with Rule 23 when bringing a "pattern or prac-
tice" class action under section 707. 7
 A "pattern or practice" suit under sec-
tion 707 is a suit brought against a private employer when the discrimination
consists of more than an isolated incident. 8
 As a result of the amendments to
Title VII and decisional law, there is no longer any essential difference be-
tween sections 706 and 707 when the EEOC is the plaintiff — the EEOC may
bring a class action under either section and may seek both injunctive and affir-
mative relief in the form of back pay and retroactive seniority. 9
 Thus, while
compliance with Rule 23 is not required of the EEOC under section 707, the
issue with respect to section 706 is still unresolved.
Although a number of district courts have considered the issue and have
held that the EEOC need not comply.with Rule 23 in bringing a class action
under section 706,'° the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in EEOC v. D. H.
Holmes Co.," was the first appellate court to address the issue. The Holmes court
held that the EEOC is not exempt from the applicability of Rule 23 and must
meet its requirements in order to maintain a class action under section 706.' 2
generally applicable to the class as a whole; or 3) where common questions of fact or law
predominate over individual questions and a class action is superior to other available methods of
adjudicating the controversy. This procedure, known as certification, must be undertaken before
an action may proceed as a class action. See, e.g., Branham v. Electric Co., 63 F.R.D. 667 (D.
Tenn. 1974). Where the requirements of Rule 23 have not been met, courts have refused to allow
actions to be certified as class actions. See, e.g., Vann Allen v. Circle K Corp., 58 F.R.D. 562,
565 (C.D. Cal. 1972); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 112 (D. Colo. 1971). The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving compliance with the requirements. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 1 23.02 n.33 (2d ed. 1977).
See, e.g., EEOC v. Stroh Brewery Co,, 19 FEP Cas. 1099, 1105-06 (F.D. Mich. 1979).
The United States Attorney General Section 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976), provides in
pertinent part:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full en-
joyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or
practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights
herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate
district court of the United States.. .
This authority was given the EEOC by the 1972 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(e) (1976).
Prior to the 1972 amendments, the Attorney General was also not required to comply with Rule
23 when bringing an enforcement action under § 707. See, e.g., United States v. T.1.M.E. -
D.C., 517 F.2d 294, 11 FEP Cas. 66 (5th Cir. 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976).
9
 EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 FEP Cas. 477, 478 (W.D. Wash. 1977). See also 118
CONC. REC. 4081-82 (1972) (remarks of Senators Williams and Javits).
'D See, e.g., EEOC v. CTS of Asheville, Inc., 13 FEP Cas. 852, 853 (W.D.N.C. 1976);
EEOC v. Vinnell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575, 577, 12 FEP Cas. 1815, 1816
(E.D. Wash. 1976); EEOC v. Rexene Polymers Co., 10 FEP Cas. 61 (W.D. Tex. 1975); EEOC
v. Lutheran Hosp., 10 FEP Cas. 1177, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 1974); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6
FEP Gas. 727, 707 (W.D. Mo. 1973). Contra, EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 12 FEP Cas. 1133,
1134 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
" 556 F.2d 787, 15 FEP Gas. 378 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
'2 Id. at 789, 15 FEP Gas, at 378.
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The court observed that the 1972 amendment, which enabled the EEOC to
bring suit, in no way altered either class action procedures or the post-1964
case law which held private suits under section 706 appropriate for class litiga-
tion under Rule 23." Moreover, the court observed that the express statutory
language of section 706 merely grants the EEOC standing to sue to the same
extent as individuals." Finding, therefore, no congressional intent to exempt
the EEOC," the court reasoned that when the EEOC brings suit, it does so
subject to Rule•23, just as does the private litigant in whose place it stands." In
support of its conclusion, the court noted that the important interests served by
the rule — preventing piecemeal suits, permitting widescale relief, protecting a
defendant from inconsistent adjudications, and providing for judicial control of
possible abuse of the class action device" — militate against granting EEOC
an exemption." The Holmes court also suggested that if, for any reason, the
EEOC was not certified at the trial court level, its recourse was to bring a "pat-
tern or practice" action under section 707 against the Holmes company while
at the same time it continued to seek relief for the five named individuals in the •
instant action under section 706)
During this Survey year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v.
General Telephone Co. of Northwesin held, contrary to the Holmes court decision,
that the EEOC is not required to comply with Rule 23 class action require-
ments when it seeks relief for a class of individuals under section 706. 21 As a
result, a split now exists between two circuits on whether the EEOC must meet
the class certification requirements of Rule 23 when it brings a class action
under section 706.
In General Telephone, the EEOC instituted an action against General Tele-
phone of Northwest, its subsidiary, and a union (hereinafter collectively re-
ferred to as "General Telephone"), alleging discrimination against women
employees with respect to maternity leave, access to craft jobs, and oppor-
tunities for promotion to managerial positions. 22 It sought both injunctive relief
and back pay." The EEOC then moved for an order bifurcating the issues of
class liability and individual damages. 24 Thereafter, the district court referred
Id, at 794, 15 FEP Cas. at 384.
• Id.
Id.
16 Id. at 795, 15 FEP Cas. at 385.
12 Id.
Id. 15 FEP Cas. at 384. The Holmes court also found that because Congress had
granted the EEOC explicit statutory standing to sue, the EEOC is a member of the class hir the
purposes of Rule 23. Id. at 796, 15 FEP Cas. at 386. See note 6 supra. The court also stated its
belief that in the typical situation the EEOC would be an excellent class representative since it
possesses the resources, experience, and tenacity to serve the class' interests adequately. Id. at
797, 15 FEP Cas. at 386. See note 6 supra. The court conceded, however, that a possible conflict
might arise between the EEOC's public purpose and the private interests in the case and noted
that this was a question of fact to be resolved at the trial level. Id.
12 Id. at 792 n.8, 15 FEP Cas. at 382 n.8.
20 599 F.2d 322, 20 FEP Cas. 52 (9th Cir. 1979).
2 ' Id. at 334, 20 FEP Cas. at 59-60.
22 Id. at 325, 15 FEP Cas. at 53.
23 Id.
" Id. EEOC's mot ion was pursuant to FED. R. Ctv. P. 42(b).
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the action to a magistrate for trial. 25 General Telephone followed with a motion
to dismiss the class action aspects of the complaint. 28
 In his report to the district
court, the magistrate recommended that General Telephone's motion to
dismiss be denied and that the EEOC not be required to comply with Rule 23. 27
The magistrate based his recommendation on three reasons: first, the EEOC is
not required to comply with Rule 23 in section 707 "pattern or practice" suits
and suits under section 706 should not be treated differently; second, the
statute itself provides the necessary authority for the EEOC to bring a class ac-
tion; and finally, it is undesirable and impractical to require the EEOC to com-
ply with Rule 23. 28 The district court adopted the magistrate's recommenda-
tions and entered an order denying the motion. 29 Later, that order was
amended to certify the question for interlocutory appeal."
On appeal, General Telephone argued that neither the Civil Rights Act of
1964 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exempts the EEOC from com-
pliance with Rule 23 when it brings a class action under section 706. 3 ' The
court, reviewing the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, the language
of the statute, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, conceded that they
failed to express clearly a congressional intention that the EEOC either comply
with or be exempt from the Rule 23 class action certification requirement. 32
The court found, however, that the two requirements essential to maintenance
of a class action are that a class exists and that the named representative is a
member of the class he purports to represent. 33 Because of its determination
that the EEOC meets these two prerequisits, the court concluded that the
EEOC should not be required to comply with Rule 23. 34 As to the first prere-
quisite, the court stated that every action under Title VII is, in effect, a class
action." The court acknowledged that the second prerequisite, membership in
a class, posed a greater problem since the EEOC was obviously not a member
of the class." The court reasoned, however, that while class action certification
requires a judicial determination that the named plaintiff will adequately
" Id.
Id.
27 Id.
" Id. The magistrate concluded that to require compliance would be undesirable and
impractical because EEOC could never comply with Rule 23 because it is nut a member of the
class it seeks to represent and could not adequately represent the class' interests and because to
require compliance would hinder congressional intent to broaden the EEOC's enforcement
powers. EIF,OC v. General Tel. Co., 16 FEP Cas. 476, 479-80 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
27 Id. .at 326, 20 FEP Cas. at 53.
30 Id.
3 ' Id.
" Id. at 328, 20 FEP Cas. at 55.
" Id. at 327-28, 20 FEP Cas. at 54-55.
34 Id. at 333, 20 FEP Cas. at 59.
35 Id. at 327, 20 FEP Cas. at 54. Courts repeatedly have asserted that discrimination on
the basis of race or national origin is by definition a class wrong, see, e.g., Gay v. Waiters' &
Dairy Lunehmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333, 14 FEP Cas. 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1977);
Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50, 8 FEP Cas. 1246, 1253 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev 'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499, 1
FEP Cas. 328, 330 (5th Cir. 1968), presumably because some characteristic common to each
group member is the basis for the different treatment.
36 599 F.2d at 328, 20 FEP Cas. at 55.
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represent the class, the EEOC had received a legislative determination that it
was an adequate representative of the class when Congress granted it standing
to sue." In short, the court concluded that because Congress had made the
determination that the EEOC is a "properly suing party" and an adequate
representative of the class," the essentials of Rule 23 had been satisfied and
Rule 23 certification is unnecessary."
In arriving at its decision, the General Telephone court explicitly rejected the
Holmes court's decision because that decision failed to recognize the distinction
between a private class action suit which must comply with Rule 23 and a suit
by the EEOC. 4° According to the General Telephone court, that distinction rests
in the EEOC's being charged with the vindication of public rights and policy
and not merely with the enforcement of private rights.'" The court also based
its decision on the similarities between actions under section 706 and section
707. Conceding that there may be differences in the nature and burden of proof
in EEOC actions as between these sections, the General Telephone court reasoned
that nonetheless in both cases the EEOC seeks to vindicate a public policy and
in both may obtain individual relief. 42
 The court endorsed the district court's
conclusion that since the Attorney General, who prior to the 1972 amendments
had been charged with bringing actions under section 707, had never been re-
quired to comply with Rule 23, it was illogical to apply a different requirement
to actions under section 706 in view of the identical nature of the two suits."
Finally, the General Telephone court addressed the issue of the procedural
safeguards available to protect defendants if the EEOC was not required to
comply with Rule 23. Rule 23 operates to protect defendants from multiple liti-
gation on the same issue, double damage payments, and inconsistent adjudica-
tion. Recognizing the need for safeguards if the EEOC was exempted from
Rule 23, the court stated that because the federal courts are vested with broad
equitable powers under Title VII, they can prescribe procedures and remedies
which are fair to all parties and which insure that defendants are not subjected
to unnecessary duplicative adjudication or double payments." Therefore, the
court concluded that defendants would be protected even though Rule 23 certi-
fication was not required.
It is submitted that the holding of the General Telephone case is correct but
that the reasoning on which it relied is questionable.
In part, the court based its decision that the EEOC need not comply with
Rule 23 in section 706 class actions on its conclusion that EEOC satisfied the
two essential prerequisites to a class action and therefore need not comply with
Rule 23. It might be observed initially that the logic of this reasoning is not
readily discernable. It is difficult to understand why the conclusion that EEOC
"
38 It at 333, 20 FEP Cas. at 59.
39 Id.
44 Id. at 331, 20 FEP Cas. at 57.
1 ' Id.
42 Id. at 333, 20 FEP Cas. at 58-59; EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 FEP Cas. 476, 478
(W.D. Wash. 1977).
43 599 F.2d at 331, 20 FEP Cas. at 57.
" Id. at 334-35, 20 FEP Cas. at 60.
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need not comply with Rule 23 follows from the assertion that the EEOC satis-
fies the essentials of that rule. Beyond this fundamental question, however, the
court's determination that the EEOC meets the prerequisite that the represent-
ative party adequately represent the class is not well-founded. Courts re-
peatedly have held that private litigants are not bound by previously litigated
government suits. 45
 The rationale for this line of authority is that the govern-
ment and the members of the class it purports to represent often pursue differ-
ent and potentially conflicting interests. 46 As one court noted in a case involv-
ing a suit previously litigated by the EEOC: "While the government may be
willing to compromise in order to gain prompt, and perhaps nationwide relief,
private plaintiffs, more concerned with full compensation . . . may be willing
to hold out for full restitution. "47
 Thus, the General Telephone court's determina-
tion that the EEOC can adequately represent the interests of class members is
contrary to the reasoning of well-accepted authority and was made without
citation to decisional law or legislative history in the opinion. Assuming, there-
fore, that the court's determination was erroneous, then, necessarily, its con-
clusion that the EEOC satisfies the basics of Rule 23 must also fail. Thus, that
Rule 23 is essentially satisfied when the EEOC brings a class action suit, a fac-
tor on which the court relied in reaching its holding, in fact, provides little, if
any, support for it.
In addition to its conclusion that the EEOC satisfied Rule 23, the General
Telephone court relied on the availability of section 707 as an alternative to sec-
tion 706. With respect to its reliance on this factor, the reasoning of the General
Telephone court was correct. Because both injunctive relief and back pay are
available under either section," there appears to be little reason to require
compliance with Rule 23 in class actions under section 706 when such com-
pliance is not required under section 707. The Holmes court, for example, ap-
parently did not recognize the anomaly created by its decision when it sug-
gested that the EEOC could bring a class action against Holmes under section
707 if in the lower court the EEOC was unable for any reason to qualify as a
class representative in the lower court. 49 Thus ;
 that section 707 provides a
ready alternative to section 706, a fact on which the court relied, does provide
support for the General Telephone holding.
In addition to the availability of section 707, however, there is a more
compelling reason for not requiring the EEOC to comply with Rule 23 in ac-
♦ United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 837, 11 FEP Cas.
167, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 65, 8 FEL' Cas.
1246, 1265 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 51 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 100 (1975); Williamson v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203, 5 FEP Cas. 204, 205 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Operating Engineers, 4 FEP Cas. 1088, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 843, 11 FEP
Cas. 167, 179 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. T. I.M.E. - D.C., 516 F.2d 299, 399 n.36, 11
FEP Cas. 66, 80 n.36 (5th Cir. 1975), reu'd on other Founds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
" Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 66, 8 FEP Cas. 1246, 1266 (5th
Cir. 1974), ree'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
" EEOC v. Singer Controls Co., 80 F.R.D. 76, 78, 18 FEP Cas. 309, 311 (N.D. Ohio
1978).
79 556 F.2d at 792 n.8, 15 FEP Cas. at 382 n.8.
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
	 135
tions under section 706 which the General Telephone court did not consider. A
judgment under Rule 23(b) generally binds all members of the class, even
those not before the court, thereby barring duplicative actions and piecemeal
suits. As noted above, however, courts have held consistently that private liti-
gants arc not bound by previously litigated government suits." In light of this
authority, to require the EEOC to satisfy Rule 23 in section 706 class actions
would have as a consequence increased expense, delay and judicial diseconomy
with no apparent countervailing benefit such as avoidance of duplicative litiga-
tion or inconsistent adjudications.
The holding in General Telephone, despite the reasoning on which it rests,
represents the better resolution of the question of whether the EEOC must
comply with Rule 23 when it brings a section 706 class action. Given the
authority that a governmental entity cannot adequately represent the private
interests of a class, EEOC would seem to be disabled, perhaps as a matter of
law, from ever satisfying Rule 23. Even if such compliance were possible, as
long as private litigants arc not bound by judgments in government-litigated
suits, the safeguards of barring duplicative suits and inconsistent adjudications
which Rule 23 provides are unavailable. To require the expenditure of time,
money and the other resources involved in a certification process under these
circumstances makes little sense. The availability of section 707 underscores
this conclusion. For these reasons, the General Telephone holding that the EEOC
need not meet the Rule 23 certification requirement when it brings a class ac-
tion under section 706 represents the better view.
C. jury Trials in ADEA Actions: Nakshian v. Claytor*
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),' which provided aggrieved employees with a right of action against
private sector employers. 2
 Federal employees were not granted a cause of ac-
tion against the Government until the Act was amended in 1974. 3
 A controver-
sy currently exists concerning a federal employee's right to a jury trial in
ADEA actions. Initially, the jury trial question arose in the context of private
sector suits, and the Supreme Court held that private employees were emitled
to jury trials. 4
 In an almost simultaneous indication of its own attitude, Con-
gress amended the ADEA in 1978 to provide explicitly for jury trials in private
'° See cases cited at note 44 supra. It should be noted that following this authority, even
where the EEOC required to comply with Rule 23 under section 707, private litigants would still
not be bound by judgments obtained by the EEOC. For this reason, the availability of section
707 as an alternative to section 706 provides only secondary support for the General Telephone
holding.
• By Mary DeNevi, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW Review.
' 29 U.S.C. SS 621-634 (1976). Enacted in 1967, the ADEA makes it unlawful for any
employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual" because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976). The Act
applies to workers between the ages of 40 and 70. Id. at § 631(a) (Supp. II 1978).
29 U.S.C. SS 626(c), 630(b) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976).
4 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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sector suits.' Congress, however, did not specifically extend that right to public
sector employees. During the Survey year, the question of a federal employee's
right to a jury trial in an ADEA action was presented to the courts.
In Nakshian v. Claytor, 6
 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that an employee who brings an ADEA action against the federal
government may demand a jury trial.' The D.C. Circuit's approval of jury
trials for federal employees in the nation's capital seems likely to lead to a
significant number of cases in other circuits in which federal employees will re-
quest jury trials in ADEA actions. Moreover, the decision may prompt Con-
gress to make an explicit statement approving or disapproving jury trials in
such actions.
The plaintiff in Nakshian was a 62-year-old civilian employee of the United
States Department of the Navy. 8 She brought an action in the district court
under section 15(c) of the ADEA, 9 charging the Navy with age discrimination
in violation of the Act.'u She requested a jury trial, and the Government moved
to strike the request on the grounds that Congress did not specifically authorize
jury trials in ADEA actions against the federal government." In a memoran-
dum opinion, the district court denied the Government's motion, and the Gov-
ernment filed an interlocutory appeal."
The D.C. Circuit's discussion of the issue on appeal centered on the Gov-
ernment's contention that jury trials are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The Government argued that the seventh amendment's guarantee
of a right to jury trial in suits at "common law"" does not apply to suits
against the Government, which were prohibited at common law.' 4 While
acknowledging that Congress may waive sovereign immunity, the Government
noted that Congress also may specify the terms and conditions under which
suits against the federal government may be maintained. ' 5 Thus, the Govern-
29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (Supp. II 1978).
628 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
7 Id. at 65. Chief Judge Wright, joined by Judge Bazelon, delivered the opinion. Judge
Tamm filed a dissent.
8 Id. at 60.
5 Section 15(c) of the ADEA provides:
29 U.S.C. § 33a(c) (1976).
1 " 628 F.2(1 at 60.
" Id.
' 2 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(13) (1976) provides that a Court of Appeals may permit an ap-
peal to be taken From an interlocutory order which involves a "controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. . . ." This is authorized when "an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion." Id.
13
 The seventh amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
' 4 628 F.2d at 60.
15
 Id.
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ment reasoned that the grant of a right to a jury trial, like a waiver of sovereign
immunity, "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."'" The
Government concluded that, since it could find no such authorization in the
ADEA or in its legislative history, the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial."
The appellee contended, and the D.C. Circuit agreed, that it is not neces-
sary to find an explicit grant of a right to a jury trial.' 8 The court found that the
Government and the dissent erroneously construed the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to include a presumption against jury trials in suits against the feder-
al government, even where the Government has otherwise waived its immuni-
ty from suit." The court determined that, "once Congress has waived the
Government's immunity, and where it has not explicitly specified the trial pro-
cedure to be followed, sovereign immunity drops out of the picture. ,,211
Having thus determined that a waiver of sovereign immunity does not in
itself indicate a preference for or against jury trials, the court reasoned that the
jury trial issue is one of ordinary statutory interpretation. 21 The court therefore
examined the language and legislative history of the ADEA, as well as relevant
case law, to determine whether the statute "expressly or by fair implication" pro-
vides for trial by jury for federal employees."
The court found three indications that Congress intended federal
employees in ADEA actions to be entitled to jury trials. The first two indica-
tions were found in the language of ADEA section 15(c), 23
 which governs juris-
diction and relief for federal government employees. First, the court reasoned
that "the very fact that Congress gave jurisdiction over ADEA suits against the
federal government to the District Courts rather than the Court of Claims sup-
ports the inference" that jury trials are to be permitted. 24 The court noted that
a grant of jurisdiction to a district court carries with it a right to trial by jury,
absent a specific provision as to method of trial." The D.C. Circuit determined
16 Id. at 61 (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
' 7 628 F.2d at 61.
18 Id. at 61, 62-63.
' 9 Id. at 63 n.4.
20 Id.
Si Id. at 63.
22 Id. (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEMRE 5
2314, at 69 (1971) (emphasis added by the court)). The court noted that:
Courts can, and do, inkr a congressional intention to allow jury trials in actions
against the Government in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, For ex-
ample, in United Stales i. Pfitsch , , , 256 U.S. 547 (1921)], the Supreme Court
concluded that actions brought against the Government under the Lever Act of
1917, 40 Stat. 276 (1917), may be tried to a jury even though the statute did not
provide for jury trials.
628 F.2d at 63.
" 29 U.S.C. 4 633a(c) (1976).
" 628 F.2d at 63. Section 15(c) provides in pertinent part that an aggrieved employee
may bring an action "in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction.. . ," 29 U.S.C.
633a(c) (1976).
25
 628 F.2d at 63-64 (quoting 5 MOORE'S, FEDERAL PRACTICE 138.31 [2f at 236 (2d ed.
1980)).
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that two Supreme Court decisions, United Stales v. Pfitsch 26 and Law v. United
States," had relied on this reasoning in concluding that actions against the
federal government could be tried before a jury. 2 °
The court found the second indication of congressional intent to provide
for jury trials in the use of the term "legal relief'' in section 15(c). 29 The court
pointed out that the same language was used in section 7(c) of the ADEA,
which governs suits against private employers." It noted that, before section
7(c) was amended in 1978 to provide explicitly for jury trials for private
employees,"' the Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons32 had held that the term
"legal relief" indicated congressional intent to provide for jury trials."" Thus,
the court concluded that, by using the term of art "legal relief" in section
15(c), Congress had "exercisled] its power to place such suits within the class
of suits to which the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee applies."'"
The court found the third indication of congressional intent to provide for
jury trials in the legislative history of the 1978 ADEA amendments. The
Government contended that, had Congress intended to authorize jury trials in
section 15(c) actions, it would have amended that section when it amended sec-
tion 7(c) in 1978." The court, however, examined the legislative history of the
1978 amendment, and concluded that "Congress was merely acting to reaffirm
its intention to provide for jury trial whenever the issue was in doubt. "36 The
court noted that Senator Edward Kennedy, who proposed the amendment
before the Supreme Court's decision in Lorillard, did so because of a conflict on
the jury trial issue in several courts of appeals," and that the discussion of the
amendment centered on the propriety of jury trials in age discrimination cases,
without distinguishing between public and private employers."
26 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (Supreme Court assumed that district court jurisdiction implies
jury trials).
27 266 U.S. 494 (1925) (cases under War Risk Insurance Act may be tried before a
jury).
28 628 F.2d at 64.
29 Id. Section 15(e) provides in pertinent part that government employees may bring ac-
tions for "legal or equitable relief." 29 U.S.C. 5 633a(c) (1976).
3° 628 F.2d at 64. Section 7(c) of the ADEA provides in pertinent part: Any person ag-
grieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. 5 626(c)(1) (1976).
" Section 7(c)(2) of the ADEA provides:
In any action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a trial by
jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a
result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought
by any party in such action.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (Stipp. II 1978).
" 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
" 628 F.2d at 64, See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 585.
" 628 F.2d at 64.
" Id.
36
 Id.
37 See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977) (right
to jury trial in ADEA actions against private employers), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Pons
v. Lorillard, 549 F,2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977) (right to jury trial), af/'d, 434 U.S. 575 (1978);
Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1978) (no right to jury trial), vacaled and re-
manded, 435 U.S. 911 (1978).
" 628 F.2d at 65.
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Based on these three indications of congressional intent — district court
jurisdiction, the use of the term "legal relief," and legislative history — the
Nakshian court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial in her
ADEA action against the Navy.
In the Nakshian dissent, Judge Tamm adopted the Government's argu-
ment that sovereign immunity includes immunity from jury trials as well as im-
munity from suits." In addition, he took issue with each point of statutory con-
struction raised by the majority in support of jury trials for federal employees
bringing ADEA actions.
Judge Tamm determined that section 1 5(c)'s grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion in federal district court did not support the majority's holding, and that the
majority's reliance on United Slates v. Pfitsch" on this issue was "unavailing-. ,,41
He pointed out that the Pfitsch Court's statement that district court jurisdiction
implies a right to jury trial was dictum. 42 Consequently, he concluded that the
statement should not be construed to require jury trials whenever the Govern-
ment waives sovereign immunity and provides for actions against it to be
brought in district court.'"
In addition, Judge Tamm determined that the majority's reliance on the
Lorillard Court's construction of ADEA section 7(c) was misplaced in a case
construing section 15(c). He emphasized that Lorillard dealt with employees in
the private sector, and that the Supreme Court did not discuss federal em-
ployees or waiver of sovereign immunity." Judge Tamm also disagreed with
the majority's construction of the term "legal relief." He argued that the
Lorillard Court found the term significant only when it referred to suits covered
by the seventh amendment. 45 Remarking that suits against the federal govern-
ment are not encompassed by the seventh amendment, he reasoned that the
term "legal relief" does not trigger a right to jury trials in section 15(c)
actions. 46 As did the Government,'" Judge Tamm found the failure of Con-
gress to amend section 15(c) to be significant. He noted that "[w]here Con-
" Judge Tamm contended that waiver of sovereign immunity does not carry with it an
automatic waiver of immunity from jury trials. He noted that the seventh amendment jury trial
guarantee applies only to suits at "common law," and that actions against the Government were
not allowed at common law. Id. He reasoned that the seventh amendment therefore cannot be
applied to suits against the United Status, absent a clear congressional statement of authoriza-
tion. Id. at 65-66. Because he was unable to find such a clear statement in the language of the
ADEA, its legislative history, or the case law construing it, he concluded that Congress had not
intended to authorize jury trials. Id. at 70.
4" 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
628 F.2d at 69.
" Id. at 70. Judge Tamm noted that the major issue in Pfitsch was whether the district
court was to have exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought under § 10 of the Lever Act, ch. 53,
40 Stat. 276 (1917), or was to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims. 628 F.2d at
69-70. See United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. at 549.
43 628 F.2d at 70.
" Id. at 69. Judge Tamm remarked that jury trials raise "different concerns" for federal
employees than for those in private industry, expressing concern that "Wuries may be too sym-
pathetic toward plaintiffs in cases where the federal government is the defendant. — Id.
" Id. at 69.
46 Id.
47 See text at note 35 supra.
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press has carefully employed a term in one place but excluded it in another, it
should not be implied where excluded." 48
 He determined that the failure to
amend section 15(c) "cannot be deemed inadvertent," since Congress had
amended other sections of the ADEA when it amended section 7(c) in 1978. 49
On the issues raised in Nakshian, the reasoning of the majority is more per-
suasive than that of Judge Tamm. Judge Tamm offered no precedent in sup-
port of his contention that there is a presumption against jury trials in suits
where the government has otherwise waived its sovereign immunity. The ma-
jority, by contrast, advanced a logical argument, supported by prior case law, 5°
that a right to trial by jury may be inferred from statutory language. 5 '
The majority found adequate manifestation of Congress' intention to
create a right to a jury trial in the language of the ADEA. The first indication of
congressional intent was the grant of exclusive jurisdiction of section 15(c) ac-
tions to the federal district courts. 52
 As the majority noted, the Supreme Court
in United States v. Pfitsch 53 stated that such a grant carries with it a right to jury
trials. 54
 Judge Tamm was correct in his assertion that the statement was dic-
tum. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the jury trial issue important in
reaching its decision in Pfitsch. The Pfitsch Court determined that Congress had
been aware of the jury trial connotation when it granted sole jurisdiction of ac-
tions arising under section 10 of the Lever Act to the federal district courts, and
that this awareness was in fact instrumental in Congress' decision not to grant
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims." If Congress was aware of
the jury trial connotation in 1917, when it enacted the Lever Act, it can be
assumed that Congress was equally aware of that connotation when it enacted
ADEA section 15(c) in 1974.
The majority found a second manifestation of congressional intent to pro-
vide for jury trials in ADEA actions against the Government in the use of the
term "legal relief" in section 15(c). In Lorillard, the Supreme Court held that
"legal relief" is a term of art, which carries with it a connotation of right to
trial by jury. 56 Although the ADEA plaintiff in Lorillard was a private-sector
employee, the Court's reasoning applies with equal force to government
employees. 57 The Lorillard Court reiterated the rule that, where a term which
" 628 F.2d at 68 (quoting J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Vessel Morning Star, 457 F.2d
815 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972)).
" 628 F.2(1 at 69 n.8. judge. Taman noted that Congress in 1978 had amended subsec-
tion (a) of § 633a, and had added subsections (1) and (g). Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a (Supp. II
1978).
" See, e.g., Law v. United States, 266 U.S. 494 (1925); United States v. Plitsch, 256
U.S. 547 (1921).
" 628 F.2d at 62-65. Furthermore, the majority remarked that, "if there are to be any
presumptions [regarding method of trial], it would seem that the preference for jury trials in our
jurisprudence would support a presumption in favor of such trials." Id. at 63 n.4.
52 See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976).
53 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
" Id. at 550.
" Id. at 550-52.
56
 434 U.S. at 583.
" The Nakshian majority acknowledged that Lorillard concerned private employees, but
determined that "we must assume that Congress meant to confer the same rights when it used
the same term in authorizing suits against the Government." 628 F.2d at 64.
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has a "well-known meaning in common law or in the law of this country" is
employed in a statute, Congress is presumed to be aware of the significance of
the term." Therefore, the Lorillard Court inferred that Congress was aware of
the jury trial connotation of "legal relief" when it enacted section 7(c). 59 Since
the Court in Lorillard thus assumed that Congress knew the significance of
"legal relief" when it enacted section 7(c), it is logical to infer that Congress
was aware of that significance when it later enacted section 15(c). Furthermore,
it can be argued that, had Congress disagreed with the Lorillard Court's inter-
pretation of "legal relief," it could have removed the term from section 15(c)
when it amended section 7(c) to provide for jury trials.
The soundness of the majority's construction of "legal relief" is not
refuted by Judge Tamm's argument that the Lorillard Court based its inter-
pretation of that term on the seventh amendment, which does not apply to suits
against the Government. Admittedly, the Lorillard Court stated that "Idyl cases
in which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined, the Seventh
Amendment provides a right to jury trial. " 60 The seventh amendment, how-
ever, was not the basis of the Lorillard Court's decision. In fact, the Court
stated earlier in the opinion that its resolution of the statutory construction
issue made consideration of the constitutional (seventh amendment) issue un-
necessary. 6 ' The statement quoted above, therefore, can be considered dictum
employed by the Court in reaching its determination that the use of the term
"legal relief" in ADEA section 7(c) supported the inference that Congress in-
tended for jury trials to be available in section 7(c) actions. Consequently, the
Court's reference to the seventh amendment, read in context, simply means
that Congress, in using the term "legal relief," brought ADEA section 7(c) ac-
tions within the coverage of the seventh amendment. The Nakshian majority
therefore seems correct in its assumption that the use of the same term in sec-
tion 15(c) as in section 7(c) brought actions against the federal government
within the coverage of the seventh amendment, although they would not
belong there absent a congressional mandate. 62
The final source of contention between the majority and Judge Tamm was
the failure of Congress to amend ADEA section 15(c) in 1978 when it amended
section 7(c) to provide explicitly for trial by jury. Judge Tamm noted that Con-
gress had altered several sections surrounding 15(c) in 1978, and therefore
could have amended section 15(c) had it so intended. 63
 This is Judge Tamm's
most persuasive argument, since Congress at that time did have an opportuni-
ty to provide explicitly for jury trials in section 15(c) actions. Nevertheless, the
grant of sole jurisdiction in the federal courts and the use of the term "legal re-
lief" are positive indications that Congress intended to make jury trials avail-
able for federal employees. In light of these positive indications, Congress'
omission of an explicit grant of a right to jury trials is not decisive. Moreover, it
can be argued that, had Congress intended to bar jury trials, it would have
58
 434 U.S. at 583 (quoting Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S.
	 59 (1911)).
59
 434 U.S. at 583.
6° Id.
6 ' Id. at 577.
62 628 F.2d at 64.
63 628 F.2d at 69 n.8.
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amended section 15(c) to make that intention clear when it amended the sur-
rounding sections." In addition, as the majority noted, the failure of Congress
to amend section 15(c) when it amended section 7(c) "is easily explained by the
fact that the cases which prompted congressional action were brought against
private employers. "65
In Nakshian, the D.C. Circuit established the right to a jury trial for plain-
tiffs bringing ADEA actions against the federal government. The impact of
Nakshian in other circuits, however, remains to be seen. Although the reasoning
of the majority is persuasive, judge Tamm's dissent presents arguments which
undoubtedly will be raised in attempts to block jury trials in these circuits. Un-
til Congress makes a definitive statement on the right of all federal employees
to jury trials in ADEA actions, section 15(c) plaintiffs arc likely to encounter
delays in reaching the merits of their cases while interlocutory appeals on the
jury trial issue are being decided. In the interest of clarity and judicial
economy, Congress should take the initiative and make a definitive statement
authorizing jury trials in section I5(c) actions without waiting for further
judicial construction of the ADEA.
D. Standard of Proof Jepsen v. Florida Board of Regents*
The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green' enunciated the
proper order and nature of proof in Title VIP cases. According to the standard
set forth in McDonnell Douglas, the complainant has the initial burden of estab-
" This conclusion finds support in the remarks of Congressman Pepper, Chairman of
the House Committee on Aging and a member of the Conference Committee on the 1978
amendments to the ADEA. Congressman Pepper placed the following statement in the Congres-
sional Record on September 5, 1979:
Those who participated in the House and Senate debates [on the amendment]
would be surprised to learn that legislative efforts to confirm the right to a jury trial
have been construed as a denial of that right. It would be indefensible to deny
Federal employees the right to a jury trial. Under any legislative enactment in the
field of civil rights, the Federal Government should be the leader not a grudging
participant. . . . As chairman of the Committee on Aging, I will continue to watch
developments in this area, and will ask for further delineation of the right of
Federal employees to a jury trial if conflicting judicial interpretations are not
resolved in favor of a jury trial.
125 CONE. REC. E4258 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Pepper).
" 628 F.2d at 65. See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2c1 950 (4th Cir. 1977),
aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded, 435 U.S. 911 (1978).
By Audrey Helen Rothschild, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW RF.viEw.
411 U.S. 792 (1972).
2 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq. (1976). Title VII was amended by the Equal Opportunity
Act of 1972, 5 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), to bring educational institutions within the purview of the
Act. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — to fail or refuse to
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lishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 3 A complainant may prove her
prima facie case by establishing that (1) she belongs to a protected class, such as
a particular race or sex; (2) she applied and was qualified for the job in ques-
tion; (3) despite her qualifications she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection,
the employer continued to seek applicants with her qualifications. 4 Once the
complainant has completed this step, the burden shifts to the employer to ar-
ticulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its act ions. 5 If the employer
convinces the court of the legitimacy of its reason for seeking other job ap-
plicants after denying the complainant a position, the plaintiff then has the
burden of proving that the employer's articulated basis was in fact pretext."
Since the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas, a major issue
has arisen regarding its applicability to Title VII cases involving academic in-
stitutions. Several federal courts have refused to adopt the McDonnell Douglas
standard of proof in suits against universities,' These courts instead have re-
quired the employee to satisfy a more stringent standard of proof 9 because of a
judicial reluctance to interfere with the professional hiring and promotional
practices of educational institutions. 9 The reasoning for this approach is that
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin; or,
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
411 U.S. at 802.
'
6 Id. at 804.
7 See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 8 FEP Gas. 609 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff'd, 8 FEP Cas. 319 (S.D. N.Y. 1973) (Female research associate professor sought injunctive
relief forbidding medical school to terminate her. The court rejected her claim of sex discrimina-
tion.), Faro was the first major Title VII decision involving a university. Green v. Board of
Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249, 4 FEP Cas. 126 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 594, 5 FEP Gas.
677 (5th Cir. 1973) (Plaintiff charged sex discrimination in the university's failure to promote her
to the rank of full professor. The court followed the university's decision against promotion.).
Many other courts have relied on the philosophy expressed in Faro that courts should exercise
minimal scrutiny of university employment practices. Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435
F. Supp. 1328, 1353-54, 15 PEP Cas. 1516, 1537-38 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury
College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868, 12 FEP Cas. 297, 305 (D. Vt. 1976); Labat v. Board of Higher
Educ., 401 F. Supp. 753, 757, 10 PEP Gas. 1449, 1452 (S.O.N.Y. 1975).
See, e.g., Green v. Board of Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249, 4 FEP Cas. 126 (N.D. Tex.
1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 594, 5 FEP Cas. 677 (5th Cir. 1973). Rather than apply McDonnell Douglas.
the court stated that the decisions of universities are to be upheld by the courts when reached by
the correct procedures and supported by substantial evidence. 335 F. Supp. at 250, 4 FEP Cas. at
127.
In Green v. Board of Regents, 335 F. Supp."249, 4 FEP Cas. 126 (N.D. Tex. 1971),
the court stated: It is undisputed that such evaluations [of a person's qualification] are
necessarily judgmental, and the Court will not substitute its judgment !Or the rational and well
considered judgment of those possessing expertise in the field." Id. at 250, 4 FEP Cas. at 127.
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the hiring and promotional decisions of universities arc based upon subjective
criteria,'° and thus arc the least suited for supervision by the courts."
In contrast, other federal courts have insisted that the McDonnell Douglas
standard of proof be utilized in such situations. 12
 In particular, in Jepsen v.
Norida Board of Regents," a case decided during the Survey year, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the burden of proof articulated in McDonnell
Douglas was applicable to suits involving universities." With its decision in
,Jepsen, the Fifth Circuit has joined the First and Second Circuits in holding that
plaintiffi should not have to meet a higher burden of proof in Title VII claims
against academic institutions than in Title VII suits against other employers.
The plaintiff in ,Jepsen was a female associate professor of English at
Florida State University.' 5
 D r, Jepsen was first employed by the university in
1946 as an instructor.'" In 1947 she was promoted to the rank of assistant pro-
fessor, which position she held until 1971, when she was promoted to associate
professor. By 1974, when Dr. Jepsen filed suit, she had never been promoted to
the rank of full professor and she was receiving a salary of $13,905 for a nine-
month academic year." Dr. Jepsen filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida, claiming that the defendant univer-
sity had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act." She alleged that, because of her sex, the university
had denied her a promotion to the rank of full professor and had failed to grant
her a salary increase.'" In support of her claim, Dr. Jepsen maintained that
IS One subjective criterion which faculty members and other professionals often look at
in evaluating their peers is the personality of the individual in question. Faro, 502 F.2d at 1232, 8
FEP Cas. at 611. Other such subjective criteria include the specifications of the particular posi-
tion and the quality of the person's educational experience. Id. It is not enough that a candidate
possess the requisite degree. Rather, consideration is also given to the reputation of the degree-
issuing institution.
" Faro, 502 F.2d at 1231, 8 FEP Cas. at 610.
' 2 See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 22 FEP Cas. 62 (3d Cir. 1980) (Female
faculty should not be denied a "meaningful remedy" merely because the complainant's case oc-
curred in an academic setting. In requiring the college to grant plaintiff tenure, the court treated
the university the same as other Tide VII defendants.). Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d
1150, 17 FEP Cas. 1316 (2d Cir. 1978) (Black female teacher formerly employed by university
brought Title VII action. The district court and court of appeals applied McDonnell Douglas.).
13 610 F.2d 1379, 21 FEP Cas. 1700 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 21 FEP Cas. 1695 (D.N.D.
Fla. 1977).
14 Id. at 1382, 21 FEP Cas. at 1702-03.
15 Id. at 1380, 21 FEP Cas. at 1700.
IS Id.
17 Id.
Id. at 1381, 21 FEP Cas. at 1701.
IS Id. Dr, Jepsen also asserted that the defendants were guilty of discrimination prior to
1972, the year in which Title VII was amended to apply to governmental entities and educational
institutions. Although pre-1972 discrimination by a university is not actionable under Title VII,
the plaintiff alleged that the earlier failure to promote her had a discriminatory impact on her
eligibility for promotion now and on her current salary level. According to Dr. Jepsen, she had
been limited to the position of assistant professor for 25 years while equally qualified men had
been promoted after five or six years. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff raised another issue, icgarding
the scope of discovery of faculty evaluation forms crucial to her case. Prior to trial she h.R1 filed a
motion to compel discovery, requesting the district court to grant her access to 14 faculty evalua-
tion forms. The district court ordered that the plaintiff's counsel could examine any of the forms
November 1980]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 145
male faculty members with whom she was equally, if' not more, qualified had
been promoted and had been granted higher pay raises than she had received. 2 ' 1
The district court rejected her claim, concluding that it was unsupported
by the evidence." At the outset of its decision, the court noted that promotion
and tenure decisions in an academic setting required the use of subjective
criteria for evaluating candidates." The district court expressed a reluctance to
interfere with the professional judgment of the faculty and thus adopted a
higher "abuse of discretion"" standard of proof in lieu of the traditional Title
VII standard set out in McDonnell Douglas. 24 Relying on the university's evalu-
ation of Dr. Jepson's credentials and performance, the court concluded that
Jepsen had not proven a clear abuse of discretion by the university. 25 Absent
such a showing, the court would not substitute its own judgment for that of Dr.
Jepsen's peers. 26
Dr. Jepsen appealed the district court's dismissal for her action to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Reversing the district
court's decision, the court of appeals held that it was improper for the district
court to apply an "abuse of discretion" standard in a Title VII suit against the
university. 27
 Although the court acknowledged that this standard had been ap-
plied previously in Title VII actions against educational institutions, 28 the
,Jepsen court maintained that such institutions are not entitled to any special
deference under Title VII. 29
In adopting this approach, the court of appeals relied heavily on Board of
Trustees a. Sweeney. 3° This Supreme Court decision involved a Title VII suit
containing evaluations of less than satisfactory. However, the court would not allow copies to he
made of these forms. The coon of' appeals held that the plaintiff should have been allowed to in-
troduce these documents into evidence. The defendant university rebutted Dr. Jepsen's prima
facie case by asserting that they based their decision not to grant her tenure and a raise on un-
biased faculty evaluations. The court of appeals reasoned that if the university was making such
assertions, then Dr. Jepsen should be permitted to rely on these unbiased evaluation forms to
establish that the university's explanation was pretext and that the university was in fact biased.
Id, at 1381, 21 FEP Cas. at 1701-02.
20 Id. 21 FEP Gas. at 1701.
Jepsen v. Florida Board of Regents, 21 FEP Gas. 1695, 1699 (D.N.D. Fla. 1977).
22 Id. at 1698. Because of the subjective nature of faculty promotional and hiring deci-
sions, "I tlhe court cannot tell a university that it has set its standards too high for its employees.
Instead, the claims must be reviewed in light of the standards used by the university and the court
must be convinced that there had been uniform application." Id.
23 The district court adopted an "abuse of discretion" standard because it did not con-
sider it appropriate to substitute its own judgment for the professional judgment of Dr. Jepsen's
peers. Id. at 1699. The court noted that the faculty members were in constant contact with Dr.
Jepsen and that they were in a superior position to make such evaluations. In light of these facts,
the court felt reluctant to challenge the decision of the evaluation committee in the absence of a
showing of an abuse of discretion on their part. Id.
" Id. at 1699. The district court found support for its contention in Green v. Board of
Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249, 4 FEP Cas. 677 (5th Cir. 1973), and Faro v. New York Univ., 502
F.2d 1229, 8 FEP Cas. 609 (2d Cir. 1974). Id.
" 21 FEP Gas. at 1699.
26 21 FEP Cas. at 1699.
" 610 F.2d at 1381, 21 FEP Cas. at 1702.
28 See text and notes at notes 2-3 supra.
29 610 F.2d at 1382, 21 FEP Cas. at 1702-03.
70 439 U.S..24 (1978).
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brought against Keene State College, and the Jepsen court interpreted the case
as sanctioning the application for traditional Title VII standards to suits
against educational institutions. 3 ' Sweeney involved a factual situation very
similar to the Jepsen case. The complainant in Sweeney was denied a promotion
and she thus brought a Title VII action against the college, claiming that the
school had discriminated against her on the basis of sex by failing to promote
her." In addition to referring to Sweeney, the Jepsen court also noted that caution
against intervention in a university's affairs cannot be allowed to undercut the
explicit intent of Title VII. 33
 Through Title VII, Congress sought to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to abolish discriminatory practices
which have created racially and sexually stratified jobs." The "abuse of discre-
tion" standard that had been adopted by the district court in Jepsen would
mean that courts would defer to faculty judgments that may be biased against
female faculty members. To assure that the courts do not abdicate their respon-
sibility to provide a forum for litigating all complaints of sex discrimination the
McDonnell Douglas standard should be adopted. According to theJepsen court, if
courts continue to defer to the judgments of the university faculty, they are
allowing employment bias to go unchecked. 35 Thus, the Jepsen court concluded
that the burden of proof standard articulated in McDonnell Douglas should be
applied to Title VII actions against universities as well as against other
employers under this Act. 36
In attempting to treat discrimination by an employer university in the
same manner as discrimination by a different type of employer, Jepsen is sup-
ported by the amended version of Title VII as well as the Sweeney decision
which applied the McDonnell Douglas standard to the area of university hiring
and promotions. In utilizing this standard, the Sweeney court of appeals stated:
[W]e caution against permitting abdication of a responsibility en-
trusted to the courts by Congress. That responsibility is simply to
provide a forum for the litigation of complaints of sex discrimination
in institutions of higher learning as readily as for other Title VII
suits."
Since Sweeney, another important case has been decided in the Second Cir-
cuit. The court of appeals in Powell v. Syracuse University"  abandoned its earlier
11 610 F.2d at 1382, 21 FEP Cas. at 1702-03.
32 Id.
Id. (quoting Sweeney v, Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 176 FEP Cas. 378, 383 (1st
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1975)).
" Id.
35 Id. at 1383, 21 FEP Cas. at 1703.
Id. at 1382, 21 FEP Cas. at 1702.
" 569 F.2d at 176.
" 580 F.2d 1150, 17 FEP Cas. 1316 (2d Cir. 1978). Plaintiff in Powell was a black
female teacher at Syracuse University. The university's Tenure Committee voted to terminate
plaintiff's employment. 580 F.2d 1152, 17 FEP Cas. at 1318. Plaintiff refused to submit her letter
of resignation and appealed the Committee's decision to the Subcommittee on Academic
Freedom. Id. The Subcommittee found no evidence of discrimination but noted that there were
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position in Faro v. New York University" in which the court had deferred to the
professional judgment of the faculty." In contrast, the Powell court adopted the
McDonnell Douglas standard for cases involving universities. 4 ' The Powell court
stressed that courts would no longer tolerate the unlawful behavior of univer-
sities which discriminate in their hiring and promotional practices. 42
In applying the McDonnell Douglas standard to cases of discrimination at
the university level, both the Sweeney and Powell courts reasoned that the
amendment to Title VII compelled their decisions.'" In 1972, Congress passed
an amendment which extended the application of Title VII to educational in-
stitutions. 44 Congress passed this amendment because it recognized that the
problem of employment bias at the university level was as much a reality as it
was in any other area of employment.'" In the words of the House Report:
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor does
any national policy suggest itself to support the exemption of these
educational employees — primarily teachers — from Title VII cover-
age. Discrimination in education is as pervasive as discrimination in
any other area of employment."
Consequently, it would seem that if Congress was as troubled by the wide-
spread discriminatory practices at the university level as it was by such prac-
tices among other employers it would want to see the federal courts treat every
case of discrimination, even those occurring at academic institutions, with the
same degree of sensitivity. The Jepsen court thus was correct in applying to
universities the traditional burden of proof standards articulated in McDonnell
Douglas. By applying the McDonnell Douglas standard to university situations the
Jepsen court sought to assure that all cases of discrimination will be treated
alike.
procedural irregularities in the disposition of the case. Id. It recommended that plaintiff be
reinstated but the dean refused to do so. Id. The university then hired a white male and a white
female. Id. Plaintiff brought a Title VII suit against the university, claiming that her dismissal
was a product of racial and sexual discrimination. Id. at 1151, 21 FEP Cas. at 1316.
39 502 F.2d 1229, 8 FEP Cas. 609 (2d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff in Faro was a female research
associate professor. 502 F.2d at 1230, 8 FEP Cas. at 609. In 1971, the plaintiff received notice
that her appointment would be terminated as of August 31, 1972. Id. at 1231, 8 FEP Cas. at 610.
Plaintiff did receive an offer of a new appointment without tenure possibilities but with a continu-
ation of current salary and fringe benefits. Id. She sought a preliminary injunction forbidding the
medical school to terminate her employment and requiring the school to place her in a teaching
job that retains her in the tenure chain. Id. Plaintiff based her claim on the ground that the
university had discriminated against her on the basis of sex. Id.
41) Id. at 610.
" 580 F.2d at 1154, 17 FEP Cas. at 1319.
42 Id.
" Powell, 580 F.2d at 1154, 17 FEP Cas. at 1319; Sweeney, 569 F.2d at 173, 16 FEP Cas.
at 383.
" H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in [1972] U , S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2155.
43 See Powell, 580 F.2d at 1154, 17 FEP Cas. 1319.
46 H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in[ 1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2155.
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Although Jepsen endeavors to effectuate the congressional purpose behind
the 1972 amendment to Title VII, it is an insufficient attempt to assure that
courts will evaluate independently a Title VII plaintiff's claim against a
university. Under ,Jepsen, the plaintiff is given an opportunity to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.'" As one element of her prima facie case,
however, a Title VII plaintiff must prove that she is qualified for the position
denied her." Because decisions regarding promotion and tenure in higher edu-
cation cannot be measured by objective evaluation of an applicant's qualifica-
tion, many courts, purporting to use the McDonnell Douglas standard, may be
unable to make their own judgments regarding the qualifications of the plain-
tiff.'" In a belief that they lack the expertise in the educational area to apply
subjective criteria in evaluating an applicant, these courts are willing to defer to
the professional judgment of those who are in constant contact with the can-
didate and those with the expertise to apply these criteria." Thus, even without
having to show a clear abuse of discretion, the plaintiff may have difficulty
demonstrating that she was qualified for the job, because the courts may con-
tinue to defer to the judgments of the faculty. 5 ' Furthermore, since the
qualifications for an academic position are generally not capable of objective
measurement, a plaintiff may find it exceedingly difficult even to establish what
the qualifications for the job are. She must, however, know what the job re-
quirements arc before she can prove that she is qualified.
Finally, for those courts willing to decide without university assistance
whether a candidate is qualified for an academic position, ,Jepsen does not pro-
vide criteria for determining the relative weight to be assigned the various at-
tributes of the applicant. Consequently, even though Jepsen states that
deference in the abstract is improper and that the plaintiff shall have the right
to establish her prima facie case, courts may still find themselves coming to the
same conclusion under McDonnell Douglas as they would have had they applied
an "abuse of discretion" standard.
In applying the McDonnell Douglas standard to Dr. jepsen's Title VII ac-
tion against Florida State University, the court of appeals took a step toward
eliminating employment bias in the area of higher education. At the same time
that Jepsen requires the courts to intervene in a university's hiring and promo-
tional decisions, the ,Jepsen decision is no guarantee that university Title VII ac-
tions will be treated the same as other Title VII actions. It is, however, a van-
tage point from which other courts can work towards this end.
4 ' 610 F.2d at 1382, 21 FEP Cas. at 1702.
48 Id.
4' See, e.g., Lieberman v. Grant, 20 PEP Cas. 877 (D. Conn. 1979).
50 21 FEP Gas, at 1698.
51 Lieberman v. Grant, 20 FEP Cas. 877 (D. Conn. 1979), is an excellent illustration of
how the courts continue to defer to the professional judgment of the 'faculty even under the
McDonnell Douglas standard. The plaintiff in Lieberman was allowed to establish her prima facie
case. 20 FEP Cas. at 888. The court then ruled that the university had successfully rebutted the
plaintiff's prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that she was not promoted because of
"the honest and sincere belief of those who were charged with evaluating her work that neither
her teaching nor her scholarship were of sufficient quality to merit a lifetime appointment." Id.
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II. THE EMPLOYER'S ACTIONS AND PROGRAMS:
DISCRIMINATION V. NON-DISCRIMINATION
A. Employer's Indirect Discrimination: DeGrace v. Rumsfeld*
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "[alll personnel actions
affecting employees . .. in military departments .. . shall be made free from
any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin."'
Typically, an employer will be held liable under section 2000e-1b(a) if it is
shown that "but for" his own, direct discrimination, he would not have
discharged the plaintiff-employee.? Under some circumstances, however, an
employer covered by the terms of section 2000e-lb(a) legally may be responsi-
ble not only for his own, direct acts of discrimination, but also for the discrimi-
natory conduct of his employees, if such behavior is condoned. 3 Accordingly,
where an employee is racially harassed by fellow employees, section
2000e-lb(a) imposed an affirmative duty on the employer to take reasonable
measures to corect the situation. 4
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 5 addressed the question of whether the discriminatory acts
of an employee's coworkers could taint a personnel decision regarding that
employee so as to make the decision violative of sectin 2000e-lb(a). In answer-
ing this query in the affirmative, the court held that discharging art employee
for absenteeism resulting from racial harassment on the part of the employee's
coworkers, when uncorrected by the worker's supervisor, is not an employ-
ment decision " 'free from any discrimination based on race' "6 as defined in
section 2000e-16(a). This decision is significant in two respects. First, it liberal-
ly interprets section 2000e-16(a), finding that an employer's decision to dis-
charge an employee is discriminatory within the meaning of the Act even
though the employer himself acted without any discriminatory intent. Second,
of equal significance, the court used a "but for" causation test that did not
wfocus on hether the discharge of the employee would have occurred "but for"
the employer's discrimination, but instead, examined whether the employee's
conduct that led to the discharge would have occurred "but for" the discrimi-
nation of other employees at the place of employment. The court's expansive
reading of section 2000e-16(a)'s reference to "personnel actions . free from
• By Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW R
' 42 U.S.C. 2000c-16(a) (1976). This section provides the exclusive remedy lOr claims
of discrimination in federal employment. Brown v. General Scrv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820. 829
(1976). Section 2000c-16(a), however, does not apply to uniformed members of the military,
Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 E. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Mo. 1977), or to discrimination against the
physically handicapped, McNutt v. Hills, 426 F. Supp. 990, 1002 (D.D.C. 1977).
Givhan v. Western Consol. School Dist., 429 U.S. 410, 417 (1979); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 500 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979). See text at notes 39-43 infra.
3 Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., Container Div., 425 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (N.D. Ohio
1976).
+ Id.
5 614 F.2d 796, 21 FEP Cas. 1444 (1st Cir. 1980).
• Id, at 804, 21 FEP Cas. 1449.
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any [racial] discrimination" led to the use of the "but for" test in this novel
manner, making the employee's, rather than the employer's, actions the focus
of the inquiry.
In DeGrace, the plaintiff was a civilian firefighter employed by the Naval
Air Station of South Weymouth (NASSW).' In November and December,
1974, he received three notes containing racially offensive comments and
threats of harm. Furthermore, at about the same time he also discovered that
some of his work equipment had been damaged.' DeGrace stated that the notes
made him nervous, ill, and afraid to go to work. 9
 As a result, he called in sick
and remained absent from duty from November 19 through December 21,
1974. 1 " At no time did he provide medical certification for his absence."
DeGrace had been informed as early as December 6, 1974, that he must sub-
mit a written request for continued absence, and state a justification for this re-
quest.' 2
 He was also notified that a failure to get approval of such a request
would make him as absent without official leave (AWOL), and subject him to
disciplinary action." DeGrace never complied with this requirement." On
December 21, 1974, however, DeGrace returned to work stating that he had
regained his health and that henceforth he would report for work regularly.' 5
Despite these assurances, DeGrace, did not report to work again until January
4, 1975.' 6 At that time, he, for the first time, informed his commander of the
threatening notes, and revealed that his absence was due to fear for his per-
sonal safety. 17
 After reading photostatic copies of the notes, his commander
reported the incident to the base commanding officer, who ordered an in-
vestigation by the Naval Investigating Service (NIS)." On January 8, 1975,
DeGrace again met with his supervising commander.' 9
 At this time he stated
that his continued absence was due to concern over the notes, although he also
indicated that his apprehension would not prevent his return to duty on his
next scheduled tour beginning January 10. 20 Again, however, in spite of his
Id. at 798, 21 FEP Cas. 1445. This was the second time that DeGrace had been
discharged from his job at the NASSW and the second time that he claimed that his discharge
was the product of racial discrimination. DeGrace was first employed at NASSW in June, 1971
and was the only black firefighter during the course of his employment. After a one year proba-
tionary period, DeGrace was discharged for failure to "demonstrate qualifications necessary to
promote the efficiency of the service." Id. at 799, 21 FEP Cas. 1445. This discharge was ap-
pealed through Civil Service Commission procedures. The EEO Complaints Examiner found
that the opinions of those who testified against the plaintiff were tainted by racial bias. The Ex-
aminer recommended that DeGrace be reinstated, and that his supervisors be admonished. This
first discharge was not the subject of the current action. Id. at 799-800, 21 FEP Cas. at 1445-46.
" Id. at 800, 21 FEP Cas. at 1446.
9 Id.
lo Id.
12 Id. at 801, 21 FEP Cas. at 1447.
' 3 Id.
' 4 Id.
Id. at 800, 21 FEP Cas. at 1446.
' 6 Id
' 7 Id. at 801, 21 FEP Cas. at 1446.
IR Id.
' 4 Id.
20 Id.
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assurances to the contrary DeGrace did not return until January 22. At that
time he met with an NIS investigator, and expressed interest in proceeding
with the investigation. 21 Nevertheless, two days after this meeting DeGrace, on
advice from his attorney, decided to refrain from cooperating with the in-
vestigation. 22 He refused to surrender the originals of the notes for handwriting
analysis, and, on his request, the investigation ultimately was cancelle(1. 2 " As a
result of DeGrace's failure to seek approval for his continued absence, the
NASSW notified him on February 7, 1975, of its intention to discharge him for
excessive and unauthorized absenteeism. 24 DeGrace subsequently brought an
action in federal district court against the Secretary of Defense and others
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), claiming that his discharge was the product of
racial discrimination. 25
The district court found that one or more of DeGrace's coworkers were
responsible for the notes. 26 It also found that the coworkers regularly engaged
in racially discriminatory conduct toward DeGrace and that at least part of the
reason underlying his continuous absence was fear for his personal safety. The
court maintained that the NASSW fire department was "infected with perva-
sive racism" 27
 and that the supervisory personnel should have known of this
and, taken affirmative steps to correct it. 20 The court found that this obligation
had not been satisfied. 29
Despite these findings, the district court held that the commander was
warranted in deciding that DeGrace's absence, without authorization or sub-
21 Id. 21 FEP Cas. at 1447.
2'2
23 U.
21 Id.
25 Id. at 798, 21 FEP Cas. at 1444. DeCrace initially brought the present suit as a class
action against the respondent. The district court certified a class of "all past, present, and future
black civilian employees, applicants, and deterred applicants at NASSW." Id. at 799, 21 FEP
Cas. at 1445. After trial was completed but before a decision was rendered, the class was decerti-
fied because plaintiff's interests were not "such as to cause him to fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." Id. (quoting district court's unpublished opinion). The decertification
was upheld on appeal. Id. at 810-11, 21 FIT Cas. at 1453. The court of appeals recognized that
employees may represent job-applicants in class actions, but would not allow plaintiff-employee
to do so in this case. Id. This conclusion was based on the court's finding that plaintiff's claim did
not involve hiring practices, nor did his individual grievance (termination) implicate such prac-
tices. Moreover, plaintiff did not seek reinstatement but only damages. Because reinstatement
was not sought, plaintiff had no stake in the relief that would be appropriate for a class. For these
reasons, the court found that plaintiff was not the proper party to represent the interests of of the
asserted class. Id. 21 FEP Cas. at 1453-54. See also Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F. Supp•
961 (M.D.N.C. 1973), modified, 499 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64,
67 (1st Cir. 1975) (employee or former employee is proper representative of non-employees
under FED. R. Cly. P. 23); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246-47 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (former employees who did not seek reinstatement arc
permitted to represent a class of present and future employees where the former employees' in-
dividual claim implicates hiring practices affecting all class members).
26 DeGrace, 614 F.2d at 800, 21 FEE' Cas. at 1446.
" Id. at 803, 21 FEP Cas. at 1448 (quoting the opinion of the district court which is un-
reported).
2B Id.
"
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stantial excuse, was grounds for dismissal . " The court concluded that the dis-
charge was the product of the commander's concern about the danger created
by an understaffed firefighting force, and was not the result of any racial con-
sideration. 31
 Accordingly, the court refused to grant any relief to DeGrace."
On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
DeGrace claimed that the district court erred in holding that his discharge was
not the result of racial discrimination within the meaning of section 2000e-16(a).
He argued that this conclusion was inconsistent with the court's findings that
the fire department was replete with racism, and that his superiors had clone
nothing to ameliorate this situation." The court of appeals agreed with
DeGrace, and therefore, reversed the district court. In doing so, the court of
appeals focused on the relationship between DeGrace's fear, stemming from
racial harassment by his coworkers, and his prolonged absence from work. 34
The court concluded that although the actual decision to discharge may have
been free of any racial bias, DeGrace's absenteeism was the product of both
racial harassment and his supervisor's failure to prevent such misconduct. 35
Thus, the district court was correct in finding that there was no direct relation-
ship between DeGrace's discharge and any racial discrimination on the com-
mander's part. The discharge, however, was the indirect result of racial dis-
crimination, and the court failed to recognize that such indirect discrimination
falls within the purview of section 2000e-16(a). Consequently, the district court
erred in finding that the discharge was "free from any racial discrimination
based on race"" and in assuming that there was no basis for relief in the ab-
sence of any direct racial bias on the commander's part. Accordingly, the court
of appeals vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for fur-
ther findings. 37
In making its decision, the court of appeals articulated the burden of proof
that a plaintiff-employee must satisfy to establish a section 2000e-16(a) viola-
tion. 38
 In order to prevail, an employee who claims that his discharge was
based on absenteeism stemming from offensive conduct of fellow employees
must establish: (1) that the misconduct of his coworkers was racially motivated
and that it reasonably placed him in fear for his personal safety; (2) that his
supervisor was or should have been aware of this misconduct and of the
employee's fear, but failed to take reasonable measures to deal with the situa-
tion; (3) that he would have reported to work but for his reasonable fear, and
his supervisor's culpable failure to take corrective action; and (4) that he acted
reasonably under the circumstances. 39
Next the court considered the adequacy of the district court's findings as
to each element of this four part test." First, with regard to the reasonableness
3n Id.
3' Id.
32 Id.
Id.
34 Id.
Id. 21 FEP Cas. at 1449.
1 ' Id. at 804, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (emphasis added)).
37 Id.
Id.
19 Id.
4° Id. at 804-07, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449-51.
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of plaintiff's fear for his personal safety, the appellate court concluded that the
findings below were sufficient to indicate that DeGrace's fear was both reason-
able and the product of the racial misconduct of other employees:"
As for the second element, whether NASSW acted reasonably after it
knew or should have known of DeGrace's fear, the court of appeals found the
analysis of the district court to be incomplete.'" Although the lower court found
that NASSW could have clone more to dissipate the racially hostile climate, it
did not make an express finding as to whether NASSW had acted reasonably
after learning of the threatening notes. The court of appeals acknowledged that
the Navy had instigated investigation, which DeGrace had opposed, but stated
that other corrective measures may have been available. 43
With regard to the third element of proof, whether DeGrace would have
reported to work but for his reasonable fear of harm, the court of appeals char-
acterized the district court's findings as ambiguous." The court of appeals
stated that plaintiff could prevail only if his fear was the "determinative
faetor" 45 with regard to his absence. It emphasized that "[a] proper excuse
such as fear for personal safety, reasonably based, must not only be available to
the plaintiff, but plaintiff must actually be acting on this ground before he can
claim his absence was justified." 46 Although the lower court determined that
fear was "at least part" 47 of the reason for his absence, this finding fell short of
the requirement that "but for" this fear, DeGrace would have returned to
work. 48 The district court's opinion was also inadequate because it failed to
determine whether plaintiff's fear was reasonable for the entire length of his
absence or only for a portion of that time."
" Id. at 804, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449. Although the district court did not expressly qualify
plaintiff's fear as reasonable, it did find that the notes were authored by his coworkers. The court
of appeals stated that "Nmplicit is the finding that the fear sterns from the notes since there is no
other reason for plaintiff's apprehension," and that "defendants [do notl contend that fear
would be an unreasonable, abberational response to notes of such a tenor especially in light of
firefighters' occupational situation where mutual dependency and cooperation is required for safe
firefighting." Id.
42 Id. at 805, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449-50.
" Id., 21 FEP Cas. at 1450. One alternative measure suggested by the court of appeals
was intradepartmental investigation which, it noted, plaintiff claimed to favor, Id.
" Id.
45 Id. at 806, 21 FEP Cas. at 1450.
•	 16 id.
4 ' Id. (quoting from the district court's opinion).
" Id. The "but for" test was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a discharged non-
tenured teacher claimed that a school district's refusal to rehire him was based upon the exercise
of his right of free speech. Thus, he asserted that the discharge violated his first and fourteenth
amendment rights and sought reinstatement and damages. The court held that although consti-
tutionally protected conduct played a substantial part in the decision not to rehire the plaintiff,
the decision was not necessarily a constitutional violation. Id. at 285. The Board could escape
liability, if it could, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the same
decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Id. at 287. In essence, the Board had to prove
that there was no "but for" relation between its decision and the teacher's speech.
" DeGrace, 614 F.2d at 806, 21 FEP Cas. at 1450. DeGrace was absent from November
17, 1974 to January 22, 1975. The court of appeals directed the district court to determine if
DeGrace's absence for this length of time was reasonable. If the district court found that this
absence was unreasonably excessive, it was then to determine whether DeGrace's absence was
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Regarding the fourth element of proof, requiring that the plaintiff show
that he acted reasonably under the circumstances, the court of appeals reached
several important conclusions. Noting that "[nlot every response by the victim
of racial discrimination can be excused," 5° the court stated that DeGrace had a
duty to act reasonably. 5 ' This duty required him to bring matters to the atten-
tion of NASSW in a timely fashion, and to cooperate with, or at least not im-
pede, NASSW's good faith effort to correct the situation. 52
 Specifically, the
court stated that DeGrace could not block NASSW's investigations without ex-
plaining his reasons for such action and at the same time assert his right to re-
main absent." To illustrate the importance of an employee's cooperation with
his employer in this situation, the court of appeals noted that when DeGrace
was discharged, his commander erroneously thought that the absence was clue
to physical illness that had not been verified because of DeGrace's failure to
comply with the procedures for acquiring an authorized leave of absence."
Because of the various shortcomings in the findings of the district court,
the court of appeals directed the lower court to decide on remand whether
DeGrace's commander should have been aware of the racial misconduct of the
employees and/or DeGrace's corresponding fear; whether the commander,
assuming he was aware of the problem, failed to take reasonable measures to
correct the situation; whether DeGrace would have reported to work but for his
fear; and whether DeGrace acted reasonably under the circumstance." An af-
firmative finding with respect to each of these issues would result in relief for
DeGrace.
The DeGrace opinion evidences a judicial willingness to define broadly
the section 2000e-16(a) relationship between racial discrimination and person-
nel actions. It interpreted 2000e-16(a) to proscribe not only employment deci-
sions that are the direct product of racial discrimination but also those that
arise indirectly from such discrimination, that is from the conduct of third par-
ties not involved in the decisionmaking process. With this expansive approach
comes a corresponding increase in an employer's potential liability under Title
VII. Although the DeGrace court recognized that an employer cannot be re-
quired to guarantee a working environment free from any racial bias, the
employer must "let it be known . . . that racial harassment will not be toler-
ated," and must "take all reasonable measures to enforce this policy." 56 The
court, however, did not articulate specifically how much an employer must do
to avoid liability." Thus, an employer can be liable for a Title VII violation
where he discharges an employee for reasons that are normally proper grounds
for a discharge. To avoid such liability, the employer must demonstrate either
reasonable in the period before he informed the commander about the notes (November 19-
December 21, 1974) or until January 4, 1975 when he stated he was not afraid to return to work.
5 " Id.
5 ' Id.
" Id. at 807, 21 FEP Cas. at 1451.
51 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id
'" Id. at 805, 21 FE!' Cas. at 1449.
" Id. at 807, 21 FEP Cas. at 1451,
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that it was reasonable for him to be unaware of the racial misconduct of other
employees, or that he took reasonable corrective measures. Even if he acted un-
reasonably, he could escape liability by showing that the worker's conduct,
which formed the basis of the discharge, was an unreasonable response to the
harassment by his coworkers.
Because the court of appeals did not specify the limits of its decision, it is
conceivable that its holding could be applied to circumstances in which the
employer would become responsible for the actions of third party non-em-
ployees under Title VII. For example, if non-employees harassed black em-
ployees on the employment premises, it seems clear that the DeGrace court
would require the employer to take reasonable steps to correct the situation.
The employer's responsibility, however, is less clear where such harassment
occurs in a place other than the employment premises. If harassment took
place in a location where the employee was required to go to perform his duties
the employer well may be obligated to attempt to stop it under DeGrace. The
further removed the harassment is from the workplace, however, the less
reasonable it becomes for the employer to have a responsibility to prevent it
under Title VII. Thus, if a black employee receives threatening letters regard-
ing his employment at home from non-employees, there is probably little that
the employer can do to assuage the situation. That non-employees are the
harassing parties must enter into a determinination both of' what is reasonable
for the employer to do and also of what is a reasonable response to the situation
by the employee qua employee. An even more important aspect of the DeGrace
decision lies in the court's application of the "but for" causation test of Title
VII. The court cited the United States Supreme Court cases of Mt. Healthy City
Board of Education v. Doyle" and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 59 and the First Circuit decision of Loeb v. Textron 6 ° as authority for its use of
a "but for" requirement. These cases employed the "but for" test to deter-
mine whether an employer's decision to terminate an employee was justified.
Under the Mt. Healthy line of cases an employer's decision to terminate an
employee violated section 2000e-16(a) if the discharge would not have occurred
"but for" some direct act of discrimination on the employer's part. 61 In
5" 429 U.S. 274 (1977); sec note 3! supra.
59 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
"" 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
"' For the holding in Mt. Healthy, see note 31 supra. Givhan involved a fact situation
similar to that of Mt. Healthy. In Oiohan, a discharged teacher intervened in a desegregation action
against respondent, claiming, inter alia, that her dismissal was based on her criticism of the school
board, and, therefore, infringed upon her right of free speech under the first and fourteenth
amendments. The court held that in order for the teacher to prevail, the district court must find
that her criticism of-the school board was not only the primary reason for her discharge, but that
the board would not have discharged her "but for" her exercise of first amendment protected
speech. 439 U.S. at 417. The Giahan Court cited the Mt. Healthy decision as support for the but
for" test. Id.
In Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979), the plaintiff-employee claimed
that his discharge violated Title VII because it was based on age discrimination. The court re-
quired plaintiff to show that "but for" his employer's discriminatory intent, he would not have
been dismissed. Id. at 1019. It is interesting to note that in Loeb, the employee was required to
satisfy the "but for" causation requirement for recovery.
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DeGrace, the court did not focus on the reasonableness of the employer's deci-
sion to discharge the employee but rather, on the reasonableness of the
employees that lead to the discharge. The real issue before the court was
whether firing an employee for his behavior was reasonable when the behavior
might be a reasonable response to the racism of his fellow employees. Because
the employee's conduct was at issue the DeGrace court subjected it, and not the
employer's actions to the "but for" analysis. It required the employee to show
that "but for" the fear reasonably resulting from the racial misconduct of his
fellow employees, he would not have been absent." If DeGrace's absence was
shown to have resulted from the racial discrimination of his coworkers, then his
supervisor's decision to discharge him was based indirectly on racial discrimi-
nation, and thus, in violation of Title VII.
The DeGrace court's use of the "but for" test to scrutinize an employee's,
rather than the employer's, conduct is novel yet logical. As a means of estab-
lishing a Title VII'violation, it is a fair approach to dealing with the statute. By
broadly defining "personnel action . free from any discrimination," the
court recognized that a personnel action may be tainted with discrimination al-
though the employer acted without discriminatory intent. Thus, under the
DeGrace court's approach, an employee need not show discriminatory intent on
the part of his employer but may prove a Title VII violation by demonstrating
that his own conduct, which admittedly was the basis for the employer's deci-
sion to discharge, would not have occurred "but for" the racial discrimination
of his coworkers.
Prior to DeGrace, section 2000e-16a had been the source of the employer's
affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to control and correct the racial
misconduct of his employees." In DeGrace, the court of appeals used this as its
starting point. By interpreting section 2000e-16(a) to proscribe employment
decisions based both on direct and indirect racial discrimination, the DeGrace
court went further than its predecesors. The net result of its decision is that in
addition to relying on an employer's duty to attempt to abate the racism of an
employee's coworkers, the employee may take his own reasonable steps to cope
with the situation. Since the employee is the target of such racism it seems fair
that he be given some leeway in responding to it without jeopardizing his job
status.
B. Employer's Retaliatory Action: Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co.*
Section 704(a) of Title VII protects employees from retaliatory action for
opposing an unlawful employment practice) In pertinent part the section pro-
vides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
62
 DeGrace, 614 F.2d at 805, 21 FEP Cas. at 1450.
° Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., Container Div., 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
* By Patricia A. Asack, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). The section also protects employees from retaliatory
action for participating in Title VII proceedings.
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criminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. • ." 2
This clause, denominated the "opposition" clause,' has been the object of
considerable judicial debate with respect to its reach and meaning. 4 One area
of debate has been whether an employee must have only a reasonable belief
that the practice which he opposes is a violation of Title VII or whether the
practice opposed must in fact be a violation of Title VII in order for the em-
ployee's activities to be protected by section 704(a). 5 Most courts have taken
the position that it is sufficient that the person engaging in "opposition"
behavior reasonably believes that the protested practice is illegal. 9
During this Survey year, however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co.' appears to have added a new element to be con-
sidered by the courts in determining whether the behavior in question is pro-
tected under section 704. The Monliero court held that, where an employer's
practice is not discriminatory in fact and the employee's accusations of discrim-
ination do not result from a sincerely held belief that his employer was discrimi-
nating, the "opposition" clause does not protect the employee. 8 The court
noted that where both of these factors are present — no discrimination in fact
and an insincere accusation of discrimination — it is immaterial whether the
standard that an employee must meet to bring his conduct within the "opposi-
tion" clause is an objective "reasonable belief ' standard or a subjective "con-
scientiously held" standard. 9
 Under a "reasonable belief" standard it is suffi-
cient to make out a section 704 claim if a reasonable man standing in the plain-
tiff's position, on all the facts and circumstances present, would have believed
that he had been the victim of discrimination. 10
 A subjective "conscientiously
Id.
3 See Hearth v, Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 687, 18 FEP Cas.
329, 330 (D. Minn. 1977).
There is little authority on the meaning of the clause or the scope of protection which it
affords. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp,, 463 F.2d 337, 341, 4 FEP Cas. 557, 581 (8th Cir.
1972). Courts, therefore, have concerned themselves with such questions as whether the practice
opposed was in fact illegal, see, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 18 FEP
Cas. 98! (9th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. C & E Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 10 FEP Cas
1131 (M.D. Ga. 1975), whether ambiguous protest constitutes opposition, see Tidwell v.
American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 3 FEP Cas. 1007 (D. Utah 1971), and whether the form of
expressing opposition strips the opposition of protection, see, e.g., Green v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 4 FE!' Cas. 577 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 425 F. Supp.
318, 11 FEP Cas. 1426 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222, 13 FEP Cas. 804 (1st Cir. 1976).
Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688, 18 FEP Cas. 329,
331 (D. Minn. 1977) (reasonable belief of employee sufficient); accord, Berg v. La Crosse Cooler
Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 21 FEP Cas. 1012 (7th Cir. 1980); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588
F.2d 692, 695-96, 18 FEP Cas. 981, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1978). But see EEOC v. C & E Sportswear
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 10 FEP Cas. 1131 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (practice opposed must in fact be a
violation of Title VII); accord, Winsey v, Pace College, 394 F. Supp. 1324, 1331, 10 ['EP Cas.
829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6 See cases cited in note 5 supra.
7
 615 F.2d 4, 22 FEY Cas. 90 (1st Cir. 1980).
at 8, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
9 Id.
10 Id. at n.6.
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held" standard, on the other hand, requires that it be shown that the plaintiff
in fact believed, however unreasonable that belief, that he had been the victim
of unlawful discrimination." The significance of the decision is two-fold. First,
the decision implicitly rejects the view that the protested practice must in fact
be discriminatory in order to be prOtected under section 704. More significant,
however, is the decision's implication that the reasonable belief standard,
unless supplemented by the subjective standard requirement that the plaintiff's
belief was honestly held, is also inadequate, for a determination that opposition
behavior is within the scope of protection of section 704.
In Monteiro, the plaintiff, a black, began working for Poole as a "buffer"
in 1958. 12 Five years later he voluntarily left Poole's employment because of his
belief that his supervisor, Courcy, returned more work for rebuffing to black
employees than to white employees. 13 Shortly thereafter, Montiero was rehired
by Poole as a "buffer" at another of its plants and was given the unofficial title
of "lead-man" of the department.' 4 In 1972 Monteiro was demoted as "lead-
man," partly as a result of conflict with the then assistant manager Menzies. 15
Because of the demotion, Montiero filed charges with the Massachusetts Com-
mission Against Discrimination (MCAD).' 6 A settlement resulted in which
Monteiro was reinstated as lead-man subject to his adherence to certain rules
and regulations contained in the settlement memorandum." These rules stated
that Monteiro must maintain his position at his machine, must not roam about
the plant at will, and must refrain from the "continuing use of the word 'dis-
crimination.' "'g In 1973 Monteiro again filed charges with the MCAD and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EE0C)." Before deposi-•
Lion of these charges, Courcy, Monteiro's former supervisor, was named
supervisor at the Poole plant where Monteiro was employed. 2° Some months
later Courcy and Monteiro became involved in a verbal fracas which led to
Monteiro's discharge. 21 The fracas, which lasted about thirty minutes, began
when Courcy ordered Monteiro back to his work station." Monteiro re-
sponded that there were others away from their stations and that he was being
" Id. at n.5.
17 Id. at 5, 22 FEP Cas. at 90.
" Id. at 5-6, 22 FEP Cas. at 90. Because buffers were paid on a piecework basis, the
amount of work returned would cause a reduction in the worker's wages. Id. at 6, 22 FEP Cas. at
90. The district court found, however, that the two workers who had the most work returned to
them were white. Id.
Id. at 6, 22 FEP Cas. at 90.
15 /d. The district court found that Menzies was partly motivated by racial prejudice but
that Poole neither practiced nor permitted racially discriminatory policies. Id. at n 2, 22 FEP
Cas. at 90 n.2. In the instant action, Monteiro sought no remedy for this incident. Id.
' 6 Id. at 6, 22 FEP Cas. at 90. Monteiro also filed a grievance with the union. Id.
' 7 Id. 22 FEP Cas. at 90-91.	 •
18 ld. 22 FEP Cas. at 91. The district court noted that while the last-mentioned rule was
of questionable enfOrceability, it served to highlight the nature of the relationship between
Monteiro and Poole. Id. at 6 n.3, 22 FEP Cas. at 91 n.3.
' 9 Id. at 6, 22 FEP Cas. at 91. The gravamen of the charges is not contained in the
court's opinion.
20 Id.
2 ' Id.
22
 Id. at 6-7, 22 FEP Cas. at 91.
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harassed. 23
 Courcy repeatedly ordered Monteiro to return to his station and
stated that Monteiro's failure to do so was grounds for discharge. 24
 After these
exchanges, Monteiro accused Courcy of discrimination and was then told by
Courcy that he was fired. 25
Following his dismissal, Monteiro filed another charge with the EEOC al-
leging, among other things, that he was discharged in retaliation for opposition
to unlawful employment practices. 26 The EEOC's "Determination" found
that Monteiro's charge of retaliatory discharge was not substantiated."
Monteiro then brought an action against Poole in district court claiming he had
been discharged because of race."
The district court found that there was no discriminatory policy practiced
or permitted by Poole; that Monteiro had failed to establish that his discharge
resulted from racial prejudice; and that Monteiro had failed to show that he
was terminated in retaliation for his opposition to unlawful employment prac-
tices." With respect to its conclusion that the discharge was not the result of
prohibited retaliation, the district court determined that although Monteiro's
accusation of discrimination was a factor in bringing about the discharge, the
discharge was essentially the result of Monteiro's challenge to Courcy's
authority." The court also rested its conclusion on Monteiro's failure to show
that his accusation had been made in good faith. 3 ' The district court observed
that the "opposition" clause protects an employee who has a "conscientiously
held belief" that there is racial discrimination." Here, however, according to
the court, it was as likely that Monteiro's accusation was based on a belief that
"the best defense to correction from the superintendent was a strong offense"
as on a belief, conscientiously held, that discrimination existed."
On appeal, Monteiro challenged the district court's determination that his
termination had not been retaliatory. 34 Relying on Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit
Commission," Monteiro contended that section 704(a) protects informal opposi-
" Id. at 6, 22 FEP Cas. at 91.
24
 Id. at 7, 22 FEP Cas. at 91.
25
26 id.
" Id. The EEOC "Determination" addressed all of Montciro's allegations. It found
reasonable cause to believe that Monteiro's earlier temporary demotion by his former supervisor
was because of Monteiro's race. Id.
" Id. He also alleged that he had been discriminated against in other ways. Id. at 5, 22
FEP Cas. at 90. These are not specified in the opinion.
29 Id.
" Id. at 7, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
" Id, at 8, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
" Id. at 7, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 5, 22 FEP Cas. at 90.
" Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 18 FEP Cas. 329 (D.
Minn. 1977), In Hearth, the plaintiffs, male bus drivers, brought action against their former
employer, the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC), charging inter alia that they had been
suspended by MTC in retaliation for their protests against MTC's enforcement of its dress code.
Id. at 686, 18 FEP Cas. at 329-30. They contended that MTC's enforcement of its dress and
grooming code was arbitrary and discriminatory because it was enforced only against some maleS
and because female bus drivers were not required to conform to the same standards. Id, at 687,
18 FEP Cas. at 330. The court found that neither of these differences in enforcement constituted
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tion by an employee who reasonably believes he has been the victim of dis-
crimination." He argued that section 704(a) is violated if a reasonable man in
his position would have believed that he had been the victim of unlawful dis-
crimination. 37 Therefore, he contended that the district court had erred in stat-
ing that an employee must have a conscientiously held belief that discrimina-
tion existed in order to be protected under section 704(a). 38
The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Monteiro's argument as inap-
posite to the issue at hand." The sole issue before the Hearth court, according to
the First Circuit court, was whether a plaintiff had to show that the employ-
ment practice opposed was in fact a Title VII violation. 40 Therefore, in ruling
that the plaintiff need only have a reasonable belief that discrimination was be-
ing practiced, the Hearth court had merely held that opposition conduct did not
lose its protected character solely because the alleged unlawful practice was
later found to be lawful.'" The court of appeals stated that here, however, the
district court's holding rested not only on the finding that Poole's actions were
lawful but also on the finding that Monteiro's accusation was not made in good
faith but was, in essence, a smokescreen. 42 The issue before the lower court,
therefore, was whether the protection of section 704(a) is available to one who
makes insincere and unfounded claims of discrimination in order to excuse
noncompliance with legitimate employer demands." In considering this issue,
the court of appeals drew an analogy to labor relations law, pointing out that
concerted activities otherwise protected by section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act lose that protection when they are undertaken in bad faith,"
Following from this, the court reasoned that when an employer's conduct is not
sex discrimination. Id. The court, nevertheless, concluded that despite the fact that the complaint
of practices were not discriminatory, a claim under section 704(a) is viable so long as the em-
ployee had a reasonable belief that that which he opposed constituted prohibited discrimination.
Id. at 688, 18 FEP Gas. at 331.
'6 615 F.2d at 8, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
"17 Id. at 91 n.6, 22 FEP Cas. at 92 n.6.
." Id. at 7-8, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
3" Id. at 8, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
4" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
4 3 Id.
" Id. (citing Leviton Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 686, 84 L.R.R.M. 2670 (1st Cir.
1973)). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 157 (1976), in pertinent part,
provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.. . .
In determining whether employee activities are protected, a critical factor is whether the alleged
grievances were pressed in good faith. See, e.g., NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.
1972) (conspiracy against an unpopular manager). The protection provided by the section is also
lost if the concerted activity involves violence, see, e.g., Carpenters Local 131 v. Cisco Constr.
Co., 266 F.2d 365 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 828 (1959), gross insubordination, threats of
physical harm, see, e.g., NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972), or illegal activity,
see, e.g., NLRB v. Dallas Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 745, 264 F.2d 642 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959).
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discriminatory, the plaintiff must show that his opposition was in response to
some "honestly held, if mistaken, feeling that discriminatory practices
existed" in order to be protected by section 704(1). 45 In the court's view, when
the employer's practice was not unlawful, the plaintiff is obliged to demon-
strate that his belief was honestly held irrespective of whether a "reasonable
belief" standard or a "conscientiously held" standard is applied. 46
 Monteiro,
however, had failed to do this. 47
 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's finding that Poole's discharge of Monteiro was not a retaliatory
action in violation of section 704(a). 45
The First Circuit court stated in Monleiro that it was unnecessary to its
decision to adopt either the "reasonable belief" or the "conscientiously held"
approach as the standard for determining whether an employee's conduct is
protected by section 704(a) when the employer's challenged practice is lawful. 49
The inference to be drawn from this statement is that, when the appropriate
opportunity is presented, the First Circuit will join with the majority of courts
Which have considered the question in rejecting the view that the protested
practice must in fact be illegal in order for the employee's opposition conduct to
enjoy the protection of section 704(a). 5 ° The majority view appears to be
sound. It seems logical to assume that appropriate informal opposition to per-
ceived discrimination would be chilled by the threat of retaliatory action in the
event that the protested practice is not illega1. 5 ' Moreover, the informal resolu-
tion of such charges should be encouraged. 52 The alternative means of resolu-
tion provided by Title VII, the filing of formal charges with the EE00 53 or the
initiation of private suit, 54 may well be avoided through informal communica-
tion between an employee and his employer. Finally, elimination of employ-
ment discrimination is the purpose behind Title VII. 55 For this reason, the stat-
ute should be liberally construed. 56
Although the First Circuit's implicit refusal to require that the protested
" 615 F.2d at 8, 22 FEP Cas. at 92.
46 Id.
" Id., 22 FEP Cas. at 92-93.
48 Id. at 89, 22 FEP Cas. at 93.
49 Id. at 8 n.5, 22 FEP Cas. at 92 n.5. It should he noted that not all activity is protected
by the "opposition'' clause. Courts have looked to the propriety of the form of the opposition ac-
tivity. For example, illegal activity is not protected. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463
F.2d 337, 341, 4 FEP Cas. 577, 581 (8th Cir. 1973). Opposition activity which is too disruptive is
also not protected. Hockstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 415 F. Supp. 318, 11 FEP Cas. 1426 (D.
Mass. 1976), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222, 13 FEP Gas. 804 (1st Cir. 1976) (constant complaining; cir-
culating rumors; disclosing confidential information to newspaper).
" See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 18 FEP Cas. 981 (9th
Cir. 1978); Hearth v., Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 18 FEP Gas, 329 (D.
Minn. 1977).
" Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688, 18 FEP Cas. 329,
331 (D. Minn. 1977).
52 Id. at 668-89, 18 FEP Gas. at 331.
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
55 Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Comm' n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 689, 18 FEP Cas. 328,
331 (D. Minn. 1977).
56 id.
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practice be illegal for the protection of section 704(a) to be triggered is in keep-
ing with the weight of authority, the First Circuit's introduction of what is
essentially a good faith requirement as a factor to he considered in section 704
actions is novel:" The Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, the only other
appeals courts yet to rule on whether the protested practice must be illegal,
have adopted the objective reasonable belief standard. As noted earlier, the
First Circuit left open whether it would adopt an objective "reasonable belief"
standard or a subjective "conscientiously held" standard to determine whether
conduct is protected when the employer's activity is lawful. Significantly, how-
ever, Monteiro suggests that, even if the First Circuit ultimately joins the Ninth
Circuit 58 and the Seventh Circuit59 in adopting the reasonable belief approach,
the First Circuit will require in addition that the plaintiff demonstrate his good
faith in order to prevail in a section 704(a) action. This would mean that a First
Circuit plaintiff would have to demonstrate both that he sincerely believed that
he was the victim of discrimination and that a reasonable person in his position
reasonably would have so believed. In a circuit which follows the "reasonable
belief" standard alone the plaintiff would be called upon to show only that on
all the facts and circumstances a reasonable person would have believed that
discrimination was being practiced against him.
The First Circuit's indication in Monleiro that it is disinclined to accept the
"reasonable belief" standard at all is as interesting and significant as the
possibility that the First Circuit would require that the "reasonable belief" ap-
proach be supplemented by a "conscientiously held" good faith requirement.
The opinion suggests that the First Circuit favors the subjective "conscien-
tiously held" approach. In a footnote the court rioted that this standard affords
more protection to an employee than the reasonable belief standard because it
protects the activity of an employee who unreasonably but honestly believes
that the employer is practicing unlawful discrimination." If the First Circuit
adopts this approach it will be the first to do so.bt Presumably, the effect of such
a decision would be that the First Circuit plaintiff would be required to show
only that he sincerely believed that the practice he opposed was illegal in order
to maintain a section 704(a) action. The Monteiro holding, in short, would
become the governing standard in determining whether an employee's conduct
is protected from retaliation when the employer's practice is found to be lawful.
Whether the First Circuit ultimately adopts a "reasonable belief"' stand-
5/ One court, utilizing the objective "reasonable belief' approach achieved the same
result as would be arrived at using a subjective "conscientiously held — standard. On the basis of
the facts of the case the court concluded that it could be inferred that the employee knew that her
employment was in jeopardy because of her inadequate job performance and personal difficul-
ties. Knowing the true reasons for her employment problems, she nevertheless brought a suit
under section 704(a) in an attempt to use the sex discrimination laws as a shield to her employers
termination action. EEOC v. Johnson Co., 18 FEP Cas. 896, 903 (D. Minn. 1978).
58 Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695, 18 FEP Cas, 981, 982-83 (9th
Cir. 1978).
5" Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045, 21 FEP Cas. 1012, 1015-16 (7th
Cir. 1980).
6° 615 F.2d at 8 n.5, 22 FE? Gas. at 92 n.5. The court did not address which party
would bear the burden of proof under a subjective approach.
6 ' See note 57 supra.
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and supplemented by a "conscientiously held" standard or simply a "con-
scientiously held" standard, its introduction of this good faith clement by
either means is not inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII. As noted earlier,
that purpose is the elimination of employment discrimination." 2
 When there is
no unlawful discrimination in fact, however, effectuation of the act's purpose is
not aided by allowing the protection of section 704(a) to an employee who does
not sincerely believe that the policy or practice in question is discriminatory
even if a reasonable person in the employee's position would so believe. To
provide protection through section 704 in these circumstances would be to
allow the Act's remedial purpose to be subverted for personal motives and
benefit. No end consonant with Title VII's purpose is served by allowing one
who knows that the employer's practice is lawful to use the protection of section
704(a) as a sword against compliance with the employer's legitimate demands
or as a means of disrupting the employer's place of business.
Despite this value as a prophylactic measure, however, the use of the sub-
jective approach, whether alone or in conjunction with the reasonable belief
approach, has some drawbacks. Its primary disadvantage is that it requires a
court to determine the employee's intent in engaging in the opposition. In ad-
dition, the subjective approach can lead to a situation where identical acts may
be protected under section 704(a) in one case but unprotected in another. The
primary benefit of the objective approach, on the other hand, is that it avoids
this necessity of probing the employee's state of mind. Since the subjective test
is used successfully in other contexts," however, these practical problems do
not seem of sufficient magnitude to outweigh its benefits. Such an approach ex-
tends section 704 protection to the employee who sincerely but unreasonably
believes his employer is unlawfully discriminating, minimizes misuse of Title
VII for illicit personal benefit, and reduces the possibility of successful use of
the Act for unfounded disruption of the employer's business. Because the sub-
jective approach offers these advantages, the First Circuit's approach in
Monteiro is defensible and desirable.
C. Seniority Systems: California Brewers Association v. Bryant*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits practices, procedures,
or tests that operate to " 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices." 2
 Seniority systems, however, are exempted from this prohibi-
tion by section 703(h). This exemption permits an employer to use different
standards of compensation and other employment benefits where such differ-
ences are based on a seniority or merit system.' The exemption is not available
where such differences arise out of the employer's intent to discriminate on ac-
62 See text at note 55 supra.
63
 See, e.g., St. Arrant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (defamation): St. Joseph
Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 111. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51 (1975) (fraud).
* By Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Staff Member, BosTON Col.t.E.GE LAw REVIEW.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
3
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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count of race. 4 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters u. United States, 5 the
Supreme Court of the United States interpreted this exception as intended to
"make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would
not be unlawful under Title VII . . . even where the employer's pre-Act dis-
crimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights than
Negroes." 6 Title VII does not define "seniority system" nor is this term de-
fined by legislative history.' In the Survey year decision of California Brewers Asso-
ciation v. Bryant,' however, the Supreme Court for the first time undertook to
define "seniority system" as used in section 703(h).
In Bryant the respondent challenged the purported "seniority system"
contained in the multi-employer collective bargaining agreement between the
California Brewers Association and the Teamsters. 9 This system operated by
defining permanent, temporary, and new employees and by articulating the
rights of each employee class regarding hiring and lay-offs.'° Respondent
claimed, inter alia, that the agreement's requirement that an employee work
forty-live weeks in a calendar year in order to acquire permanent status barred
him and the members of his putative class from achieving, or from having a
reasonable opportunity to achieve, permanent status." Therefore, respondent
argued, the forty-five-week rule perpetuated historical racial discrimination)?
The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the
complaint for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted."
Although no opinion accompanied this order the court's decision probably
rested on its conclusion that the rule was part of a bona fide seniority system.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision," ruling that the
forty-five-week provision was not a seniority system nor was it a part of one
within the meaning of Title VII. ' 5 The court of appeals reasoned that to qualify
as a seniority system, the forty-five-week rule would have to provide for an in-
4 Id
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" Id. at 352.
See 110 CONG. REG. 1518, 5423, 7207, 7213, 7217, 12723 (1964).
" 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
9 Id. at 600-01.
15 Id. at 602-03. Respondent had been employed intermittently by one of the peti-
tioners, the Falstaff Brewing Corporation, since 1968. Because he had not worked more than 45
weeks in any one calendar year, he had never qualified as a permanent employee under the terms
of the multi-employer collective bargaining agreement between the California Brewers Associa-
tion (the petitioner brewing companies) and the Teamsters Brewery and Soft Drink Workers
Joint Board of California {the defendant-employee unions). Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 602.
' 7 Id. at 601-02. Respondent brought this suit as a class action on behalf of himself and
other Negroes similarly situated against petitioner and several unions. He filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that defendants had
discriminated against the putative class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e and of 42 U.S.C. 5 1981. Id. at 601. The complaint also asserted under 29
U.S.C. 55 159 & 185 that the defendant unions had breached their duty by, among other things,
the negotiation of unreasonable privileges for some employees and not others. Id. at 601 n.3. The
Supreme Court, however, considered only the Title VII claim. Id.
13 This decision is unreported. See 444 U.S. at 601.
' Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 427.
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crease in employment rights as the duration of employment increased.' 6 The
rule, however, did not achieve this end since employees would be terminated
shortly before completing a forty-five-week period of employment. They subse-
quently would be rehired and the forty-five-week period would begin to run
anew. Consequently, employees could work for great lengths of time while
never satisfying the forty-five-week requirement. Thus the rule effectively
barred many long term employees from attaining permanent work status."
The court, therefore, characterized the rule as "simply a classification device
to determine who enters the permanent employee seniority line" and it con-
cluded that "this function does not make the rule part of a seniority system. " 18
It remanded the case to the district court for trial to determine whether the
forty-five-week standard had a discriminatory impact on blacks.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" to determine the scope of the
seniority system exception under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
deciding whether the forty-five-week provision qualified as a seniority system,
the Court found it necessary to define the term "seniority system" within the
meaning of Title VII. To do so, it relied upon "commonly accepted notions
about 'seniority' in industrial relations"" and considered such concepts in
light of Title VII and national labor policy. 2 ' It noted first that "seniority"
connotes length of employment and that a "seniority system" conditions.im-
proved employment rights and benefits upon increased lengths of employ-
ment. 22 Thus, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the essential ele-
ment of a seniority system is the enhancement of employment rights as a func-
tion of an increase in employment duration.
Unlike the court of appeals, however, the Supreme Court held that senior-
ity systems could encompass provisions that would not in themselves provide
for increased benefits based on the length of employment, 23 provided such rules
were necessary to make the system as a whole function." The Court character-
ized the forty-five-week requirement as such a rule.
The Court supported its rather flexible delineation of Title VII's use of the
term "seniority system" with a cursory examination of the nation's labor
policy. It observed that the structure of a particular seniority system is the
product of the collective bargaining process in a particular business or in-
dustry." As a result, it must be expected that the characteristics of seniority
systems will vary depending on the parties to the agreement. 26 The Court con-
16 Id. at 426.
" Id. at 426-27.
" Id. at 427 n.11.
" 442 U.S. 916 (1979).
20 444 U.S. at 605.
21 Id.
" Id. at 605-06.
" Id. at 606-07.
24 Id. at 607-08. For example, such rules could define the types of employment condi-
tions that would be affected by seniority and set out the circumstances under which seniority
would be forfeited.
" Id. at 608.
26 Id.
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eluded that section 703(h) is not intended to prefer any particular type of
seniority system over another. 27
The Court tempered its malleable interpretation of a section 703(h)
seniority system by stating that employment rules that "depart fundamentally
from commonly accepted notions concerning the acceptable contours of a
seniority system" cannot qualify for the section 703(h) exception merely by be-
ing labeled as part of a seniority system." It implied that section 703(h) only
applies to those employment rules that clearly are based on length of employ-
ment and to those rules that, though not directly time-related, are necessary to
make the seniority system work." Thus, in the Court's view, a threshold re-
quirement for entering a seniority tract that has no direct or indirect relation to
durational considerations cannot qualify for a section 703(h) exemption."
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court found that the
agreement created two parallel seniority tracts, one for temporary . employees
and another for permanent employees. 3 ' The Court characterized the forty-
five-week provision as defining the threshold qualification required to enter the
permanent employee seniority track. 32 Because this provision focused on length
of employment, the Court found it to be a component of a seniority system
within the meaning of section 703(h). 33 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that the forty-five-week rule was a part of a section
703(h) seniority system. 34 It noted, however, that on remand to the district
court, respondent still could invalidate the rule if it could show either that the
seniority system established by the agreement was not "bona fide," or that the
differences in employment conditions attributable to the agreement were the
product of international racial discrimination within the meaning of section
703(h). 35
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented,
finding the majority's opinion inconsistent with the purposes and intent of sec-
tion 703(h).: He agreed with the Court that a seniority system is " 'a scheme
that, alone or in tandem with non-`seniority' criteria allots to employees ever
imposing employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent
employment increase.' " 37 He maintained, however, that the forty-five-week
rule was not a bona fide element of a permissible seniority system because it
operated to prevent certain employees from acquiring improved rights and
27 Id.
2H Al.
29 Id.
" Id. at 60B-09. The Court mentioned educational pre-requisites, physical or aptitude
tests, and "subjective standards" as examples of threshold requirements that bear no direct or
indirect relation to the duration of employment. Id. at 609-10.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 609.
33 Id.
3+ Id. at 610-11.
" Id.
" Id. ,Justice Powell and Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
" Id. at 614 (quoting majority opinion at 605-06).
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benefits as their length of service increased." Justice Marshall noted that
because the industry was seasonal and because a temporary employee easily
could be replaced by a permanent employee or otherwise layed-off, the forty-
five-week rule did not focus on time, but on circumstances beyond the
employee's control." Since the forty-five-week provision functioned in this
manner, Justice Marshall found it at odds with common notions of seniority
and, therefore, not a part of a section 703(h) seniority system.'"
Justice Marshall's opinion reflects a concern that the forty-five-week rule
easily could be abused by employers desiring to keep minorities out of perma-
nent positions. Although it reached an opposite result, the Court, to some ex-
tent shared this concern. The majority observed that freedom of collective bar-
gaining must not be allowed to sweep within the ambit of section 703(h) em-
ployment rules that depart fundamentally from commonly accepted notions
concerning the acceptable contours of a seniority system simply because those
rules arc clubbed "seniority" provisions or have some nexus to an arrange-
ment that concededly operates on the basis of seniority.'" Competing with this
concern, however, was the Court's determination to leave unfettered the free-
dom of employers and unions to design differing seniority systems through col-
lective bargaining. The Court correctly reconciled the need for this freedom
with the dangers of abusing the 703(h) exemption by a loosely defining senior-
ity system. In doing so, it implicitly recognized that checks on such abuse are
not to be imposed by limiting definitions but are to be found instead in section
703(h)'s prescription of "seniority systems" which are not "bona fide" and
which are the product of racial discrimination. In sum, the decision provided
employers and unions with general guidelines for determining what may and
may not be included in a section 703(h) seniority system, while maintaining
freedom of collective bargaining to the fullest extent possible.
The majority's opinion leaves open two avenues of attack on provisions
that allegedly are not within the section 703(h) exemption. First, it may be
argued that the rule or provision does not conform to commonly accepted no-
tions of seniority because it does not focus on the enhancement of employee
privileges conditioned by the length of employment because it gives effect to
subjective qualifications. 42
 It was this argument that was advanced by respon-
dent in Bryant, but it failed since the Court found that the challenged provisions
did condition employment benefits on the length of employment. The Court
expressly noted, however, that a second line of argument remained available to
respondent on remand." Thus, if a rule is found to constitute a seniority provi-
sion, it may be asserted that the rule does not comply with the section 703(h)
requirement that the seniority system be bona fide and without racial intent to
qualify for the exemption.
" Id. at 615.
39 Id.
4° Id. at 615-16.
4 ' Id. at 609.
" The majority and the dissenters agree that educational and physical standards or tests
are "subjective'' criteria while the length of employment is "objective. — Id. at 609, 618.
44 Id. at 610-11.
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Consequently, justice Marshall's concern that the forty-five-week rule
was an abuse of the exemption might be alleviated by respondent's showing
that even though the rule is a component of a seniority system, it nevertheless is
employed to perpetuate intentional racial discrimination. Such a showing
would preclude the characterization of the seniority system as "bona fide"
within the meaning of section 703(h) and bar the availability of the exemption.
Because respondent in Bryant had not advanced this argument, there was no
finding before the Court as to whether the termination of temporary employees
shortly before the completion of a forty-five-week period was the product of in-
tentional racial discrimination or the result of a seasonal demand for labor in
the California brewing industry.
The adequacy of the Court's delineation of the scope of the seniority
system exemption can be determined only by more litigation. Through the in-
terpretation and application of the holding in Bryant, it will become evident
whether the Court's safeguards are sufficient to prevent Justice Marshall's con-
cerns from becoming a reality.
III. DISCRIMINATION IN SKILLED AND UNSKILLED POSITIONS
A. Qualifications for Unskilled Labor: Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co.*
In a Tide VII' action, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination. This may be done, in part, by
showing that the plaintiff was qualified for the position sought.' It is clear that
when an employer seeks applicants for a skilled position for which there are
minimum objective qualifications, the plaintiff must show that she has met
these standards. When the employer, however, seeks applicants for an un-
skilled position for which there are no articulated requirements, the question
arises whether a plaintiff must show he is qualified for an unskilled job in order
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in accordance with the stand-
ard of proof enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green." The standards laid down by the Court in McDonnell Douglas places the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination with the com-
plainant. 4 Once this step has been completed the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. 5 Lastly,
once the defendant-employer has convinced the court of the legitimacy of its
• By Audrey Helen Rothschild, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1976).
• In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Supreme Court
described the initial burden of proof which a plaintiff must meet in an employment discrimina-
tion case. The complainant in a Title VII suit must carry the initial burden of proof by establish-
ing a prima fade case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that the plaintiff
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applicants; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected for the job; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
' 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
4 hi
Id.
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reasons, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant's articulated
base were in fact pretext. 6
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit determined whether the term "unskilled" meant a total lack of qualifi-
cations. In Holder v. Old lien Coal Co.,' the court of appeals held that
"unskilled" does not mean unqualified, 8 but rather it means not skilled in a
particular handicraft or lacking technical training. 9 According to the court, an
unskilled position may require specific qualifications, and consistent with its
definition of "unskilled," the court of appeals also held that a plaintiff, to
establish a prima facie case, must prove herself qualified, even for an unskilled
position
The plaintiff in Old Ben submitted three applications for an unskilled posi-
tion at the defendant's coal mine." Unskilled positions, such as the one plain-
tiff applied for, were neither advertised by defendant nor described by the col-
lective bargaining agreement as requiring any particular qualifications. 12 The
unskilled category merely indicated that the defendant did not require any
technical skills for the position." For the skilled positions that it offered, de-
fendant sought only those persons with a minimum of six months experience in
one of the listed skill areas. 14 The plaintiff's first two applications indicated that
she had attended high school and a beauty college from which she graduated
with a degree." Her employment record consisted of eleven years of experience
as a beautician and light work in a factory during one winter. 16 The plaintiff's
third application was notably different than the prior two." By the time she
filed this application she had been hired by another coal mine and had accumu-
lated sixteen months of work experience." She was hired by defendant on the
basis of this application and remains an employee of defendant's coal mining
company.I 9
 The plaintiff brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act," contending that Old Ben Coal Company had discriminated against her
6 Id.
Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198, 21 FEP Cas. 1462 (7th Cir. 1980).
a Id. at 1201, 21 FEP Cas. 1464.
9 Id.
LO Id.
H Id. at 1200, 21 FEP Cas. at 1463.
12 Id. at 1201, 21 FEP Cat, at 1464,
' 3 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1200, 21 FEP Cat, at 1463.
16 Id. A dispute arose whether the plaintiff's first application mentioned prior truck driv-
ing experience. Id. The plaintiff insisted that she had rioted four months of such experience. Id.
The personnel administrator of the mine denied that any mention was made of her truck driving.
Id. No reference was made on either of the two subsequent applications. Id.
' 7 Id.
18 Id.
' 9 Id. at 1200, 2! FEP Cas. at 1463-64.
2 " 42 U.S.C. § 2002-2 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
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on the basis of sex in its failure to hire her on the first two applications. 2 ' She
sought back pay, seniority, pension credits and her legal costs attendant with
the action. 22
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana con-
cluded that the plaintiff had not proven a case of sex discrimination and dis-
missed her action. 23 The district court judge applied the burden of proof for-
mula set out in McDonnell Douglas. Specifically, the court maintained that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that she was qualified for an unskilled position at
defendant's mine at the time she was rejected for employment. 24
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision." The plaintiff argued on appeal that she had satisfied her initial
burden of proof and thus the district court had erred in dismissing her case. 26
In support of her argument that she had established a prima facie case, plaintiff
noted that she had applied for an "unskilled" position. 27 Plaintiff then claimed
that unskilled meant that the job did not require any qualifications and thus she
was necessarily capable of doing any unskilled job. 28 The court of appeals re-
jected her definition of the term "unskilled," insisting that unskilled does not
connote an absolute lack of qualifications." According to the majority, the term
"unskilled" is merely a label which indicates that an employer does not require
technical skills as a prerequisite for being hired." Thus, an employer may still
hire on the basis of work experience and non-technical qualifications, even
when filling an "unskilled" position. 31 The record revealed that defendant
consistently sought the most experienced worker to fill those positions from
which plaintiff was rejected." The court refused to brand the defendant's ac-
tions as discriminatory simply because the employer did not necessarily con-
sider all applicants for unskilled positions to he equally qualified. According to
the court, there is nothing in Title VII, that requires an employer to hire a
woman over more qualified individuals whether the position sought is skilled or
unskilled."
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color or national origin.
Id.
2 ' 618 l'.2(1 at 1198, 21 FEP Cas. at 1462.
" Id. at 1199, 21 FEP Cas. at 1462-63.
" Id. am 1200, 21 FEP Cas. at 1463.
24 Id
25 M.
26 Id.
 at 1201, 21 FEP Cas. at 1464.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id
30 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
33
 Id. at 1202, 21 FEP Cas. at 1465.
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Plaintiff based her appeal on the contention that "unskilled" meant that
the job did not require any qualifications.'" Plaintiff reasoned that since she
had sought an "unskilled" job, she automatically established a prima facie
case that she was qualified for the position sought." Plaintiff also argued that
the court had confused the burden of proof standard enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas which requires a complainant to establish a prima facie case. 36
Specifically, plaintiff contended that she should not have to prove job exper-
ience or comparable qualifications 37 in establishing a prima facie case since the
job itself requires no qualifications. Rather, showing a relative lack of work ex-
perience should be part of defendant's rebuttal since hiring an experienced ap-
plicant is a matter of personal preference and not of necessity." The court of
appeals rejected plaintiff's contention by stating that plaintiff must show that
she did not have an absolute or relative lack of qualifications even though art
unskilled job is involved. 39
 In concluding that it is a plaintiff's burden to show
that she is more experienced and better qualified for an "unskilled" position,
the court of appeals distinguished its earlier decision in Davis v. Wiedner" which
the dissenting judge held controlling.'" The court of appeals interpreted the
Davis decision as holding that the plaintiff did not have to show as part of her
prima facie case that she was as qualified as those retained on the job. 42 The
Davis court also stated that what a plaintiff must show in her prima facie case
varies with respect to the factual circumstances.° Thus, in distinguishing the
holding in Davis, the Old Ben court focused on the factual distinctions between
the two cases." The judgment not to retain the plaintiff in Davis as a member of
the nontenured faculty was a subjective one based on information not visible to
plaintiff and in the sole possession of the defendant. The court reasoned that it
therefore made sense to require the employer to establish that the plaintiff was
relatively less qualified. In contrast, the defendant in Old Ben based its hiring
" Id. at 1201, 21 FEP Cas. at 1464.
33 Id.
" Id. at 1202, 21 FEP Cas. at 1465.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1202, 21 FEP Cas. at 1465. In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals
relied on International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), in which the
Supreme Court stated that the McDonnell Douglas formula of a prima facie case is to be flexibly ap-
plied. Id. at 358. In applying this language the Court stated that a Title VII plaintiff must show
that her rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an
employer might rely to reject a job applicant." Id. One of these reasons is the absolute and rela-
tive lack of qualifications. Id. The other is the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Id.
" 596 F.2d 726, 19 FEP Cas. 668 (7th Cir. 1979). The employer in Davis asserted that
the plaintiff there was not as qualified as the other applicants for a faculty position at the universi-
ty. The employer further contended that an additional element for establishing a prima facie case
of employment discrimination be that plaintiffs rejection did not result from a relative lack of
qualifications. 596 F.2d at 730, 19 FEP Cas. at 671. The Davis court held that the plaintiff had
made a prima facie case. Id. The court also stated that showing that the plaintiff had a relative
lack of qualifications was part of the employer's burden of proof. Id.
4 ' 618 F.2d at 1203, 21 FEP Cas. at 1466.
42 Id. at 1202 n.5, 21 FEP Cas. at 1465 n.5.
4' Id.
4 * Id.
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decisions on the mining-related experience of the applicants." The court main-
tained that since the mining experience of those hired was obvious from the ap-
plications which were available to plaintiff, there was no reason to excuse plain-
tiff from showing that she was as qualified as those hired.'" Having concluded
that plaintiff failed to show that she was qualified for the job, the court of ap-
peals held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.'"
The dissenting judge in Old Ben stated that plaintiff had met her burden of
proof since she had proven that she possessed the qualifications required by the
employer for an unskilled position." The burden should then shift to the de-
fendant to present his legitimate business reasons for hiring male applicants in-
stead of the plaintiff." The dissent emphasized the importance of distinguish-
ing between explicit job qualifications and legitimate employer preferences."
According to the dissent, unless a plaintiff can initially show that she is
qualified for the job sought, the burden will never fall on the defendant to
justify his actions. 5 ' The dissent also noted that the critical difference between
qualifications and preferences is that qualifications must be uniform for all ap-
plicants whereas preferences are applied according to the employer's discre-
tion. 52 The dissenting judge warned that if courts permit an applicant to be
labelled "unqualified" because she does not possess a preferred quality that is
not demanded of all applicants, the plaintiff's burden will never be met. 53 The
dissent maintained that this is the situation which the majority created by char-
acterizing work experience as a qualification for an unskilled position." The
dissent believed that had the court distinguished between qualifications and
legitimate preferences it could have concluded that plaintiff had established a
prima facie case. The dissent noted that Old Ben had not announced any re-
quirements or qualifications for the unskilled job for which plaintiff sought to
be hired. 55 Experience with heavy machinery was merely a job preference, not
a necessity. The dissent then concluded that the plaintiff should therefore not
have been required to prove she had mining experience in order to prove she
was qualified for the job." According to the dissent, plaintiff was qualified for
the unskilled job and therefore met her burden of establishing a prima facie
case." The burden would then shift to defendant Old Ben to establish in its
rebuttal of plaintiffs prima facie case that those hired were more exper-
ienced." The focus of the court would then be on whether defendant had met
that burden. 59
45 Id.
46 Id
" Id. at 1203, 21 FEE' Cas. at 1466.
" Id. (Swygert, ,J., dissenting).
49
 Id.
541
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1204, 21 FE!' Cas. at 1467.
56
 Id.
57 id
" Id.
" Id.
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The dissenting, judge concluded that mining experience was not a require-
ment for employment in an unskilled position. 60
 In arriving at this conclusion,
the dissent relied on the testimony of the defendant's personnel administrator.
This witness conceded that experience was a basis fir selection Only if it was
available. 6 ' If no applicant had this experience, an applicant without it would
be hired. 62
 Mining experience, the dissent argued, was therefOre not a
minimum job qualification for the unskilled position sought by the plaintiff. 63
The dissent then turned to Davis v. Weidner" which had recently been
decided by that court. Davis was interpreted by the dissent as stating that
legitimate employer preferences are not part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case. 65 In Davis, the court concluded that the plaintiff had proven that she was
qualified. 66
 Thus, the burden of showing her relative lack of qualifications was
to be placed on the defendant." The dissent analogized Davis to the facts in Old
Ben, concluding that a discussion of the plaintiff's relative lack of mining-
related qualifications and experience was unrelated to her prima facie case.
It is submitted that the position advanced by the majority is unsound. As
the dissent noted, the majority's holding blurs the distinction between job
qualifications and legitimate employer preferences, thereby making the plain-
tiff's initial burden an onerous one. Under the Old Ben decision an employer
can apply legitimate preferences to one applicant and not another while the
plaintiff must still prove that she satisfies such "qualifications" to establish a
prima facie case. Qualifications must be uniform for all applicants; otherwise
so-called qualifications could be required at the mere discretion of the
employer, perhaps depending on illegitimate criteria such as the sex of the ap-
plicant. In Old Ben, the employer did not require any particular qualifications
for its unskilled jobs. Yet the majority still maintained that in the area of un-
skilled employment, the employer's preference for mining experience consti-
tuted a job qualification.
The significance of the decision in Old Ben lies with the court's refusal to
distinguish between job requirements or qualifications and legitimate employer
preferences. The danger in making a preference analogous to a qualification is
that preferences may be applied at the whim of the employer. Consequently, it
will be extremely difficult for the plaintiff to show with certainty whether she
was in fact qualified since the notion of qualification under the Old Ben decision
will necessarily include elements of an employer's discretion. Furthermore, a
person seeking employment in an unskilled position may find their efforts
frustrated under Old Ben. In Old Ben, the defendant announced no re-
quirements or qualifications for the unskilled position and yet the court held
that an applicant's prior mining experience was in fact a qualification for the
job. In effect, the court's ruling permits employers to advertise vacancies for
60 Id.
fi i
" Id.
6.9
64
 596 F.2d 726, 19 FEP Cas. 668 (7th Cir. 1979).
63
 618 F.2d at t203, 21 FEP Cas. at 1466.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1204, 21 HP Cas. at 1466-67.
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unskilled jobs without announcing the basic employment qualifications which
they are actually considering. An applicant for an unskilled position may have
no prior idea of what employers are requiring and thus, the individual cannot
make an informed decision as to which jobs she should apply for. The dissent,
however, argued that if no qualifications arc announced by the employer that
would mean that there in fact arc no requirements. Thus, everyone would be
qualified for such an unskilled position and applicants would know in advance
whether they arc suited for the job.
B. Use of General Statistical Comparisons in Tide VII
Litigation Involving Skilled Positions:
EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co.' and Davis v. Califano 2 *
Statistical evidence has achieved widespread use by Title VII' plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.' If the plaintiff demonstrates a
significant statistical disparity between the composition of the defendant's work
force and that of the relevant labor market, 5 thus creating an inference of' dis-
crimination against an under-represented class, he is said to have made out a
prima facie case.'" The defendant must then produce evidence to rebut the in-
ference that illegal discrimination has occurred. This use of statistical evidence
by Title VII plaintiffs has been justified on the basis that claims of employment
discrimination are frequently difficult to prove because most, if not all, em-
ployment information is in the hands of the defendant. The difficulty of proof is
amplified when, as is often true, employment decisions are made subjectively,
rather than being based on objective criteria! Given the difficulty of proving
discrimination, the use of statistical evidence provides the plaintiff with one of'
the only means of showing the court that he was a victim of discrimination.
Although courts have uniformly allowed statistical evidence in Title VII
actions, they have struggled to define its proper role. One problem en-
countered by the judiciary has been to determine the appropriate use of general
population statistics in discrimination cases involving jobs requiring special
• By C. Scott Stevenson, Staff Member, BosTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
610 F.2d 178, 21 FEP Cas. 351 (4th Cir. 1979).
• 21 FEP Gas. 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
' See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United Stales, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (cases cited in note 20).
5 Generally, the relevant labor market is composed of individuals who possess the
specific qualifications required for the positions in question and who live within a reasonable
distance of the employer's place of business. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S, at :310-12; Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 22 FEP Cas. 184, 191 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
6 It should he stated at the outset that plaintiffs seldom rely solely on statistical evidence
to prove a Title VII claim. Proof of individual instances of discrimination, and/or a showing that
the defendant uses subjective hiring criteria, frequently accompany statistical evidence of
discrimination. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 338-39;
Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838, 14 FEP Cas. 1143, 1148-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
For example, in Hazelwood teachers had been hired on the basis of "such intangibles as
'personality, disposition, appearance, poise, voice, articulation, and ability to deal with
people'.. . ." 433 U.S. at 302.
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skills. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in two recent Title VII class
actions. 8 The opinions indicate that statistical data is normally limited to a
comparison of the composition of the qualified workers in the relevant labor
market with the composition of defendant's work force in that job category.°
In the first case, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 1 ° the
Court found general population/work force comparisons probative where the
jobs in question did not require special skills or qualifications." The central
claim in Teamsters was that the plaintiffs had been illegally denied truck driving
positions." Because driving is a skill generally possessed or readily acquired by
the general public, the Teamsters Court allowed the plaintiffs to use general
population statistics to prove their case." Nevertheless, while the Teamsters
Court permitted the use of general population data, it cautioned that general
population figures might not always "accurately reflect the pool of qualified job
applicants. . ." 14 A second Supreme Court decision appearing shortly there-
after, Hazelwood School District v. United Stater, 15 expanded on the caveat con-
tained in Teamsters. The jobs in question in Hazelwood were teaching positions
which required skills not possessed by the general population. The Hazelwood
Court stated that "[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular
jobs, comparisons to the general population ... may have little probative
value."" The Court determined that since the comparative statistics intro-
duced in the district court had been properly limited to public school teachers,
and thus had taken into account the special qualifications for the position, such
statistics were probative of the defendant's intent."
While it is now apparently settled that general population statistics are
probative of discrimination only in litigation involving unskilled jobs," a more
basic problem has yet to be resolved: under what circumstances can a job be
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); international Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
9 'teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20 & 342 n.23; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 & n.13. It is
apparent from a reading of Teamsters and Hazelwood together that the Court did not entirely rule
out the use of general population statistics in special qualification cases. When the statistical
disparities are gross, a plaintiff may not be required to Fine tune the statistics. See Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 342 n.23.
'" 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" See id, at 339-40 n.20.
12 Id. at 329.
Id. at 339-40 n.20. The Hazelwood Court's view of the statistics used in Teamsters is il-
luminating:
In Teamsters, the comparison between the percentage of Negroes on the employer's
work force and the percentage in the general areawide population was highly pro-
bative, because the skill there involved — the ability to drive a truck — is one that
many persons possess or earl fairly readily acquire.
Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
' 5 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
' 6 Id. at 308 n.13. As stated in note 9 supra, the Hazelwood Court did not entirely rule out
the use of general population comparisons in special qualification cases.
17 Id.
'" In addition to the Supreme Court's rationale developed in Teamsters and Hazelwood,
see, e.g., the Fourth Circuit cases on the issue. Hill v. Western Eke. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 103-06, 19
FEP Cas, 490, 493-96 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 577 F.2d 229, 233, 17
176	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 22:40
said to require special qualifications. Since the evidentiary value of general
statistical comparisons turns on whether .
 the jobs in question are skilled or un-
skilled, such a determination assumes critical importance. This chapter will
contrast the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit with that
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit with respect to the
question of special job qualifications in Title VII cases involving general statis-
tical comparisons.
1. The Fourth Circuit Approach
In EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co.," a Survey year Title VII class action, the
Fourth Circuit defined the burdens of proof on the issue of whether particular
jobs require special qualifications." In the court's view, when it is not apparent
simply from the identification of jobs in question whether special qualifications
exist, the burden is on the employer to show that the positions in fact require
special qualifications. 21 If the employer fails to sustain his burden of proof, the
general statistics will be presumed appropriate in assessing the plaintiff's prima
facie proof." The Radiator Specialty court held that the issue of special qualifica-
tions must be addressed as a threshold issue by trial courts when the plaintiff
seeks to use general population statistics to establish a prima facie case. 23
The Radiator Specialty case arose when an ex-employee of the Radiator
Specialty Company (RSC) tiled a charge of discrimination with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (the Commission or EEOC) against his
former employer. 24 The Commission brought suit alleging that RSC had dis-
criminated against blacks by restricting them to less desirable and lower paying
jobs." The Commission relied on statistical evidence which showed that while
RSC's workforce included a higher percentage of blacks than did the general
population in the relevant labor market, blacks were under-represented in
RSC's professional, managerial, clerical, and sales positions. 26 Other evidence
demonstrated that among the "new hires" into RSC's white collar positions,
the percentages of blacks were substantially less than their representation in the
general population, and that few of RSC's black employees were promoted in-
to the jobs in question. 27 As a further indication of probable discrimination, the
FEP Gas. 815, 818 (4th Cir. 1978); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1354-55, 14 FEP Cas.
235, 245 (4th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
610 F.2d 178, 21 FEP Gas. 351 (4th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 184-85, 21 FEP Cas. at 356.
21 Id. at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 356.
22 Id.
" Id. at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 357.
" Id, at 181, 21 FEP Cas. at 353.
" Id. The action alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. S§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
26
 The court gave the following example:
lIjn April 1971 RSC employed 207 white persons and 273 black persons. About
82% of the employed whites were either "white collar'' employees or were super-
visors or foremen in "blue collar" units. Less than 5% of the blacks employed
were white collar, or were supervisors or foremen in blue collar units.
Id. at 181 n,2, 21 FEP Cas. at 353 n.2.
27 id. at 181, 21 FEP Gas. at 353.
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EEOC presented evidence that RSC had utilized highly subjective standards
for hiring and promotions." The trial court considered the plaintiff's statistical
data and the evidence of subjective hiring and promotion methods sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which the defendant then failed
to rebut." After a trial on the merits, the trial court held that RSC had engaged
in unlawful employment practices and ordered extensive injunctive relief.'"
On appeal, the circuit court considered the case below in light of Hazel-
wood, which the Supreme Court had decided in the interim. Using Hazelwood as
authority, RSC contended that the EEOC's statistical evidence, which was
based on general population comparisons, was insufficient as a matter of law to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with regard to hiring and promo-
tion into professional, managerial, clerical, and sales positions because those
positions required special qualifications. 3 ' The court agreed with the defendant
that RSC's professional positions 32 manifestly required special qualifications
neither commonly possessed nor readily acquired by the general population,
and therefore that the plaintiff's proof was not sufficient to make out a prima
facie case with respect to those positions." Accordingly, the circuit court
reversed the district court's finding of discrimination to that extent.'"
The court was unwilling, however, to accept the defendant's assertion that
the remaining clerical, managerial, and sales positions also required special
skills." It was unclear to the court whether these jobs required special qualifi-
cations because the issue had not been addressed below; therefore, that issue
was remanded to the district court. 36 The Radiator Specialty court suggested that
on remand the district court might find it necessary to receive further evidence
before it could resolve the question." The Fourth Circuit court also indicated
that if the defendant was able to establish that these positions required special
skills, it would be necessary for the Commission to show a disparity between
the percentage of qualified blacks in the population and the percentage of
blacks holding those positions at RSC in order to make out a prima facie case.'"
In the course of its discussion, the court formulated guidelines allocating
the burden of proof on the issue of special qualifications. The court observed
that cases in which the plaintiff seeks to introduce general population statistical
comparisons can be divided into three classifications," The first category con-
29 The district court found "that RSC utilized unpublicized, unwritten, and highly sub-
jective standards and procedures for recruiting, hiring, transferring and promoting persons into
its upper level positions." Id. at 181, 21 FEP Cas. at 354.
" EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 20 FEP Cas. 704, 711-12 (W.D.N.C. 1979).
" Id. at 711-15.
3 ' 610 F.2d at 184, 21 FE.1 3 Cas. at 355.
32 The "professional positions" were not defined. Apparently, as part of its proof, the
plaintiff had "identified and described" certain positions as professional, and the circuit court
simply adopted the plaintiff's characterization. Id. at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 357.
Id. at 185-86, 21 FEP Cas. at 357.
M at 186, 21 FEP Cas. at 357.
35 Id.
3E Id.
:sr Id.
" Id.
39 See id. at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 356.
178	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:40
tains cases in which it is manifest from the mere identification of the jobs in
question that no special skills arc required," In such cases, a court may rule as
a matter of law that the plaintiff's general population comparisons arc pro-
bative. 41
 At the other end of the spectrum arc cases in the second category.
These cases involve positions that obviously require special qualifications.
Thus, a court usually may not find a prima facie case on the basis of general
statistical evidence. 42
 Between the two extremes lies the third category, in
which it is not apparent whether the positions are skilled or unskilled:43 The
court ruled that in category three cases, unless the defendant establishes that
the positions in fact require special qualifications, the plaintiff's statistics will
be presumed appropriate in assessing the plaintiff's proof." The Radiator
Specialty court concluded that RSC's professional positions fell into category
two, with (he remaining jobs in the third category.'"
2. The District of Columbia Approach
In Davis v. CaYana,'" an individual Title VII action decided during the
Survey year, the court reached a two-pronged holding. First, the court stated
that any distinction between statistical proof in class and individual discrimina-
tion suits is largely artificial.'" Thus, the court held that a private plaintiff
alleging a violation of Title VII may prove a prima facie case of unlawful dis-
crimination on the basis of statistical evidence alone." Second, the court for-
mulated a "minimum objective qualifications" test which it used in testing the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's prima facie statistical evidence." In the Davis
court's view, the qualified labor market used in a Title VII plaintiff's statistical
comparisons is composed of those persons who possess the minimum objective
qualifications of the job in qucstion. 5° If, as in the Davis case, promotion deci-
sions into the position in question are based entirely on subjective criteria with
no objective requirements, then the court would allow a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case using general statistics comprising all of the employees of the
organization at which the plaintiff is employed. 51
4 " Id.
41 Id. Teamsters, which involved truck driving positions was cited by the Radiator Specialty
court as an example of a category one case. Id.
" Id. Hazelwood, which concerned teaching positions, was cited by the Radiator Specially
court as an. example of a case falling into the second category. Id.
13 Id.
44 Id. The court did not specifically cite an example of a category three case. Certain
technical positions, however, e.g., computer programmer or laboratory technician, would seem
to all within this category.
44' Id. at 185-86, 2! FEP Cas. at 357.
46 21 FEP Cas. 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
47 Id. at 276-77.
" Id. at 276.
49
 Id. at 278.
50 Id.
5 ' In promotion cases such as Davis, the organization in which the plaintiff is an
employee is viewed as the relevant labor market. Id. Thus, even though the plaintiff's statistics
did not compare the composition of defendant's work force for the job in question with that of the
general population, the comparisons actually made by_ the plaintiff were, in a sense, general
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The plaintiff in Davis was a white woman employed by the federal govern-
ment as a Ph.D. research chemist at the National Heart, Lung and Blood Insti-
tute (NHLBI). 52
 She had been on the job for several years, and had received
several promotions" before she was denied a promotion to a scientific staff
position, a job which required considerable expertise," The plaintiff sued her
employer, alleging that she was denied the promotion on the basis of her sex. 55
She relied almost exclusively on statistical evidence of disparate treatment of
males and females by her employer to prove that its employment decisions
were illegally discriminatory. 56
 Other evidence indicated that promotions were
made on an ad hoc basis using subjective criteria by predominantly male pro-
motion panels. 57 Although the job sought by the plaintiff, that of independent
investigator, did not carry established minimum objective qualifications,"
such positions generally were filled by persons with either M.D. or Ph.D.
degrees who had participated in a staff fellowship program designed by the
NHLBI to give candidates an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity for the
job."
After a trial on the merits, the district court entered judgment for the de-
fendant. 6° The court concluded, inter alia, that as a matter of law the plaintiffs'
statistics were not relevant because they did not contain information regarding
that pool of applicants specifically qualified for the independent investigator
position."' For support, the district court relied on precedent holding that when
a job requires special qualifications, the plaintiff must introduce data concern-
ing the number of qualified persons in that particular labor pool in order to
establish a prima facie case, and cannot rely on more general statistics. 62 Alter-
natively, the district court concluded that, even if the plaintiff's statistics were
relevant, statistics alone may not prove a prima facie case in an individual, as
opposed lo a class, action. 63
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the district court's decision." The
statistical comparisons. All of the employees at the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute.
regardless of their position, were considered part of the qualified labor market. Id.
" Id. at 274.
" Id. The plaintiff had received promotions from her starting position, at CS-5, to a
CS-9 level position.
" Id. at 274-75.
55 Id. at 274. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated
against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C:. §§
2000e-2000c-17(1976).
" See 21 FEP Cas. at 275.
" Id. at 274. "No objective criteria were established to guide the promotion decisions of
supervisors, branch chiefs and ad hoc promotion panels, . ." Id. at 279.
58
 While the independent investigator position did not require minimum objective
qualifications, the court did state that the "qualifications for a senior scientific reasearch staff
position of independent investigator, . . are the capability of perceiving a specific research prob-
lem and developing a hypothesis and protocol for determining its truth or falsity." Id. at 275.
59 Id.
n° Davis v. Califano, 19 FEP Cas. 1045, 1052 (I).D.C. 1978).
" Id. at 1052.
" Id.
" Id.
" Davis v. Califano, 21 FEP Cas. 272, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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court first addressed the trial court's alternative conclusion that a prima facie
case may be established by the use of statistical evidence in an individual case.
In doing so, the court drew a parallel between recovery by individuals in class
actions, and recovery in individual discrimination suits. 65 The court observed
that once the prima facie case is established in a class action, individual
claimants may recover for particularized injuries by showing merely that they
belong to the class, and that a promotion or other job benefit was denied them
during the period of class discrimination." Because the court saw no fun-
damental difference between class and individual actions, it held that relief in
an individual case should be forthcoming on exactly the same standarcls. 67
The Davis court next addressed the district court's primary conclusion that
the plaintiff's statistics were in any event irrelevant. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court on this point, finding that the statistics introduced by
the plaintiff were not only relevant, but were probative of a discriminatory in-
tent on the part of her employer. 68 In the court's view, because there were no
minimum objective qualifications for the position sought by the plaintiff, use of
relatively general statistical comparisons was proper. 69 The total absence of ob-
jective criteria used by the employer in its promotion decisions provided addi-
tional support for the plaintiff's prima facie case." Thus, the plaintiff was
allowed to establish a prima facie case with statistics comparing the composi-
tion of the NHLBI's upper grade and salary staff with the composition of the
enitre work force at NHLBI, including secretaries and file clerks. 7 '
Davis was decided over a strong dissent. While the dissenting judge im-
plicitly conceded that statistics sometimes may be used by an individual plain-
tiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, he would have affirmed
the lower court decision on the basis of one of four suggested alternative hold-
ings, only one of which is relevant here." The dissent would have held, inter
65 The Court reasoned that if;
statistical proof of a 'broad-based policy of employment discrimination ]provides]
reasonable grounds to infer that individual lemployment] decisions were made in
pursuant of the discriminatory policy . . . and require[s] the employer to come
forth with evidence dispelling that inference' in a class action, so too should the use
of statistical evidence have equal force and effect in an individual discrimination
case.
Id. at 277 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359).
66 Id. at 277.
" 7 Id. at 276-77. Davis is significant in this respect. Although the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had previously hinted that statistical evidence might establish a prima facie
case in an individual action, see 1-lackley v. Roudebush, 520 F,2d 108, 158, 11 FEP Cas. 487, 526
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 839, 14 FEP Cas.
1143, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Davis is the first decision by any federal court directly holding that a
private plaintiff may prove a prima facie case on the basis of statistical evidence alone. This part
of the Davis opinion is treated cursorily because of the chapter's focus on the Davis court's
minimum objective qualifications standard.
68 21 FEP Cas. at 277-79.
69
" Id. at 274. Subjective procedures often "encourage and foster discrimination" and
the court reasoned that they must therefore be more closely scrutinized. Id. at 279.
71 See id. at 278.
72 Davis, 21 FEP Cas. at 279 (dissenting opinion). The dissent also reasoned that even if
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the defendant had successfully rebutted the
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alia, that the plaintiff's statistics were not sufficiently detailed to make out a
prima facie case in an individual action involving a highly skilled position. 73
Because of the great skill necessary for the job, the dissenter would have re-
quired the plaintiffs initial proof to touch on the obvious qualifications con-
sidered for the job. 74
3. A Comparison of the Approaches
The Radiator Specialty case represents the latest in a series of Fourth Circuit
decisions which have attempted to limit the use of general statistical com-
parisons in discrimination cases. 75
 These cases have responded specifically to
plaintiffs who sought to introduce general statistics when the jobs involved were
skilled. In Radiator Specialty, the Fourth Circuit's consideration of the issue
culminated in the guidelines discussed above which enable a trial court, by
placing the job in question into one of three categories, to determine more easi-
ly when a Title VII plaintiff's general statistical proof may be sufficient to make
out a prima facie case.
The Fourth Circuit's guidelines prevent a plaintiff from using statistics
which have little probative value to shift the burden to the defendant to rebut
an inference of discrimination. Radiator Specialty protects a defendant in two
ways. First, if a court is convinced that the case involves an obviously skilled
position a plaintiff's general population statistics normally will not be con-
sidered. 76
 Second, a defendant will be able to prevent a prima facie showing on
the basis of general population statistics where the jobs are not clearly skilled or
unskilled if he can show that the jobs are in fact skilled." A defendant is thus
given procedural protection from plaintiffs who build shaky claims with broad
statistical comparisons in cases involving skilled jobs.
The court's guidelines also recognize, to a lesser extent, the difficulties a
plaintiff may have in obtaining the proper evidence to establish a prima facie
case. Accordingly, in cases involving all but obviously skilled positions, a plain-
tiff may establish a prima facie case with more easily accessible general popula-
tion statistics, 78
 unless the defendant sustains his burden of proving special
qualifications.
Radiator Specialty proceeded from the premise that general statistics are
probative unless the job in question requires special qualifications. It then
reached a limited holding focusing upon the burden of proving special qualifi-
cations in a discrimination case. Although the Davis case started from the same
basic tenet, it bypassed the analysis that was the focus of Radiator Specialty, and
arrived at a much broader holding. The Davis court discussed the specific
tiff's initial showing, that the plaintiff's statistics were equivocal and insufficient to establish a
prima facie case, and lastly that because the plaintiff elected not to participate in the internal staff
fellowship program she failed to show that she was qualified for the position she sought. Id ,
" Id. at 280-81. See text at note 84 infra.
" Id. at 281.
" See cases cited in note 18 supra.
" Radiator Specialty, 610 F.2d at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 356.
"
7 Id.
78
 General population data is readily available to the public in the form of census data,
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area data and the like.
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nature of statistical comparisons necessary to establish a prima facie case, no
matter what type of position is the subject of litigation. The court held that only
the minimum objective qualifications necessary for one to be eligible for the
particular job must be considered in the statistical data presented initially by
the plaintiff."
The effect of the Davis holding is that general statistical comparisons are
probative in all cases unless the defendant has established minimum objective
qualifications for the job in question. 8° This is so whether the job involved is a
highly skilled scientific research position, as in Davis, or an unskilled truck driv-
ing position, like those in Teamsters. The fact that a job requires "special
skills," by itself, has no effect on a plaintiffs prima facie case. Job require-
ments must be in the form of minimum objective qualifications required of all
hirees. Only then does a Title VII plaintiff have to adjust the qualified labor
pool for his comparisons to reflect the minimum job requirements.
The court's focus in Davis is, more than anything else, a recognition of the
practical realities of establishing a prima facie case with statistics. No plaintiff
would be able to account for every conceivable factor relevant to the promotion
or hiring decision in his statistics. To force him to do so would present a formi-
dable barrier to the establishment of a prima facie case. Thus, while an
employer actually might consider any number of qualifications desirable in fill-
ing certain positions, a plaintiff should only be required to adjust its statistical
comparisons to reflect those qualifications that are required of all candidates. 8 !
The defendant is in a much better position to introduce more refined statistics
reflecting additional relevant criteria as part of its rebuttal.
Despite its apparent beneficial effects, the standard set out in the Davis
decision has at least one major drawback. The minimum objective qualifica-
tions test accounts for only the objective job criteria which arc applied to all
hirecs. Thus a plaintiff's prima facie proof may disregard any objective qualifi-
cations not possessed by all candidates, as well as all subjective criteria used in
hiring. Clearly, the standard is of considerable aid to the plaintiff in establish-
ing its prima facie case." In some cases, however, the plaintiffs proof will meet
the minimum objective qualifications standard, but will in fact be highly
79 Davis, 21 FEP Gas, at 278.
" The Davis court does not explicitly indicate whether the plaintiff or the defendant
must show that a job has minimum objective qualifications. Nonetheless, it would appear de facto
that a defendant would have to shoulder the burden of doing so at the peril of allowing the plain-
tiff to establish a prima facie case with statistics that do not account for any special qualifications.
GI Radiator Specialty, 610 F.2d at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 356 (category three cases).
" Davis, 21 FEP Cas. at 278. The Davis court noted that the Supreme Court limited the
relevant labor market in Hazelwood to teachers, but did not require that the statistics reflect years
of work experience, quality of training, and other potentially relevant factors. Id. at 278 n.42.
A further illustration of the Davis court's rationale lies in the court's observation:
a particular number of years of work experience were established as a mini-
mum job criterion, then that would need to he reflected in the profferred statistics.
If, however, work experience were only a factor to he considered in promotion
decisions, a plaintiff's statistical data need not take that into account.
Id. at 278.
" At the risk of stating the obvious, the Davis court appeared to have been concerned
primarily with aiding a Title VII plaintiff in his efforts to establish a prima facie case. In contrast,
Radiator Specialty focused on protecting discrimination defendants from prima facie shiftings on
the basis of overbroad statistical comparisons.
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suspect as a true indication of the defendant's intent. This is especially likely in
cases involving upper level positions where hiring criteria are not clearly stated
and may be largely subjective." As stated in the dissent to Davis, the minimum
objective qualifications test may ignore the obvious skill requirements of the
job if they are not required uniformly of all candidates."
The Davis case presents an example of an extreme fact situation which
does not fit into the court's minimum objective qualifications analysis.
Although the job in question did not carry any minimum objective qualifica-
tions, it obviously required highly technical skill and experience. Virtually all
of the positions were filled by persons with doctoral degrees who had completed
a fellowship program at the NHLBI. Thus, those two criteria were tantamount
to minimum qualifications. At the least, the plaintiff should have had to intro-
duce comparisons which restricted the labor pool to those employees possessing
those characteristics. It seems ludicrous, as was done in Davis, to allow the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case with statistics using the entire staff at the
NHLBI as the qualified labor pool for the independent investigator positions. 85
The employer in Davis was unjustly given the burden of rebutting an inference
of discrimination based on very weak evidence.
Notwithstanding the questionable result reached on the facts of Davis, a
minimum objective qualifications standard is a workable approach. The stand-
ard yields an unreasonable result only in extreme cases, such as Davis, where
no objective job qualifications have been established and the jobs in question
arc obviously skilled. In most other cases, it can be argued that if minimum ob-
jective qualifications do not exist then none are necessary. Therefore, the
plaintiff's general statistics may be used quite properly in order to establish a
prima facie case.
It is doubtful that the Fourth Circuit would disagree with the District of
Columbia Circuit's minimum objective qualifications test as a standard for
determining the qualified labor pool for statistical comparisons. In fact, the
Radiator Specialty court, true to the rationale of Davis, would allow a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case with general population statistics unless the defend-
ant showed that the job required special skills." The Fourth Circuit, however,
undoubtedly would take issue with the Davis court's exclusive focus on a job's
minimum objective qualifications without considering the job itself. Unlike the
Davis majority, the Radiator Specialty court would not limit its inquiry to a posi-
tion's minimum objective qualifications in determining whether general
population comparisons are probative. In some cases, according to Radiator
" That is not to say that if a plaintiff introduced relined statistical data reflecting the
minimum objective qualifications of a highly skilled job (where such qualifications existed) to
establish a prima facie case, the Davis court's standard would not be useful. Nonetheless, where
an obviously skilled position carries no minimum objective qualifications it is unfair to allow a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case with general statistics which are not probative.
This conclusion may leave a plaintiff faced with such a case unable to establish a prima
facie case with statistics. He cannot use general population data because the job is obviously
skilled, and he cannot use more refined statistics because the job has no minimum objective
qualifications that can be reflected statistically. In this type of case, hopefully other fOrms of proof
of the defendant's intent can be employed.
" Davis, 21 FEP Gas. at 281 (dissenting opinion).
" Davis, 21 FEP Cas. at 278.
" Radiator Specially, 610 F.2d at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 356.
184	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol, 22:40
Specialty, it is obvious from the mere identification of the job that it requires
special qualifications, and therefore the plaintiff's general statistics will not be
considered." The Radiator Specialty guidelines suggest that, as a matter of prac-
tical judgment, a court could decide that a plaintiff's general statistics are not
probative in such cases. No inquiry into the job's minimum objective qualifica-
tions would be necessary." As stated by the Davis court itself:
The invocation of statistical data works no magical incantation. As
with any evidence, the usefulness of the statistical evidence "depends
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. "S9
In Davis, the surrounding evidence suggested that the plaintiff's general
statistics were of little probative value. The court should have considered such
evidence instead of focusing exclusively on the job's minimum objective quali-
fications.
With Davis and Radiator Specially, the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit have made useful contributions to efforts being made to define
the proper statistical comparisons in discrimination cases involving jobs with
special qualifications. Courts may adopt either approach with probable
substantial benefit. The guidelines set forth in Radiator Specialty will aid courts
in assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's general population comparisons.
Similarly, the minimum objective qualifications standard promulgated in
Davis, while leading to a poor result on the facts of the case, should be adopted
as the statistical standard plaintiffs must normally meet in order to establish a
prima facie case. Only in the rare case involving obviously skilled positions
with no established minimum objective qualifications, should the Davis court
standard yield to the more practical approach set forth by the Fourth Circuit in
Radiator Specialty.
IV, TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT:
Gunther v. County of Washington*
In an attempt to eliminate the existence of widespread wage discrimina-
tion against women,' Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 2 The Act
specifically prohibits employers from discriminating between employees on the
" Id. at 185, 21 FEP Cas. at 356. See text at note 42 supra.
" By the same token, if the case fell into Radiator Specialty's category three (neither ob-
viously skilled or unskilled), Davis' minimum objective qualifications standard would be used.
Presumably, the plaintiff's statistics would have to be adjusted to reflect only the special qualifi-
cations that the defendant was successful in showing. Radiator Specialty, 610 F.2d at 185, 21 FEP
Gas. at 356. There the court stated: "If the defendant succeeds [in sustaining the burden of
showing that the jobs are skilled] the plaintiff should have an opportunity to adjust his statistical
proof to reflect a labor pool base with the special qualifications found required." Id.
Davis, 21 FEP Cas. at 276 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340).
* By Constance A, Brown, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
See Declaration of Purpose of the Equ.1 Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat.
56, reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 59-60. See also HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCA-
TION AND LABOR, R EPORT ON THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, H.R. REP. NO. 309, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687-92.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 amended 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. 206 (1976), by adding subsection (d), 29 U.S.0 206(d) (1976). The Equal Pay Act
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basis of sex by paying unequal wages for equal work.' The Act excepts from
this equal work-equal pay standard, however, any compensation made pur-
suant to a seniority system, a merit system, a quality or quantity production
system, or a differential based upon a factor other than sex.' One year after
enacting the Equal Pay Act, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 5 Although more comprehensive than the Equal Pay Act, section
703(a)(1) of Title VII also prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex. 6
Apparently concerned that section 703(a)(1) might conflict with the Equal Pay
Act, Senator Bennett' introduced an amendment to Title VII which ensured
the coordination of the two statutes. 8 Specifically, the Bennett Amendment
provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII "for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
provides in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based upon any other factor other than
sex.
29 U.S.C. S 206(d) (1976).
See text of the Equal Pay Act at note 2 supra. Although the phrase "equal work" has
been interpreted as requiring that the work performed be more than comparable, Angelo v.
Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1173-74, 14 FEP Cas. 1178, 1786-87 (3d Cir. 1977),
the jobs need not be identical. Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 958, 15 FEP Cas. 1333,
1336 (2d Cir. 1977); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265, 9 FEP Cas. 502, 506 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). Instead, the courts•have adopted a substantially equal
standard, under which jobs are considered "equal" if the actual work performed involves skill,
effort, and responsibility of a substantially equal nature. Ridgway v. United Hospitals-Miller
Div., 563 F.2d 923, 926, 16 FEP Cas. 345, 347 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Prince William
Hosp, Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285, 9 FEP Cas. 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1974).
See text of the Equal Pay Act at note 2 supra. Because of their precise language, the first
three specific exceptions pertaining to seniority, merit and productivity systems have raised few
interpretive problems. See 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. 5 31.10 (1979). The
fourth, more sweeping exception, which allows pay differentials that are based upon factors other
than sex, has been more troublesome. Generally, the exception has been construed as covering
situations involving temporary work assignments, 29 C.F.R. 5 800.147 (1979), employee train-
ing programs, id., and night shift work, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
Problems have arisen, however, in determining whether such factors as experience, hours of
work, and physical exertion make the work performed unequal and thus outside the scope of the
Equal Pay Act; or whether these variants qualify under the broad other than sex exception. See 1
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 55 31.10-.27 (1979).
42 U.S.C. 55 2000e-1 to 17 (1976).
6
 Apart from prohibiting discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion or
national origin, section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), provides in per-
tinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual's
sex . Id.
7 Wallace Foster Bennett, Republican Senator from Utah.
110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (remarks of Senator Bennett). Unlike the Equal Pay
Act, which was a product of careful legislative consideration, see note 1 supra, the sex discrimina-
tion provisions of Title VII were included hastily in the Civil Rights Act only one day prior to the
bill's enactment. Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrirninalion in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil
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of	 compensation paid	 if such differentiation is authorized by the (Equal
Pay Act I.'"
Although all courts agree that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII should be
construed harmoniously,'" two conflicting interpretations of the Bennett
Amendment itself have been adopted. Some courts, for instance, view the
amendments as incorporating within Title VII the Equal Pay Act's equal work
standard as well as the statute's four exceptions which authorize pay differen-
tials that are based upon factors other than sex." Under this view, only claims
based upon allegations of unequal pay for equal work arc cognizable under
Title VII.' 2 A second group of courts, however, interpret the Bennett Amend-
ment as incorporating only the four exceptions of the Equal Pay Act within
Title VII." Under this construction, claims of discriminatory compensation
not based upon allegations of equal work may be brought under Title VII even
though they would not constitute a cause of action under the Equal Pay Act.' 4
During this Survey year, the issue of the relationship between Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act with respect to discriminatory compensation arose for the
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Ac! of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 395, 310-13 (1968). Since the sex provi-
sions were of Bred by a principal opponent of the Civil Rights Act, many commentators have sug-
gested that the amendment protecting women's rights actually was introduced to prevent passage
of the underlying legislation. Id. Because of these unusual circumstances, Senator Bennett sug-
gested amending Tide VII to guarantee that the "provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be
nullified," 110 CoNG. REc. 13647 (1964) (remarks of Senator Bennett). See note 48 infra for the
complete text of the Bennett Amendment's legislative history.
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The Bennett Amendment provides that:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to he paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
'" Both the Equal Pay Act of 1963 arid Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 serve (111!
same basic purpose of remedying discrimination in the areas of compensation. Because of this
common goal, courts agree that the two statutes must be construed harmoniously. See DiSalvo v.
Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2(1 593, 20 FEP Cas. 825 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R.
MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 10 FEP Cas. 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 3 FEP Cas. 910 (10th Cir. 1971).
" IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 FEP Cas, 450, 457 (D.N,J. 1979) (Title VII
suit involving a discriminatory compensation claim); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F.
Stipp. 397, 400-01, 17 FEP Cas. 232, 235 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (Title VII suit involving unequal and
discriminatory compensation claims); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448, 454-55, 16
FEP Cas. 581, 585-86 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (action under first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act).
'' Courts adopting this view reason that any conduct not specifically prohibited by the
Equal Pay Act is, by negative implication, authorized by the Act and, thus, by virtue of the Ben-
nett Amendment, immune from attack under Title VII. See, e.g., IUE v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 19 FEP Cas. 450, 453 (D, NJ. 1979).
" Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446, 13 FEP Cas. 1068, 1078 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (equal pay claim under Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims unrelated to compensa-
tion); see also Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't. of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581, 590, 13
FEP Cas. 1625, 1631-32 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 U.S. 702
(1978).
" Under this construction, the Bennett Amendment is viewed as limiting the Equal Pay
Act's interaction with Title VII to situations involving only equal work. In instances when un-
justifiably large pay differentials occur for unequal work, the Equal Pay Act is deemed in-
applicable. See 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DiscRimiNATION. §§ 29.80, 33.10 (1979).
Id.
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first time before an appellate court in Gunther v. County of Washington." The
United States Court of Appeals for `the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Bennett
Amendment as incorporating within Title VII the four exceptions, but not the
equal work requirement, of the Equal Pay Act.' 6 By adopting this interpreta-
tion, the circuit court in effect held that Title VII is broader in scope than the
Equal Pay Act. Accordingly, while acknowledging that the Act's standard
should control whenever a claim of unequal pay for equal work is litigated
under Title VII," the court held the Equal Pay Act inapplicable whenever a
Title VII suit involves a charge of discriminatory compensation for comparable
jobs rather than an allegation of lower wages for the same work.' 8 Under the
circuit court's ruling, plaintiffs instituting a Title VII suit are no longer limited
to a theory of unequal pay for equal work. Rather, employees can challenge
their employer's discriminatory compensation practices for comparable or even
unique work.°
The plaintiffs in Gunther were four women formerly employed as matrons
in the Washington County jail. 2° The matrons worked in the female section of
the jail, while male deputy sheriffs staffed the male section." The female
matrons and the male deputies shared similar principal responsibilities in that
both groups processed, guarded, and transported their prisoners to and from
court." Because of the difference in the number of male and female prisoners,
however, the time which both groups spent performing their respective duties
varied. For example, since there were typically three matrons for every
prisoner, the female guards spent much of their time doing clerical work."
Conversely, since the male prisoners outnumbered the deputies by a ratio of
tbur to one, the male guards devoted more time to the inmates and less time to
clerical chores."
Prior to February 1973, the pay for the male deputies ranged from $668 to
$853 per month, whereas the matrons received $476 to $606 per month. 25 In
February of 1973, a ten-percent salary range increase became effective for both
groups even though a thirty-percent raise had been recommended for the
female guards. 16 In June of 1973, corrections officers, receiving a salary
602 F.2d 882, 20 FEP Gas. 792 (9th Cir. 1979). Although some appellate courts have
commented on the interrelationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, these cases, unlike
Gunther, have involved claims alleging a denial of equal pay for equal work. See, e.g., DiSalvo v.
Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 20 FEP Cas. 825 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R.
MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 10 FEP Cas. 697 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975).
' 6 602 F.2d 882, 890, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 797 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 891, 20 MI' Gas. at 798.
16
See note 66 infra.
70 602 F.2d 882, 885, 20 FEP Gas. 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1979).
2' Id.
22
	
FEP Cas. 788, 789 (D. Or. 1976).
23 Often having no other tasks to perform, the matrons did the clerical work relating to
the male as well as the female prisoners. 602 F.2d 882, 888, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 796 (9th Cir.
1979).
" 20 FEP Cas. 788, 789 (D. Or. 1976).
25
26
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ranging from $701 to $812 per month, began replacing the deputy sheriffs in
the male section of the jail." Although the newly created corrections officers'
positions were open to females, plaintiffs did not apply for these jobs, but in-
stead asked their union to demand equal pay for the women guarding the
female prisoners. 28 Although reviewed by the union and the County Commis-
sioners, plaintiffs' demand was never acted upon since the County subsequent-
ly decided to house the female inmates in an adjoining county's facility, a deci-
sion which eliminated the matrons' positions in Washington County." As a
result, plaintiffs filed a Title VII suit in federal district court claiming, inter alia,
that the County" had denied them equal pay for equal work. 3 ' Alternatively,
the plaintiffs contended that even if their work was not substantially equal to
that performed by the male guards, at least some of the pay differential was at-
tributable to sex discrimination. 32
Rejecting both of plaintiffs' contentions, the district court found first that
the work performed by the female matrons was not substantially equal to that
clone by the male guards. 33 Next, in dismissing plaintiffs' alternative claim of
discriminatory compensation, the district court merely stated that since the
_jobs were, in fact, dissimilar "that is the end of our inquiry." 34 In effect, by
refusing to consider the plaintiffs' claim of discriminatory compensation for
comparable jobs, the district court confined the scope of Title VII to situations
involving equal work.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's initial finding
that the work performed by the male and female guards was not substantially
equal." In so doing, the circuit court first emphasized the prisoner-guard ratio
and noted that the male jailers guarded twelve times as many inmates as the
female guards. 36
 Turning to the amount of clerical work, the court next
stressed that the matrons spent as much as fifty percent of their time doing
clerical tasks, whereas the male guards devoted little time to these duties. 37 The
" Id. The position of corrections officer was created by the Washington County Com-
missioners to free the time of the deputy sheriffs and to "professionalize the job of jail guard." Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 790. Between 1971 and 1973 the number of male prisoners processed by
Washington County jumped from 1884 to 3270. Because of this overcrowding, several male in-
mates were required to sleep on the floor, a factor causing the American Civil Liberties Union to
file an action against the County. In order to alleviate this overcrowding, the Commissioners
voted to house women prisoners in Clackamas County jail. As a result of this change the six
matrons' positions in Washington County were eliminated and replaced by two and a half police
stenographers. Id.
30 In addition to the County, plaintiffs sued their supervisors: Sheriff Barnes, Captain
Eriese, and Sargeant Rainseth. 602 F.2d 882, 885 & n.2, 20 FEP Cas, 792, 793 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1979).
31 20 FEP Cas. 788, 789 (D. Or. 1976). In addition to the equal pay charge, plaintiff's
alleged that the County terminated and refused to rehire them because they sought pay
equivalent to that of the new corrections officers. Id. The circuit court affirmed the district cou rt's
dismissal of these retaliation claims. 602 F.2d 882, 891-894, 20 FEN Cas. 792, 798-801 (9th Cir.
1979).
32 20 FEN Cas. 788, 791 (D. Or. 1976).
" Id.
"
" 602 F.2d 882, 886-88, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 794-96 (9th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 887, 20 FEP Cas. at 795.
37 Id. at 888, 20 FEN Cas. at 796.
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circuit court reasoned that taken together the greater amounts of clerical work
and the smaller number of prisoners made the matrons' jobs "qualitatively"
different from the work performed by the male jailers." Since the jobs were not
substantially equal, the circuit court approved the district court's dismissal of
the equal work-equal pay component of the plaintiffs' Title VII suit."
Reversing the lower court in part, however, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the mere finding of unequal work did not dispose of the entire case because the
plaintiffs' alternative argument involved, not the equality of the work per-
formed, but the comparative scope of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act . 4° In the
Gunther court's view, the plaintiffs, in effect, had argued that Title VII was
broader than the Equal Pay Act, and thus it allowed them to establish that sex
discrimination had produced at least part of the discrepancy in pay irrespective
of the equality of the work performed.'" In determining the validity of plain-
tiffs' argument, the circuit court specifically addressed the relationship between
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act." Initially, the court observed that the Equal
Pay Act pertains to neither unique nor comparable positions, but instead is
limited to jobs entailing the performance of substantially equal work. 43 Noting
in contrast that the language of section 703(a)(1) does not similarly confine the
scope of Title VII, the circuit court next focused on the Bennett Amendment's
proviso that any wage differentiation "authorized by the provisions of the
[Equal Pay Act]" is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII." In
construing this language, the Gunther court acknowledged the plausibility of
two interpretations. Under one interpretation, the amendment could be
viewed as incorporating an equal work requirement into Title VII, which
would make the scope of section of 703(a)(1) coextensive with that of the Equal
Pay Act. 45
 Rejecting this interpretation, however, the Gunther court construed
the Bennett Amendment as incorporating only the four affirmative defenses of
the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. 46 Hence, the court concluded that the
amendment does not limit the scope of section 703(a)( 1), but merely insulates
from attack under Title VII the compensation practices authorized by the four
listed exceptions of the Equal Pay Act. 47
In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court relied on both the legislative
history of the Bennett Amendment and the broad remedial purpose underlying
Title VII. At the outset, the court observed that according to the legislative
history, Congress never intended the Bennett Amendment to apply to situa-
tions involving discriminatory compensation." Instead, the amendment's pur-
38 Id.
a
40 Id.
4 ' Id.
42 Id.
" Id. at 889, 20 FEP Cas. at 796. Sec note 3 supra.
44 602 F.2d 882, 889, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1979). Sec note 9 supra for the
complete text of the Bennett Amendment.
* 5 602 F.2d 882, 889, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 797 (9th Cir. 1979).
46 Id. at 890-91, 20 FEP Cas. at 797-98.
47 Id.
" Id. at 891, 20 FEP Cas. at 797. The relevant legislative history of the Bennett Amend-
ment is as follows:
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of raving by members of the
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pose was to ensure that the Equal Pay Act would not be nullified in the event of
conflict with Title VII. 49
 This was accomplished by preserving in Title VII the
four affirmative defenses provided under the Equal Pay Act which authorize
pay differentials that are based on factors other than sex." In support of its
conclusion that the Bennett Amendment encompassed the exceptions but not
the work requirement mandated by the Equal Pay Act, the Gunther court
stressed Senator Dirksen's 51 statement that "141 that the pending amendment
does is recognize those exceptions." 52
 In the absence of explicit legislative in-
tent, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Title VII's broad remedial purpose of
eliminating employment discrimination should not be confined to situations in-
volving equal work, particularly since such a limitation would allow "other
equally harmful discriminatory practices" to escape review."
Having set forth its own interpretation of the Bennett Amendment, the
Ninth Circuit next distinguished those district court decisions that had adopted
a contrary construction. 54 The Gunther court observed that while these lower
courts viewed the Bennett Amendment as incorporating both Equal Pay Act
standards and exceptions into Title VII, their position was not inconsistent
with its own interpretation." Because the cases considered by the lower courts
involved equal pay claims brought under Title VII, the Gunther court agreed
fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees
of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became
effective only yesterday. By this time, programs have been established for the ef-
fective administration of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under con-
sideration, in which the word 'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not
believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the
wholesale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act. The pur-
pose of toy amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of
the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified. I understand that the leadership in charge
of the bill have agreed to the amendment as a proper technical correction of the
bill.
If they will confirm that understanding, I shall ask that the amendment be voted
on without asking for the yeas and nays.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I
believe it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully
acceptable.
Mr. DI RKSEN: Mr. President, I yield myself one minute.
We were aware of the conflict that might develop because the Equal Pay Act was
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act
carries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are car-
ried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification.
110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
* 9 602 F.2d 882, 890, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 797 (9th Cir. 1979).
SO Id,
Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican Senator from Illinois.
" 602 F.2d 882, 890, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 797 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting 110 CONG. R
13647 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen)).
" Id. at 890, 20 FEP Cas. at 797-98.
54 See note 11 supra for a listing of the district court cases holding that the Bennett
Amendment incorporates both the standards and the exceptions of the Equal Pay Act into Title
VII.
" 602 F.2d 882, 891, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1979).
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that the Bennett Amendment dictated that they be "judged under Equal Pay
standards. " 56 The court stressed, however, that since these lower courts had
not considered claims of discriminatory compensation based upon other than
unequal pay for equal work allegations, their reasoning should not be extended
to the "significantly different issue" raised by plaintiffs' alternative contention
in Gunther." Thus, while it deemed the Equal Pay Act's standards controlling
whenever an equal pay claim is raised under Title VII, the Gunther court held
that the Bennett Amendment does not preclude a plaintiff from litigating other
forms of wage discrimination under Title VII unless the compensation practice
is authorized by one of the four exceptions contained in the Equal Pay Act."
The Gunther court's analysis of the relationship between the Equal Pay Act
of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is correct for several
reasons. First, in holding equal pay claims litigated under Title VII subject «)
the Equal Pay Act's equal work requirement, the circuit court merely followed
the accepted principle that the two statutes should be construed har-
moniously. 59 Since an equal pay action may be brought under either statute,
equal pay claims raised under Title VII must be decided in accordance with the
principles prescribed by the Equal Pay Act in order to ensure consistent results
under the statutes. The Gunther court's second determination, that all Title VII
wage discrimination decisions, involving either equal pay or discriminatory
compensation allegations must recognize the employment practices authorized
by the Equal Pay Act's four exceptions, finds support in similar reasoning. If
for example, an employer could be viewed as violating section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII by differentiating wages pursuant to a plan explicitly authorized by the
Equal Pay Act's exceptions, choice of statutes, rather than employment prac-
tices, would determine the outcome of many wage discrimination cases.
Moreover, if these exceptions were not incorporated within section 703(a)(1),
Title VII would directly nullify provisions of the Equal Pay Act in contraven-
tion of the clear legislative purpose underlying the Bennett Amendment.""
As the Gunther court recognized, however, when a Title VII discrimina-
tory compensation claim involves neither equal work nor an employment prac-
tice protected by the Equal Pay Act's exceptions, the two statutes no longer
overlap, and hence the need for harmony disappears." Furthermore, in this in-
stance, the Bennett Amendment does not dictate that Title VII be coordinated
with the Equal Pay Act. For example, in defining the scope of section
703(a)(1), the Bennett Amendment provides that wage differentials authorized
by the Equal Pay Act shall not be deemed unlawful under Title VII." Because
the Equal Pay Act applies only to jobs involving the performance of equal
58 Id.
" Id. The Gunther court noted that one district court case, IIJE v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 19 FEP Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), did consider the issue of discriminatory compensation.
Since the IUE court relied on lower court cases involving equal pay claims in deciding that Title
VII should be deemed co-extensive with the Equal Pay Act, the circuit court saw "no reason to
extend" its rationale to Gunther. 602 F.2c1 882, 891, 20 FEP Cas. 792. 798 (9th Cir. 1979).
58 Id.
52 See text and note at note 10 supra.
6 ' See text and notes at notes 48-50 supra.
602 F.2d 882, 891, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 798 (9th C:ir. 1979).
82 See text and note at note 9 supra.
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work, it should not be construed as authorizing unjustifiably large pay differen-
tials for unequal work, a situation which the Act does not purport to cover. 63
For these reasons, the Gunther court was correct in holding that the Bennett
Amendment does not preclude employees from litigating discriminatory com-
pensation practices under Title VII, even though these claims would not be
cognizable under the Equal Pay Act.
The practical impact of the Gunther court's ruling is twofold. First, an in-
crease in discriminatory compensation suits under Title VII can be an-
ticipated. Since the Equal Pay Act and Title VII both provide remedies for
wage discrimination, many district courts have construed the two statutes, not
just harmoniously, but identically." If the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment is followed in other jurisdictions, however, employees can
be expected to challenge unjustifiable wage differentials for comparable 65 or
even unique work." Specifically, although employees acknowledge the differ-
ences inherent in their jobs, under the Gunther holding they still may allege that
their positions are sufficiently similar to those of higher-paid males to suggest
that sex discrimination, and not the nature of the work performed, produced
the wage discrepancy. An analogous but more difficult argument may be ad-
vanced by employees who hold totally unique positions, but who still allege
that they would be paid a higher salary if not for sex discrimination.
The problem of proof inherent in this latter argument suggests the second
ramification of the Gunther court's determination that relief under Title VII is
not limited to situations entailing equal work. Although the basis for stating a
cause of action has been increased by the Ninth Circuit's ruling, plaintiffs'
chances of successfully proving their cases have not. When plaintiffs allege
discriminatory compensation for unequal jobs, for example, their burden of
proof changes from establishing the equality of the work performed to
demonstrating the existence of sex discrimination. Specifically, plaintiffs suing
under the Equal Pay Act must merely establish that the tangible skill, effort
and responsibility required by their jobs are substantially equal to that required
by the work of higher-paid males. 67
 In a Title VII discriminatory compensation
suit, however, the plaintiffs must establish the influence of sex discrimination
as the causative factor in the wage differential. 68
 Recognizing the difficulty in
sustaining this burden, the Gunther court concluded "that problems of proof
63 See 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, $ 33.10 (1979).
64
	text and notes at notes 11-12 supra.
" See note 3 supra.
66
	Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 FEP Cas. 224 (II Alaska 1978)
where the court stated, "While the practice'of paying a uniquely situated employee less than
would be paid a member of the opposite sex in the same position may be a violation of certain
laws and reprehensible, it does not violate this [Equal Pay Act]. . , ." /d. at 226.
" See note 3 supra.
" See Pantchcnko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 18 FEP Cas. 686, 689-90 (D. Conn. 1977), in
which the district court stated,
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that she was paid less ... because she is a
woman. At most she has shown that she was slightly underpaid and that she is a
woman.... While I do not find that plaintiff has established her contention that
she worked at a level of equivalent responsibility with other chemists at the plant,
the evidence does indicate that her work was of sufficient quality and responsibili-
ty, compared to the other chemists, to merit a salary slightly above what she was
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may present substantial barriers to establishing this kind of discriminatory
compensation claim. Such problems, however, are not sufficient reason to fore-
close plaintiff's] from the opportunity to establish a claim of discrimination. "69
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES *
Prevailing parties in federal litigation ordinarily are not entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees' absent exceptional circumstances, such as a show-
ing of the losing party's had faith or an express congressional authorization of
an award. 2 One statutory exception is section 706(k) of Title VII, 3 which gives
a court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in
employment discrimination suits. The Supreme Court has observed that in
section 706(k) Congress intended to encourage aggrieved employees to serve as
"private attorney's] general" to vindicate their civil rights. 4 Thus, the Court
has interpreted section 706(k) to support awards to prevailing plaintiffs in all
but special circumstances. 5
In Christiansburg Garment Co. a. EE0C, 6 the Court considered when a Title
VII defendant may recover attorney's fees as a prevailing party under section
706(k). 7 Examining legislative history, the Court determined that the section
receiving. But there is not a shred of evidence to indicate that her salary level was
in any way related to her gender.
Id.
"" 602 F.2d 882, 891, 20 FEP Cas. 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1979).
* By Christopher B. Andrews, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The
"American Rule" contrasts with the English practice of regularly awarding counsel fees to the
prevailing party. Id.
1 Id. at 257-59.
' 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (1976). This section reads as follows:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States. a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
Id.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978). In the only
specific reference to section 706(k) in Title VI l's legislative history, Senator Hubert Humphrey
explained that the provision was included to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to
bring a meritorious suit 110 CONG. REc. 12724 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). The
Christiansburg Court's conclusions regarding the purposes underlying section 706(k) were drawn
primarily from its examination of the legislative history of the almost identical attorney's fee pro-
vision of Title II, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) (1976). 434 U.S. at 416-17, 420.
Id. at 417. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
434 U.S. 412 (1978). For a full discussion of Christiansburg, see 1977-1978 Annual Surrey
of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 20 B.C. L. Re". 61, 216 (1978).
434 U.S. at 417-23. Prior to Christiansburg, some lower courts read ihe plain language
of section 706(k) to dictate equal treatment for prevailing plaintiffs and defendants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 742, 744, 15 FEP Cas. 583, 584 (5th
Cir. 1977); EEOC v. The Bailey Co., Inc. 563 F.2d 439, 456, 15 FEE' Cas. 972, 986 (6th Cir.
1977). Other courts imposed a more stringent standard upon prevailing defendants. They
reasoned that a successful defense does not advance the Act's underlying anti-discrimination
policy and that awards against plaintiffs might deter employees from initiating legitimate suits.
See, e.g., Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 1'.2d 1058, 1064, 11 FEP Cas, 1322, 1325 (8th
194	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 22:40
has a twofold purpose; it was designed as much to deter groundless claims as to
encourage legitimate, meritorious actions. 8 The Christiansburg Court sought to
minimize the tension between these conflicting goals, while effectuating each to
the fullest extent possible.' Rejecting arguments that prevailing defendants
should always recover fees," and that they should not recover unless bad faith
is shown," the Court held that attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing
Title VII defendant only where the suit is found "frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless. . . " 12
 This standard was made stricter than that which applies to
plaintiffs" so that vigorous enforcement of meritorious civil rights claims would
not be discouraged.' 4 Because it does not require a showing of bad faith,"
however, the standard offers defendants protection beyond that enjoyed at
common law."
Christiansburg's enunciation of a defendant's award standard, based on the
Court's accommodation of the conflicting policies underlying section 706(k), is
a valuable guide to the proper application of this provision. During the Survey
year, however, several decisions were handed down which reveal that Chris-
tiansburg has not resolved all the problems encountered by the lower courts in
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in employment discrimina-
tion suits.
A. Substitution of a Subjective Standard for the Christiansburg Standard:
Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp."
The Christiansburg opinion differentiated actions brought in bad faith from
frivolous or meritless•suits. 15 Interpreting section 706(k) as offering defendants
Cir. 1975); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364, 10 FEL' Cas. 1106,
1109 (3d Cir. 1975).
" 434 U.S at 420. See note 4 supra.
" 434 U.S. at 420-22. The Court noted that defendant awards are warranted in some
circumstances to effectuate Congress' intent to "protect defendants from burdensome litigation
having no legal or factual basis." Id. at 420. It later warned, however, that assessing fees against
plaintiff's- whenever the defendant prevails "would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote
the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII." Id. at 422.
'fi Id. The defendant-petitioner argued that, given the plain meaning of the statute, the
standard which permits recovery of attorney's fees for almost all prevailing plaintiffs should apply
equally to prevailing defendants. Id. at 417-18. The Court, however, rejected this "mechanical"
construction, id. at 418, and focused its analysis on the legislative purposes of section 706(k). Id.
at 420.
" Id. at 418. The respondent Commission contended that prevailing defendants should
recover fees under section 706(k) only when the plaintiff's bad faith can be shown. Id, The Court
countered that if this had been Congress' intent, the statutory provision would not have been
necessary, because defendants can recover fees against bad faith plaintiffs at common law. Id. at
419.
II Id. at 422.
See text at note 5 supra.
" 434 U.S. at 422.
Id. at 421. The Court made it clear that its standard "in no way implies that the plain-
tiff's subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him." Id.
1 " See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
17
 606 E.2d 816, 20 FE}' Cas. 1750 (8th Cir. 1979).
' 8 434 U.S. at 422. The Court wrote:
a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds
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more protection than at common law,' 9
 the Supreme Court explained that a
plaintiff's subjective had faith is not a prerequisite to a defendant's award.'" In
the Court's view, fees may be assessed against plaintiffs where the defendant
makes the less onerous showing of an objectively groundless or unreasonable
action."' In a recent decision, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed a fee award
to a prevailing defendant in an employment discrimination suit because the
plaintiff conceivably could have believed her claim to have merit. In Bowers v.
Kraft Foods Corp., 22
 the court relied on this conceivable belief to reject the trial
court's findings that the suit was "frivolous," with "no foundation in fact,"
and "maliciously filed." 23
 The Eighth Circuit's analysis ignores Christians-
burg's suggestion that a lawsuit may be frivolous, unreasonable, and
groundless, even though the plaintiff believes that she has brought a meritor-
ious claim in good faith. It substitutes a purely subjective standard for that
enunciated in Christiansburg. To the extent that this analysis lessens the protec-
tion defendants have been given from groundless claims, Bowers undermines
the delicate policy reconciliation underlying the Christiansburg standard.
In Bowers, a black employee brought suit against her employer under Title
VII and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 24
 alleging racial discrimination in job
classifications, promotions, and pay scale. 25
 The Title VII claim was dismissed
by the district court because it was not brought within ninety days of Bowers'
receipt of a right to sue letter. 26
 At trial on the merits of the section 1981 claim,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found no evidence
supporting Bowers' allegations. 27
 The court noted that Bowers earned the
same wages as employees with greater qualifications and responsibilities," and
found no evidence that she ever was denied a promotion or salary increase
because of her race. 29
 Finding plaintiff's work habits and attitude to be un-
satisfactory, 30
 the court rejected the argument that a supervisor's criticism of
plaintiff's job performance was racially motivated." The trial court concluded
that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff con-
tinued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to say, if a plaintiff is
found to have brought or continued such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even
stronger basis for charging Into with the attorney's fees incurred by the defense.
Id. (emphasis in original).
19 Id. at 419; see text and notes at notes 11 & 15-16 supra.
2°
 434 U.S. at 421.
21 Id.
" 606 F.2d 816, 20 FEP Cas. 1750 (8th Cir. 1979).
23 Id. at 818, 20 FEP Cas. at 1752. .
24
 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (providing for equal rights under the law).
" 606 F.2d at 817, 20 FEY Cas. at 1751.
26
 467 F. Stipp. 971, 974, 19 FEP Cas. 934, 937 (E.D. Miss. 1979).
27 Id. at 972, 19 FEP Cas. at 935.
28 Id. at 972, 974, 19 FEP Cas. at 935, 936-37. In addition, plaintiff's allegation that the
hiring of two employees at a higher grade was racially motivated was rebutted by the court's find-
ing that the two were highly experienced operators of a machine which the plainitlf was incapable
of operating. Id. at 973, 19 FEP Cas. at 936.
" Id. at 973-74, 19 FEP Cas. at 936. Bowers was promoted once and received nine
salary increases, which doubled her starting salary over eight years. Id.
3° Id. The court also noted that plaintiff averaged ten absent days a year. compared to
an average of less than three for the office as a whole. Id.
3 ' Id.
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that the lawsuit was filed to punish the supervisor; 32 that Bowers had "no foun-
dation in fact for her lawsuit" ; 33 and that it was "a frivolous lawsuit malicious-
ly filed."' 4 Accordingly, the court entered judgment for the defendant and
assessed attorney's fees against the plaintiff."
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the record supported the
lower court's determination that Bowers was not entitled to relief, and it af-
firmed the judgment on the merits." It then examined Bowers' contention that
the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the
defendant." The court first determined that the Christiansburg " frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless" standard applies to defendant awards in section
1981 litigation." Purporting to apply this standard, the court reasoned:
Bowers' receipt of a right to sue letter, even though insufficient in
itself to overcome the district court's findings of frivolity, could have
led Bowers to reasonably believe that her claim was meritorious.
Moreover, the evidence, while weak, was sufficient to conceivably
have influenced Bowers to believe that she had a stronger case."
Thus, the circuit court concluded that Bowers' contentions were not so
frivolous or malicious as to justify the assessment of attorney's fees against
her,'" and it reversed the lower court's award.'"
The Eighth Circuit swept too broadly in using Bowers' conceivable beliefs
to reject all three components of the trial court's characterization of the claim.
The court might have avoided this error had it analyzed the lower court's
"maliciously filed" finding separately from the "frivolous" and "no founda-
tion in fact" findings.'" In rejecting the "maliciously filed" component, the
Eighth Circuit properly focused on the plaintiff's state of mind. Such a
" Id. at 973, 19 FEP Cas. at 936.
" Id. at 974, 19 FEP Cas. at 937.
34 Id.
35 Id. The district court did not mention the standard it applied in exercising its discre-
tion to award attorney's fees. Presumably, its analysis was similar to that of the Eighth Circuit,
which concluded that Christiansburg governed the award in the instant case. See text and note at
note 38 infra.
36 606 F.2d at 818, 20 FEP Cas. at 1751-52.
" Id.
" Id. The award of attorney's fees in section 1981 actions is governed by the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), which contains language
substantially identical to section 706(k). See 606 F.2d at 818 11.2, 20 FEP Cas. at 1752 n.2. The
Senate Report of the 1976 Act explains that it "follows the language of Title II and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964" and that "[i]t is intended that the standards for awarding fees be
generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." S. REP. No.
94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2, 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Al). NEWS 5908,
5912. The Eighth Circuit in Bowers implicitly recognized and adhered to this congressional intent
by applying the Christiansburg standard in its review of Bowers' claim under section 1981. 606
F.2d at 818, 20 FEP Cas. at 1752. See also Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 988, 20 FEP
Cas. 33(), 334 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Patzkowski v. United States, 576 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1978).
" 606 F.2d at 818, 20 FEP Cas. at 1752.
" Id.
4 ' Id.
42 As mentioned, see text at notes 33-34 supra, the lower court based its award of at-
torney's fees on its findings that Bowers had "no foundation in fact for her lawsuit" and that it
was "a frivolous lawsuit maliciously filed." 467 F. Supp. at 974, 19 FEY Cas. at 937. These are,
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characterization does not stern from an objective evaluation of the claim's
merits. A court's decision that a claim is "maliciously filed" is predicated upon
the plaintiff's conduct; it essentially charges the plaintiff with had faith. The
circuit court understandably was reluctant to sustain such a charge where the
evidence with respect to Bowers' motives was ambiguous.
The same analysis does not apply, however, to the "frivolous" and "no
foundation in fact" findings. Following Christiansburg's announcement that
defendants should be protected from frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless
actions, as well as from claims brought in had faith, the Bowers court ought not
to have limited its inquiry to the plaintiff's state of mind. It also should have ex-
amined objectively the merits of the lawsuit. In this manner, it would not have
rejected the frivolous and without foundation findings solely because of
Bowers' evaluation of her claim and her conceivable belief that the action had
merit.
The Eighth Circuit's limited inquiry may have been prompted by dicta in
Christiansburg. The Supreme Court admonished lower courts not to char-
acterize a suit as unreasonable simply because the plaintiff does not prevail."
The Court explained that "Whis kind of hindsight logic could discourage all
but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of
ultimate success."'" This language arguably supports the Eighth Circuit's sub-
jective standard, which both avoids post hoc reasoning and mitigates the deter-
rent effect of defendant awards. The dicta must be read, however, in conjunc-
tion with Christiansburg's holding, which allows defendant awards where the
claim is without foundation. 45 The Supreme Court was advising lower courts
to look beyond the outcome of litigation in objectively evaluating a suit's
merits. It was not suggesting that, in examining a claim at its inception, a court
must limit its inquiry to the plaintiff's state of mind.
Similarly, the Bowers court should not have been influenced by an ap-
prehension of deterring legitimate claims into lessening the protection defend-
ants enjoy under Christiansburg. The policy of encouraging meritorious civil
rights actions already is embodied in the Christiansburg standard. 46 The
Supreme Court appreciated that it sacrificed some of this policy's impact in
reconciling the dual purposes of section 706(k). Barring a modification or over-
ruling of Christiansburg, courts must adhere to its policy accommodation. In ex-
ercising their discretion in awarding attorney's fees under the Christiansburg
standard, courts must look beyond the plaintiff's beliefs and determine objec-
tively the merits of the claim.
B. Amount of Attorney's Fees A warded to Prevailing Title VII Plaintiffs and Thiendanis:
Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co.
Christiansburg established when a plaintiff may be liable for a prevailing
defendant's attorney's fees. It did not address, however, whether the standard
essentially, three separate findings. The Eighth Circuit ought not to have reversed the fee award
without examining each component of the findings which supported the district court's exercise
of its discretion to assess attorney's fees.
43 434 U.S. at 421-22.
44 Id. at 422.
" Id. at 421, 422. See text at notes 18-21 supra.
46 Sec text at notes 8-14 supra.
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for determining the amount of reasonable fees should differ as between prevail-
ing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. Prior to Christiansburg, in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express Inc.,'" the Fifth Circuit developed a formula for deter-
mining the amount of plaintiff awards." This formula was designed to en-
courage vigorous enforcement of Title VII by any aggrieved employee, rich or
poor, by entitling counsel for prevailing private plaintiffs to fair and adequate
compensation for their litigious efforts. 49 It has been widely applied to plaintiff
awards by other courts,'" and it is well supported by the policy underlying
plaintiff awards recognized by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg. 5 ' Following
Christiansburg's enunciation of different theories and standards underlying
plaintiff and defendant awards," however, a split has emerged between two of
the circuit courts as to whether the Georgia Highway Express compensatory stand-
ard should apply equally to prevailing defendants.
In two recent decisions the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressed its view that the Georgia Highway Express criteria should determine the
amount of a prevailing Title VII defendant's attorney's fee award. In Davis v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 53 the plaintiff appealed from a directed verdict for her
former employer in a suit alleging, inter alia, violations of Title VII.' 4 The Fifth
Circuit noted that in appealing only the class action issues without also appeal-
ing the judgment on her individual claim, Davis had ignored clear and well-
established law denying her standing." The court concluded that Davis had
continued to litigate after her claim had become "clearly groundless.""
Accordingly, the defendant, Roadway, was awarded that part of its attorney's
fees which related to the appeal." The court reasoned that Georgia Highway Ex-
press should govern defendants' fee awards, and it instructed Roadway to ad-
" 488 F.2d 714, 7 FEP Cas. 1 (5th Cir. 1974).
48 Id. at 717-19, 7 FEP Cas. at 3-5. The criteria are (1) time and labor required, (2)
novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) skill needed, (4) preclusion of other employment by the
attorney, (5) customary fee, (6) the type of fee — fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations or other
circumstances imposed by the client, (8) amount involved and results obtained, (9) experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) "undesirability" of the case, (11) nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Id.
" Id. at 716, 719-20, 7 FEP Cas. at 2, 5.
'" See, e.g., Foster v. Eloise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 13 FEP Cas. 578 (S.D.
Tex. 1976); Parker v. Mathews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 13 FEP Cas. 595 (D.D.0 1976); Lockheed
Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828, 20 FEP
Gas. 677 (N.D. Cal. 1976). For a more complete list of cases utilizing the Georgia Highway Express
criteria with respect to prevailing plaintiffs, see Heinsz, Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII
Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 259, 265 n.31 (1977).
5 ' See text at note 4 supra.
" See text at notes 4-16 supra.
" 590 F.2d 140, 19 FEP Cas. 243 (5th Cir. 1979).
54 Id. at 141, 19 FEP Cas. at 244.
55 Id. at 143, 19 FEP Cas. at 245. The district court ruled that the complaint was of an
individual nature and that it could not proceed as a class action. 19 FEP Cas. 241, 242 (S.D.
Tex. 1977). Then, at the trial of the individual claim, the district court concluded that the plain-
tiff had failed to establish even a prima facie case of discrimination, and, accordingly, it entered
judgment for the defendant. Id. at 243. On appeal, Davis raised only the class action issues. 590
F.2d at 143, 19 FEP Cas. at 245. The Fifth Circuit ruled that Davis lacked standing to appeal the
class action issues, since she had not appealed the judgment on her individual claim. Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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dress its motion for attorney's fees to the compensatory factors set forth in that
opinion. 58
Three months later, in EEOC v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery," the
Fifth Circuit again demonstrated that it does not read Christiansburg as requir-
ing the adoption of a dual standard for calculating the amount of attorney's fee
awards. The EEOC brought an action under Title VII to compel compliance
with an earlier court order. 6° Noting that the action was based on "nebulous
grounds" and that there was no evidence to sustain plaintiff's theory, 6 ' the
district court granted the defendant bank's motion for summary judgment. 62
In a hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees, held prior to the
Christiansburg decision, the district court ruled that the bank, as the prevailing
party, was entitled to such fees. 63
 Explaining that in its determination of
reasonable attorney's fees a court is not to differentiate between prevailing
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants, 64
 the district court listed the Georgia
Highway Express criteria as governing its calculation of defendant's fee award. 65
On appeal following the Christiansburg decision, the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court's finding of no evidence to support EEOC's claim fit within the
Christiansburg standard of a groundless or unreasonable suit. 66
 More important-
ly for this discussion, the circuit court was willing to affirm the district court's
judgment with respect to the amount of attorney's fees, 67
 notwithstanding the
lower court's reliance on Georgia Highway Express and its assertion that no
distinction should be made between plaintiffs and defendants in this regard.
Unlike its brethren on the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit recently re-
vealed that it would conduct a broader inquiry than that of Georgia Highway Ex-
press when calculating the amount of a prevailing defendant's fee award. Faraci
v. Hickey-Freeman Co., Inc. 68 involved a plaintiff's appeal from the district
court's dismissal of his Title VII action as frivolous and its award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing defendant. 69 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint." It also refused to disturb
the lower court's conclusion that since the action was frivolous and
unreasonable, Christiansburg allowed the award of attorney's fees to the defend-
ants. 7 ' The court then explained that determining a party's eligibility for at-
torney's fees does not end the inquiry; a court also must ascertain the proper
" Id. at 143, 19 FEP Cas. at 246. For a list of the factors set forth in Georgia Highway Ex-
press, see note 48 supra.
s9
	F.2d 1050, 19 FEP Cas. 1747 (5th Cir. 1979).
" EEOC v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 426 F. Supp. 328, 19 FEP Cas. 1744
(M,D. Ala. 1977). The earlier court order was issued in Henderson v. First National Bank of
Montgomery, 360 F. Supp. 531, 6 FEP Cas. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
61 426 F. Supp. at 331, 19 FEP Cas. at 1745.
62 Id.
63 19 FEP Cas, 1746 (M.D. Ala. 1977).
6+ Id.
Id. at 1746.47.
66
 595 F.2d at 1056, 19 FEP Cas. at 1751.
67 Id.
68 607 F.2d 1025, 20 FEP Cas. 1777 (2d Cir. 1979).
69 Id. at 1027, 20 FEP Cas. at 1778-79.
" Id., 20 FEP Cas. at 1779.
Id. at 1028, 20 FEP Cas. at 1780.
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amount of the award. 72 In delineating the factors that should enter into a
district court's calculation, the Second Circuit wrote that the amount should
"first of all, reflect a reasonable compensation for work done, tempered by a
concern for the difficulty of the case and quality of the advocacy." 73 This com-
pensatory criterion fits well within the contours of the Georgia Highway Express
standard, which had been both formulated and extended to defendant awards
by the Fifth Circuit." The Faraci court departed from the Fifth Circuit's
analysis, however, when it included two additional, non-compensatory factors
in the equation — the plaintiffs financial status and his degree of good faith in
prosecuting the action." The court explained that a fee award should both ef-
fectuate the broad legislative purposes of section 706(k) and reflect the equities
in the instant ease." The Second Circuit concluded that Faraci's limited ability
to pay" and his "readily apparent" good faith" warranted a reduction of the
fee award. 79 The court determined that an assessment of $200 would fulfill the
deterrent function 8° of section 706(k) without subjecting the plaintiff to finan-
cial ruin." Accordingly, it remanded the case for the district court to enter an
order reducing the fee award from $2,500 to $200. 82
The approach of the Second Circuit is preferable to that of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, due to its more appropriate reading of the Christiansburg opinion. Both cir-
cuits correctly applied the Christiansburg standard for determining whether the
prevailing defendant could recover attorney's fees. The Second Circuit,
however, was more sensitive to the Supreme Court's policy reconciliation upon
which this standard is based. Christiansburg explained that although plaintiff
awards under section 706(k) are supported exclusively by the policy of en-
couraging vigorous enforcement of civil rights claims," the standards govern-
ing defendant awards must reconcile this enforcement policy with that of deter-
ring groundless claims." The Second Circuit's decision to amend the Georgia
Highway Express standard with respect to prevailing defendants accords well
with the Supreme Court's recognition of the different policy considerations
supporting plaintiff and defendant awards, and it parallels Christiarzsburg's
enuniciation of a separate standard governing defendant awards.
The Fifth Circuit's extension of the Georgia Highway Expresss compensatory
standards to defendant awards fosters one of the policies recognized by the
Christiansburg Court to underlie section 706(k). Plaintiffs certainly will be de-
72 ht,
73
" See text and notes at notes 47-49 & 53-67 supra.
" 607 F.2d at 1028-29, 20 FEP Cas. at 1780.
75 Id.
" The court noted that Faraci's expenses for food, shelter, and medicine consumed
$399 of his $462 monthly income. Id. at 1028, 20 FEP Cas. at 1780.
" Id. at 1029. 20 FEP Cas. at 1780.
79 Id.
The court continually emphasized the "deterrent purpose" of section 706(k), as well
as the "congressional goal of discouraging frivolous litigation." Id. at 1028-29, 20 FEP Cas. at
1780.
81 Id. at 1029, 20 FEP Cas. at 1780.
B2 Id.
" 434 U.S. at 416-17, 420; see text at note 4 supra.
" 4 Id. at 420-22; sec text at notes 8-16 supra.
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(erred from initiating frivolous claims where they face the prospect of the huge
assessments that full reimbursement of their adversaries' expenses entails. To
the extent that employees also are dissuaded from bringing legitimate civil rights
actions, however, the decrease in meritless suits is at the expense of the policy
of vindicating civil rights violations. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's approach may
exact a higher price than is warranted by the Christiansburg Court's implicit ad-
monition against overly broad deterrents."
The Second Circuit's Faraci analysis effectively considers and reconciles
both policies supporting defendant awards under section 706(k). The same fear
of chilling meritorious claims that led the Supreme Court to adopt a stricter
standard than that which applies to plaintiffs for determining when defendants
can be awarded attorney's fees," also supports the Second Circuit's decision to
consider additional factors in its calculation of the amount of defendant awards.
The Faraci analysis, by amending the Georgia Highway Express standard with
respect to defendant awards to include the plaintiff's ability to pay and his
degree of good faith, seems calculated to mitigate the chilling effect of the Fifth
Circuit's approach, while still adequately deterring groundless suits. The court
will assess full fees where possible — that is, where the losing plaintiff can "af-
ford" it." It will set a lesser amount, however, where the compensatory figure
would subject the plaintiff to financial ruin and where the lesser sum is still a
large enough proportion of the plaintiff's disposable income to effectuate the
deterrent purpose of section 706(k). 88 Presumably, the prospect of a heavy debt
burden is less chilling than that of financial ruin. To the same effect is the Faraci
court's second additional criterion of good faith. A positive correlation exists
between a plaintiff's degree of good faith and his ability to ascertain in advance
whether he may be found liable for the attorney's fees of his opponent. 89
Because there is less of a chill where a plaintiff can predict more accurately his
potential liability, the Second Circuit's efforts to tailor the amount of the
defendant's award to the plaintiff's degree of good faith go far towards
mitigating the adverse effects of a purely compensatory standard as applied to
prevailing Title VII defendants.
65 The Supreme Court warned in Christiansburg:
That § 706(k) allows fee awards only to prevailing private plaintiffs should assure
that this statutory provision will not in itself operate as an incentive to the bringing
of claims that have little chance of success. To take the further step of assessing at-
torney's fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would
substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the ef-
forts of Congress to promote the vigorous enfOrcement of the provisions of Title
VII.
Id. at 422 (emphasis in original).
as
	 Christiansburg standard is stricter than that which applies to plaintiff's, in the sense
that it is not enough that a defendant prevail in order to be eligible for attorney's fees. The
defendant must also show that the suit was frivolous or unreasonable. See text and notes at notes
10-14 supra.
" 607 F.2d at 1028, 20 FEP Cas. at 1780. The court reasoned that a wealthy plaintiff
would be deterred from initiating frivolous suits only if the full amount of attorney's fees were
levied against it. ld.
" Id. at 1029, 20 FEP Cas. at 1780.
" Christiansburg contains dictum which recognizes a significant difference between an
unreasonable claim on the one hand, and an unreasonable claim brought in bad faith on the
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For the foregoing reasons, courts which have not yet examined this issue
should be persuaded to adopt Farad's amendments to the purely compensatory
Georgia Highway Express criteria when determining the amount of a prevailing
Title VII defendant's attorney's fee award. In so doing, the lower courts prop-
erly may reconcile the divergent policies implicit in section 706(k) in a manner
consistent with the Supreme Court's Christiansburg analysis.
other. The Court explained that in the latter case there is an even stronger basis for assessing the
defendant's attorney's fees against the plaintiff. 434 U.S. at 422; see note 18 supra. Although the
Court did not detail its reasoning, it seems likely that this dictum was prompted by two con-
siderations. First, a plaintiff is more culpable when he prosecutes in bad faith than when he in-
itiates a suit wrongly believing that it is reasonable. Second, the distinction between suits brought
in bad faith and meritorious claims is greater than the distinction between suits brought in good
faith which are subsequently found to be groundless and meritorious claims. This second con-
sideration supports the contention that there is a positive correlation between the plaintiffs
degree of good faith and his ability to predict his potential liability for the defendant's attorney's
fees.
